Harald Wiese

Premodern Indian perspectives on giving, gifting, and sacrificing

Comparisons aided by economics, marketing, and sociology

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The author is thankful for many helpful hints, by anonymous referees and also by …
Preface

In the Indian social-religious space, the Vedic period roughly dates from the second half of the second millennium BCE up to the year zero while the classical period might be considered to span the common era until the 12th c. or so, always give or take one or even several hundred years. In both periods, a special elite class of people existed that were called Brahmins. Ideally, they did not till the fields nor did they normally engage in a work as cattle herders, artisans or the like. In a rough manner, one might say that their material wellbeing depended on *dakṣinā* in the Vedic period and on *dāna* in the classical one.

Broadening the perspective beyond *dakṣinā* and *dāna*, this book is on all sorts of giving, gifting, sacrificing, rescission, reciprocity, etc. in the context of premodern India, using Vedic, classical Sanskrit, Buddhist and, to a much lesser extent, Roman and Christian sources. The Brahmanical theory of the gift (i.e., the theory of dutiful gifting, *dharmadāna*) is a major focus of, and has provided a major motivation for, this study. I hope that it is a highlight of the book. The author (while writing the book) has observed, and the readers will hopefully be convinced, that and how all these seemingly diverse aspects of giving and taking are interrelated. Such a project cannot take the form of articles, treating this or that aspect in isolation. Instead, the form of a book seems best suited to this endeavour as has already been observed by Trautmann (1981, p. 278).

This book is written on the basis of two methodological decisions. First, it is based on the conviction that generalizations can make sense, over and above the particulars that deserve mention. This does not, of course, mean that all acts of
giving can be subsumed under the Maussian concept of gifts, or not even that Trautmann’s taxonomy is a catch-all in the field of giving and taking. However, I am in general agreement with Segal (2001)’s “Defense of the Comparative Method”. The second general methodological decision concerns the application of modern economic, sociological, and marketing theories to the field at hand.

Articles written by the author in the past have been used while acknowledging self-plagiarism in a sweeping manner. I thank the editors of the … for allowing to quote from these articles.

I have the pleasure to thank many colleagues. First of all, I am indebted to … … .

Harald Wiese Leipzig, September 2019

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2 See chapter XIII.
3 See section II.C.
4 See subsection II.B(2).
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Part One:

Preliminaries

This part contains three chapters. The first one is only for reference. The second chapter is a short introduction to the book. Non-indologists may find chapter III helpful where some background information on premodern Indian concepts (social, theological, and juridical) is provided.
# I. Abbreviations, symbols, figures, and tables

## A. Texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Atharvavedapariśīṭa (Sanderson 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ĀpDh</td>
<td>Āpastamba Dharmasūtra (Olivelle 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BĀU</td>
<td>Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Olivelle 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>Buddha’s birth-stories (Meiland 2009a, 2009b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEN</td>
<td>De beneficiis (Seneca 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BhoB</td>
<td>Bhogasakti Grant B (Vats/Diskalkar 1939-1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BṛSm</td>
<td>Bṛhaspati Smṛti (Aiyangar 1941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Dānakāṇḍa of Lakṣmīdhara (Brick 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKau</td>
<td>Dānakriyākaumūḍī of Govindānanda Kavikaṇkanācāryya (Smṛṭibhūṣaṇa 1903) (cited by page number) bisher nicht??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Dānasāgara of Ballāla Sena (Bhattacharya 1953-1956, Indol Edb 2) bisher nicht??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDh</td>
<td>Gautama Dharmasūtra (Olivelle 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hem</td>
<td>Dānakāṇḍa of Hemādri (cited by page number)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>Hitopadeśa (Törzsök 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAŚ</td>
<td>Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra (Kangle 1969b, Olivelle 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KātSm</td>
<td>Kātyāyana Smṛti (Kane 1933)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS</td>
<td>Kaṭhaka Saṃhitā (Schroeder 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaS</td>
<td>A Sanskrit Dictionary of Law and Statecraft (Olivelle 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>Lekhapaddhati-Lekhapaṅcāśika (Strauch 2002) bisher nicht??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt_L</td>
<td>Evangelium secundum Mattheum (Weber 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt_E</td>
<td>Gospel according to Matthew (United Bible Societies 1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Monier-Williams 1899)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDh</td>
<td>Mānava Dharmaśāstra (Olivelle 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDhC</td>
<td>Mānava Dharmaśāstra with commentaries (Mandlik 1886)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBh</td>
<td>Mahābhārata (Sukthankar 1927-1959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBhDK</td>
<td>Mahābhārata (as cited in DK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MU</td>
<td>Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (Olivelle 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSmV</td>
<td>Nārada Smṛti (Vyavahārapadāni section) (Lariviere 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Pañcatantra (Olivelle 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RgV</td>
<td>Rgveda (Müller 1890-1892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚB</td>
<td>Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (Sāmaśrāmi 1903-1906)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Smṛticandrikā (Benson 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU</td>
<td>Taittirīya Upanisad (Olivelle 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Taittirīya Saṃhitā (Cowell 1866)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJA</td>
<td>Upāsakajanālaṅkāra by Ānanda (Saddhatissa 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCh</td>
<td>Charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa (Wiese/Das 2019, cited by sthīti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VaDh</td>
<td>Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra (Olivelle 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ViDh</td>
<td>Vaiṣṇava Dharmaśāstra (Olivelle 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YSm</td>
<td>Yājñavalkya Smṛti (Olivelle 2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YSmM</td>
<td>Yājñavalkya Smṛti with Mitākṣarā commentary by Vijñānesvara (Moghe 1882) where “YSmM 1.210 (1.212)” refers to the Mitākṣarā commentary on YSm 1.210 as given in Olivelle (2019) that is found at 1.212 in Moghe (1882).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. Transliteration**

I carefully edited the transliteration found in translations or other remarks. For example, I replace Eggeling’s “dakshīnā” by “dakṣiṇā”.
C. Mathematical Symbols

\( B \) \hspace{1cm} \text{benefit}

\( c \) \hspace{1cm} \text{cost}

\( C_i \) \hspace{1cm} \text{private consumption by individual } i

\( \delta \) \hspace{1cm} \text{discount factor}

\( D \) \hspace{1cm} \text{gift (}\text{dāna}\text{) in one-giver models}

\( D \) \hspace{1cm} \text{sum of gifts by all the donors together, } D = \sum_{j=1}^{n} D_j

\( D_i \) \hspace{1cm} \text{gift given by individual } i \text{ in models with several donors}

\( D_{-i} \) \hspace{1cm} \text{sum of gifts by agents other than individual } i

\( D_G \) \hspace{1cm} \text{the donor’s loss from gifting}

\( D_R \) \hspace{1cm} \text{the receiver’s gain from gifting}

\( g \) \hspace{1cm} \text{number of givers}

\( gl \) \hspace{1cm} \text{warm glow}

\( G \) \hspace{1cm} \text{donor, giver}

\( \mu \) \hspace{1cm} \text{merit technology factor}

\( \text{MOC} \) \hspace{1cm} \text{marginal opportunity cost}

\( \text{MRS} \) \hspace{1cm} \text{marginal rate of substitution}

\( n \) \hspace{1cm} \text{number of agents}

\( P \) \hspace{1cm} \text{sin (}\text{pāpa}\text{)}

\( \pi \) \hspace{1cm} \text{probability}

\( Ph \) \hspace{1cm} \text{fruit, result (}\text{phalam}\text{)}

\( r \) \hspace{1cm} \text{number of receivers}

\( R \) \hspace{1cm} \text{receiver}

\( \sigma \) \hspace{1cm} \text{degree of conviction (}\text{śraddhā}\text{)}

\( sh \) \hspace{1cm} \text{shame parameter (for begging)}

\( Sh \) \hspace{1cm} \text{Shapley value}
$t$ transference factor for sin

$tx$ tax rate

$\tau$ probability for trustworthyness

$U$ utility function

$v$ coalition function

$V$ utility function

$W$ wealth, income

$W_i$ wealth or income owned by by individual $i$

## D. Other abbreviations

c. century

CE common era

BCE before the common era

fn. footnote

n.d. not dated ??nicht verwendet??

p. page

pp. pages

← stemming from, going back to

¬ “not” (used in the context of actions in decision or game trees)
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II. Introduction

This introduction sketches some rough ideas about the contents of the book and about the methodologies employed. The latter aspect refers to modern economics on the one hand and to the comparative method on the other hand.

A. **What this book is (not) about**

This booklet is written by an economist who tries to be an indologist at the same time. It focuses on the Indian literature that is concerned with all sorts of giving and taking, in particular

- buying and selling,
- intertemporal buying and selling (debt),
- sacrificing,
- reciprocity,
- gifting in order to earn merit,
- gifting after death (inheritance), ??
- taxation,
- bribery ??
- judicial wagers,
- etc. etc.

Following this introductory chapter, chapter III is primarily meant for people who are not Indologists. They set the stage and provide some orientation.

The second part of the book provides the Indian perspectives on giving and taking in different contexts without, as far as possible, letting modern ideas guide the presentation. It is surely instructive to contrast Indian perspectives with pre-modern Western ideas or theories. In particular, the *beneficium* theory by the
Roman philosopher Seneca can be fruitfully contrasted with the Brahmanical dharmadāna theory. Also, some very selective Christian quotations are provided.

While all these collections have some interest in themselves, they can also be seen as the “data” to be interpreted from modern perspectives. These modern perspectives are prepared in part Three, especially for non-economists. Chapters XI and XII provide introductions to both microeconomics and cooperative game theory. Part Four is then devoted to applying economic, sociological, and marketing theories to the topics expounded in part Two.

Finally, part Five discusses similarities, differences, and interconnections between the givings and takings analyzed in this book.

Of course, while this book tries to address giving and taking in many ways, several topics are left out or dealt with only very cursorily, among them:

- The gift givers in this book are mainly householders or kings. This should not blind us to the fact that Brahmins were also expected to donate (see <6> on p. 28) and that Buddhist monks, i.e., “ascetic, celibate men who were supposed to have renounced all wealth and social ties, left such largess in the archaeological record”.5

- Kauṭilya teaches that dāna is a method a vijigīṣu might successfully employ:6 “Those are the four kinds of strategy. Among them, each preceding one is simpler. Conciliation is singular. Giving gifts is twofold, being preceded by conciliation. Sowing dissention is threefold, being preceded by

5 Schopen (2004, p. 19)
6 KAŚ 9.6.56-61, Olivelle (2013)
conciliation and giving gifts. Military force is fourfold, being preceded by conciliation, giving gifts, and sowing dissention.”

➢ The following “givings” in the context of lawsuits are not covered:
  o court fees (payable by both the unsuccessful and the successful party),
  o pledges (ādhi, valuable objects that serve to fulfil the other party’s claim if that other party is successful),
  o surety (pratibhū, where a person who guarantees that the party that has nominated him fulfils its own obligations, in particular appearance (upasthāna), payment (dāna), and honesty (pratyaya)).

➢ In the private sphere, there are three near-synonyms for deposits: nikṣepa (“open” or “unsealed”), upanidhi (“sealed”), and nyāsa (“secret”), but the usage of these and similar words is quite unstable.

➢ The manners of acquiring wealth are not treated in detail, neither for private agents through trade, husbandry, etc. nor for the ruling class through violence.

In one sense, this book is an engagement with the important work done by Nath (1987), Heim (2004), Brick (2015), and others. Nath (1987)’s books might be described as an effort in dāna-related economic (and social) history. In contrast, Heim, Brick and myself come closer to a history of economic and moral thought.

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7 ViDh 6.20-21, Olivelle (2009)
8 NSmV 1.108-111, KātSm 516-529
9 MDh 8.158, NSmV 1.104-107, KātSm 530-540
10 Lariviere (2003) for this and the following two terms
11 NSmV 1.104. Brśm 1.10.73ab produces a similar list, with four elements.
12 See Sternbach (1945).
13 This is Trautmann’s “noble exchange”. See section XIII.B.
on dāna. It seems to me that we have picked an easier task than the one undertaken by Nath.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{B. Modern perspectives}

\textbf{(1) Trautmann’s challenge}

In attacking the topics mentioned above, I will not able to fully live up to the challenge that Trautmann (1981, p. 278) has thrown up:

The analysis of exchange … holds out the promise of synthesizing large and seemingly disparate sectors of the social order by means of a small number of formal principles that run through the economy, the polity, religion, social organization, and the system of kingship. To expound properly the ancient Indian theory of exchange in the full range of its manifestations would require a book in itself …

Indeed, it is not easy to structure the vast field of giving and taking. The taxonomy proposed by Trautmann (see chapter XIII) is certainly very helpful.

\textbf{(2) Economics, sociology, and marketing}

It turns out that gifting is an interesting phenomenon not only for “historians, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, art historians, ethno-musicologists, psychologists”\textsuperscript{15}, but certainly also from the marketing, the sociological

\textsuperscript{14} In a history of economic and moral thought, one can refer to textual evidence in a more direct manner. Inferring economic history from textual sources is much more demanding and surely a much bolder exercise.

\textsuperscript{15} This list is from the series editors’ foreword in Heim (2004, p. xi) with the addition “and others”.

and the economic point of view. The current author (an economist) may be excused for concentrating on modern economic perspectives on premodern Indian giving and taking. In doing so, he follows the two editors of the “Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity” who argue that “the general concepts and methods of economic analysis can be very helpful for the study of altruism, giving, and reciprocity, provided that the relevant motives, sentiments, and types of relations are adequately considered.”

Thus, the main idea of this book is to present and analyze premodern Indian theories of giving and gifting both in the context of the time they were conceived and from the point of view of modern economics. Of course, this is not a one-way street. While Old and Middle Indian sources on dāna can be analyzed from a theoretical perspective, these texts guide the theoretical questions and provide vital input on how to structure the models proposed.

The task of bringing Indian thought on giving and taking to the attention of people in the “West” is all the more important because Western economic thought has largely and unpardonably neglected Indian economic thought. Consider the famous (among Indologists) Arthaśāstra, a 2000 years old treatise on economics and politics. It is conspicuously absent from major books on the history of economic thought. It is also a pity that Western economic thought has disregarded

\[16\] Kolm (2006, p. 5)
\[17\] Sandmo (2011) has a chapter 2 entitled “Before Adam Smith”. There, he mentions the Old Testament (Joseph in Egypt with the seven fat and the seven lean years), makes a few remarks on Aristotle, before skipping to the scholastics and to mercantilism. Similarly, Rothbard (1995) deals with “The first philosopher-economists: the Greeks” in chapter 1 and then turns to “The Christian Middle Ages” in chapter 2. Again, in his monumental collection of articles written on “economists” from Aristotle (vol. 2) and St Thomas Aquinas (vol. 3) up to
the premodern Indian theories on gifting that are described and prescribed in detail in *dharma* texts. This is also true for the above mentioned Handbook.

**C. Comparison as a method**

(1) **Comparisons all over**

I already mentioned this book’s main aim: it endeavours to shed new light on all sorts of giving, gifting, sacrificing, reciprocity, etc. in the context (but see below) of premodern India. On the other hand, it is an application and a “test” of the comparative methodology recently put forward by Oliver Freiberger.

When discussing gifts (?) or fees (?) or social exchanges (?), comparisons come about in different guises. First, one cannot help but resorting to comparisons. Indeed, comparisons seem to lie at the very heart of human understanding of all sorts.¹⁸ Comparisons are already implicit in innocuously seeming designations, for example the German term (and misnomer) “Walfisch” (whale). Similarly, is a *kanyadāna* (the gifting of a bride to a groom by the bride’s father) a specific *dharmadāna*?

Second, the specific words itself are often a matter of (heated) debate. Consider these examples:

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¹⁸ See, for example, the sweeping and still true observation by Griffiths (2017, p. 473): “As humanist scholars, we use comparison all the time.”
All sorts of connotations are evoked by Marcel Mauss who claims that “exchanges and contracts are made in the form of a gift, in theory voluntary, in reality obligatorily given and received”\(^\text{19}\). What does this imply for dharmic gifts?

Heesterman (1959, p. 242) considers the Vedic \textit{dakṣīṇā} a gift rather than a salary while others contradict.

Third, comparisons are made for ideological reasons. According to Manu,

\begin{verbatim}
śraddhayeṣṭaṁ ca pūrtam ca nityaṁ kuryāt prayatnataḥ | 
śraddhākṛte hy aksaye te bhavataḥ svāgatair dhanaś has ||20
\end{verbatim}

One should as a matter of routine obligation painstakingly offer sacrifices and donate gifts with a spirit of generosity, for these two things, when performed with a spirit of generosity and with well-acquired wealth, become imperishable.\(^\text{21}\)

In this manner, Manu might have tried to put Vedic credibility on gifts received by Brahmins in a much later period and for quite different reasons. A modern example is provided by Bloomfield (1908, p. 69) who irreverently translates Vedic \textit{dakṣīṇā} by “baksheesh”. Thus, both Manu and Bloomfield have an “agenda”.

Fourth, comparisons are involved when applying modern perspectives from sociology or economics to various givings and takings. If done carefully, one may

\(^\text{19}\) Mauss and Maurer (2016, p. 57)
\(^\text{20}\) MDh 4.226 as quoted in DK 1.39. MDh 4.226 differs slightly.
\(^\text{21}\) Brick (2015)
discover differences and commonalities not obvious to the unsuspecting consumer of words, ill-deceived comparisons, or ideologies. This indeed is the main purpose of the current book.

(2) **Freiberger’s twofold classifications**

Turning to comparative methodology, Freiberger (2018) has recently proposed manners of classifying (i) the configuration of comparative studies and (ii) the comparative process.\(^{22}\) It turns out that twofold classifications are fruitful for creating some methodological awareness of what is “going on” in comparative studies like the present one.

Turning to the Freiberger’s first item in his configuration, the author insists that “responsible scholars”\(^ {23}\) should explain the “goals of comparison”\(^ {24}\), i.e., the discipline it originates from, the scholarly discourse it is embedded in, the intended audience, and the like. The current study originates from (at least) the four disciplines of indology, sociology, marketing, and economy and should be of interest to scholars in these fields. Since the author is an economist (who tries to be an indologist at the same time), he is particularly interested in advancing his main thesis: Premodern Indian theories of giving and gifting can be fruitfully described, classified, and analyzed\(^ {25}\) from the point of view of modern economics.

\(^{22}\) See also the book-length treatment Freiberger (2019), in particular chapter 4. For the purpose of this article, Freiberger’s concise paper is sufficient.

\(^{23}\) Freiberger (2018, p. 3)

\(^{24}\) Freiberger (2018, pp. 3–4)

\(^{25}\) Freiberger (2018, p. 4) stresses description and classification as (modest) goals and has “theory formation” as one (the final) step in the comparative process.
Freiberger calls his second item of configuration “modes of comparison”. He contrasts the “illuminative mode” with the “taxonomic mode”. The former is asymmetric in that it uses the illuminating item mainly for that purpose, but without describing it as detailed as the illuminated one. In contrast, the taxonomic mode is symmetric in describing two or several items that shed light on each other in similar detail. This book is basically written in the taxonomic mode, with a few exceptions.  

Third comes the “scales of comparison”. Here one is concerned with how a comparative study “zooms in on the comparands”. The comparants of this article are Vedic texts, classical Sanskrit texts, Buddhist texts, a Senecan (Roman) text, and, to a much lesser extent, Christian sources on giving and taking. It seems that I cover them on a meso level (rather than a micro or a macro one). That is, very detailed studies of particular giftings (micro level) are rare as are very sweeping generalizations about the character or essence of Brahmanical versus Buddhist versus Christian giving (that might be an endeavour on the macro level).

Finally, Freiberger’s “scopes of comparisons”. My study is cross-cultural with respect to the comparison of dharmic giving with Christian charity. Here we have an example of analogical comparison (without any historical link). The main part of the study seems contextual in focusing on premodern India. However, it should be a matter of dispute whether the comparison of Vedic sacrifices

\[ \text{Christian sources are added mainly for illuminating purposes but do not benefit from a detailed discussion.} \]

\[ \text{Freiberger (2018, pp. 5–6)} \]
with dharmic giving is contextual. Do allusions in the dānadharma literature to Vedic sacrifices amount to more than lipservice?

Leaving the configuration of a comparative study, I turn to some items of the comparative process scetched by Freiberger (2018, pp. 8–11). In the general field of giving and taking (and with a view to Marcel Mauss), one obvious “tertium comparationis” might be “reciprocity”. However, in a complex study, there is no need to select a single tertium comparationis. It turns out that other candidates prove also useful: “thisworldly or otherworldly motives for giving”, “altruism” and the like. Also, patterns of giving may also provide tertia comparationis.

Leaving the “selection” step of the comparative process, Freiberger (2018, p. 9)’s remarks on the “description” step are helpful, in particular the “local significance”28 or “emic conceptualization”. Indeed, the premodern Indian evidence reflects the emic conceptualization while the above mentioned modern perspective on the premodern perspective is “etic”. I take up the emic perspective in part Two, while trying my hand at the etic one in part Four. The emic part need not be totally unoriginal. Sometimes, difficult translation issues arise.29

The third step is called “redescription”. It is hoped that the current study rises up to the ideal that Freiberger (2018, p. 10) describes in these words: “Studying an item through the lens of a different one, observing previously unnoticed features, discovering blind spots, etc. may result in a new description of the item that is more comprehensive or more refined.” In that manner, the comparison of

29 See sections V.B and VI.L.
economic exchange, sacrifices, and dharmic giving may amount to a process of reciprocal illumination to cite the subtitle of a book by Sharma (2005a).

I make use of Freiberger’s work several times and revisit it in the conclusions.

III. Setting the stage

For the purpose of future reference and for putting up some orientation marks, this chapter gathers some important aspects of pre-modern Indian cosmology, social system, and law.

A. The four aims

(1) **Artha**

*Artha* is concerned with the achievement of worldly aims, in particular wealth and power. From a modern perspective, the *artha* realm is economics and politics. It is characterized by cold-blooded calculations.\(^{30}\)

(2) **Kāma**

*Kāma* means pleasure or love. The best-known part of the literature on *kāma* deals with courting and love-making. Related are treatises on poetics and acting.

(3) **Dharma**

*Dharma* is about religious duties or moral obligations. A peculiarity of the Indian thought on *dharma* is the insistence on class-related duties. There is a considerable overlap between *artha* and *dharma*.

\(^{30}\) See Wiese (2012a).
(4) **Mokṣā**

*Mokṣā* lies at the center of Hindu theology. Roughly speaking, souls reside in humans (or animals or gods). The acts (*karma*) undertaken during a lifetime influence this human’s (or animal’s or god’s) concrete form in the next life. The major aim (*paramārtha*) is to be released from the cycle of births.

**B. Old-Indian Texts**

(1) **Vedic texts, up to the Upaniṣads**

By way of a very brief survey, we mention major strands of the literature to be encountered in this book. First come the Vedic texts, the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā (second half of second millennium BCE) and the Taittirīya Saṃhitā from the black Yajurveda (somewhat later, but before 1000 BCE). Second, the late-Vedic pre-classic literature, such as the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads. Among the latter, we count the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (7th to 6th century BCE) or the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (6th to 5th c. BCE). The following table is adapted and simplified from Olivelle (1998, p. 10) and shows how these literatures “fit” together.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundational text</th>
<th>Ṛgveda</th>
<th>Yajurveda black and white</th>
<th>Sāmaveda</th>
<th>Atharvaveda S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ṛgveda Saṃhitā</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taittirīya S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vājasaneyi S. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

32 This Upaniṣad chronology is due to Olivelle (1998, p. 12).
Table 1: The Vedic Branches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brāhmaṇa</th>
<th>Aitareya Br.</th>
<th>Taittirīya Br.</th>
<th>Śatapatha Br.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Āraṇyaka</td>
<td>Aitareya Ā.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Ā.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) **Dharma and artha texts**

The four aims (see previous section) are relatively unimportant for the Vedic period. Many classical texts can be put into one of the four aim categories. *Dharma* texts are of special importance for this book. Within the *dharma* literature, consider the texts ascribed to

- Āpastamba (late 3rd c. B.C.E.),
- Gautama (late 2nd c. B.C.E.),
- Baudhāyana (early 1st c. B.C.E.),
- Vasiṣṭha (late 1st c. B.C.E.),
- Manu (mid 2nd c. C.E.),
- Yājñavalkya (early 5th c. CE),
- Nārada (5th to 6th c. C.E.),

---

33 I use *dharma* texts where one may differentiate between *dharmasūtras* (typically with short aphorisms) and *dharmasāstras* (which tend to be more explicit). The dating follows Olivelle (2000, 2017, 2019), Olivelle (2005), Brick (2015, p. 8), and Benson (2010, p. 16).
• Viṣṇu (7th c.).
• Lakṣmīdhara (12th c.) and
• Mahādeva Vedāntin (17th c.)

One should note that these texts would build on predecessors most of which are not extant any more. Thus, we need to be careful not to draw far-reaching conclusions of when a specific rule has been applied or proposed for the first time.

One might classify dharma topics in this manner:

- ācāra (proper conduct)/samskāra (sacraments, mainly for twice-born, concerning birth, schooling, marriage, reverence to manes and others)
- rājadharma (laws for kings)/vyavahāra (laws for settling disputes)
- prāyaścitta (penance, expiation, purification)

Related to the rājadharma texts, an author with the name Kauṭilya has written a manual on kingship, perhaps between 50 and 125 C.E.34. This textbook is known as the Arthaśāstra, i.e., teaching (śāstra) on artha (“purpose, wealth, power”, see previous section). Arthaśāstra can be translated as “teachings on political economy”. The achievement of aims (artha) was also the content matter of the fable collections like the Pancatantra and the Hitopadeśa. Among other matters, readers are told how to win friends or how sow mistrust between friends, on how to cheat others or how to prevent being cheated.

34 See Olivelle (2013, p. 29)
(3) *Dānadharma texts*

A special focus of this book are the “Brahmanical Theories of the Gift”, citing the title of Brick’s (2015) critical edition and translation of the Dānakāṇḍa (DK) of Lakṣmīdhara’s *nibandha* (“anthology”) Kṛtyakalpataru. Buddhist Theories take a back seat, but are still covered extensively. I make heavy use of the Upāsakajanālāṅkāra by Ānanda who seems to have lived in the 12th c. CE.

**C. The four ages**

Old Indian cosmology (here according to Manu) is based on the idea of an eternal cycle of what is called “Age of the gods” (*devānāṃ yugam*). Within each of these, four ages (*yugas*) take turns:

<2>

The Kṛta Age is said to last 4,000 years. It is preceded by a twilight lasting 400 years and followed by a twilight of the same length. For each of the three subsequent Ages, as also for the twilights that precede and follow them, the first number of the thousands and the hundreds is progressively diminished by one. These four Ages, computed at the very beginning as lasting 12,000 years, are said to constitute a single Age of the gods. The sum total of 1,000 divine Ages should be regarded a a single day of Brahmā, and his night as having the very same duration.

Thus, the 12,000 years are the sum of

| 35 | See Brick (2015, pp. 3–21) for more information on the 12th century *Dānakāṇḍa*. |
| 37 | MDh 1.71, translation by Olivelle (2005) |
| 38 | MDh 1.69-72, translation by Olivelle (2005) |
4,000 + 2 \cdot 400 \text{ (Kṛta Age)}
+3,000 + 2 \cdot 300 \text{ (Tretā Age)}
+2,000 + 2 \cdot 200 \text{ (Dvāpara Age)}
+1,000 + 2 \cdot 100 \text{ (Kali Age)}

The names of the Ages are drawn from the following Manu citation where, apparently, the moral and other states of affairs are slowly deteriorating:

\begin{quote}
\textless 3\textgreater 
\begin{align*}
\text{cātuṣpāt sakalo dharmah satyam caiva kṛte yuge |} \\
\text{nādharmenaṅgamaḥ kaścin manuṣyān upavartate ||} \\
\text{itaresvāgamād dharmah pādaśas tvavaropitaḥ |} \\
\text{caurikānṛtādhyābhir dharmaś cāpaiti pādaśaḥ ||} \\
\text{arogāḥ sarvasiddhārthāś caturvarṣaśatāyuṣaḥ |} \\
\text{kṛte tretādiṣu tveṣāṁ vayo hrasati pādaśaḥ ||} \\
\text{[…]} \\
\text{anye kṛtayuge dharmas tretāyāṁ dvāpare 'pare |} \\
\text{anye kaliyuge nṛṇaṁ yugahṛśānurūpataḥ ||} \\
\text{tapah paraṁ kṛtayuge tretāyāṁ jñānam ucyate |} \\
\text{dvāpare yajñam evāhur dānam ekaṁ kalau yuge ||}^{39}
\end{align*}
\end{quote}

In the Kṛta Age, the Law is whole, possessing all four feet; and so is truth. People never acquire any property through unlawful means. By acquiring such property, however, the Law is stripped of one foot in each of the subsequent Ages; through theft, falsehood, and fraud, the Law disappears a foot at a time. In the Kṛta Age, people are free from sickness, succeed in all their pursuits, and have a life span of 400 years. In the Tretā and each of the subsequent Ages, however, their life span

\begin{flushright}
39 MDh 1.81-83, 85-86
\end{flushright}
is shortened by a quarter. […] There is one set of Laws for men in the Kṛta Age, another in the Tretā, still another in the Dvāpara, and a different set in the Kali, in keeping with the progressive shortening taking place in each Age. Ascetic toil, they say, is supreme in the Kṛta Age; knowledge in the Tretā; sacrifice in Dvāpara; and gift-giving alone in Kali.\textsuperscript{40}

Very interestingly, gift-giving is a characteristic of the worst yuga, the contemporaneous Age from the writers’ point of view.

### D. The four classes

In premodern India, the priests were recruited from the first class or first varṇa. Very famous is the puruṣa hymn from the Ṛgveda (second half of second millennium BCE)\textsuperscript{41}:

\begin{verbatim}
<4>    yát púruṣaṁ vyádadhum katidhā vyákalpayan |
        múkhaṁ kíṃ asya káu báhú ká úru pádá ucyete ||
bráhmaṇo 'ṣyā mÚkham áśīd báhú rájanyáḥ kṛtáḥ |
    úru tád asya yád vaiśyāh padbhyaṁ śúdró ajāyata ||
\end{verbatim}

When they apportioned the Man, into how many parts did they arrange him?
What was his mouth? What his two arms? What are said to be his two thighs, his two feet?
The brahmin was his mouth. The ruler was made his two arms. As to

\textsuperscript{40} Olivelle (2005)
\textsuperscript{41} Jamison and Brereton (2014, p. 5)
\textsuperscript{42} ṚgV 10.90.11-12
his thighs—that is what the freeman was. From his two feet the servant was born.\textsuperscript{43}

In Sanskrit, these four classes are called \textit{brāhmaṇa} (Brahmin), \textit{rājanya} (ruler), \textit{vaiśya} (freeman), and \textit{śudra} (servant) in the Ṛgveda. Within a passage on creation, the Mānava Dharmaśāstra (mid-second century C.E.), echoes the Ṛgveda, but employs the word \textit{kṣatriya} for the second class.\textsuperscript{44}

The rank order\textsuperscript{45} hinted at in the Ṛgveda is elaborated in a different manner by Manu:

\begin{verbatim}
<5> bhūtānāṁ prāṇināṁ śreṣṭhāṁ prāṇināṁ buddhijīvinaṁ ||
buddhimatsu narāḥ śreṣṭhā naresu brāhmaṇāḥ smṛtāḥ ||
brāhmaṇeṣu ca vidvāṁso vidvatsu kṛtabuddhayaḥ ||
kṛtabuddhiṣu kartāraḥ kartṛṣu brahmavādināḥ ||\textsuperscript{46}
\end{verbatim}

Among creatures, living beings are the best; among living beings, those who subsist by intelligence\textsuperscript{47}; among those who subsist by intelligence, human beings; and among human beings, Brahmins—so the tradition declares. Among Brahmins, the learned are the best; among the

\begin{verbatim}
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{43} Jamison and Brereton (2014)
\textsuperscript{44} MDh 1.31
\textsuperscript{45} Taking the Indian case as a starting point, Dumont (1980) analyzes hierarchy and considers man as “homo hierarchicus”. The interested reader may in particular read Dumont (1980, pp. 65–91).
\textsuperscript{46} MDh 1.96–97
\textsuperscript{47} According to Olivelle (2005, p. 242), “higher animals, such as dogs and jackals, who know to take shelter when it rains and to go after food and water” are meant.
learned, those who have made the resolve\textsuperscript{48}; among those who have made the resolve, the doers; and among the doers, the Vedic savants.\textsuperscript{49}

In order to get some concrete ideas, how the four classes differ in society, see, for example, Āpastamba’s allocation of classes to occupations:

\textsuperscript{6}svakarma brāhmaṇasyādhyayanam adhyāpanaṁ yajño yājanaṁ dānaṁ pratigrahaṇaṁ dāyādyam śiloñchaḥ \textsuperscript{5}anyac cāparigrītītam etāny eva kṣatriyasyādhyāpanayājanapratigrahaṇānīti parihāpya daṇḍayuddhādhikānī \textsuperscript{7}kṣatriyavad vaiśasya daṇḍayuddhavarjaṁ krśig-oraksyavānijyādhikam\textsuperscript{50}

The occupations specific to a Brahmin are

<\textit{a}> studying,

<\textit{b}> teaching [the Vedas, HW],

<\textit{c}> sacrificing,

<\textit{d}> officiating at sacrifices,

<\textit{e}> giving gifts,

<\textit{f}> receiving gifts,

<\textit{g}> inheriting, and gleaning, as well as

<\textit{h}> appropriating things that do not belong to anybody.

The occupations specific to a Kṣatriya are the same, with the exception of

<\textit{i}> teaching,

<\textit{j}> officiating at sacrifices, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{48} See Olivelle (2005, p. 242).
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Olivelle (2005)
  \item \textsuperscript{50} ĀpDh 2.10.4-7. Similarly elsewhere, for example KAŚ 1.3.5-7.
\end{itemize}
receiving gifts, and the addition of
meting out punishment and warfare.

The occupations specific to a Vaiśya are the same as those of a Kṣatriya, with the exception of
meting out punishment and warfare, and the addition of
agriculture, cattle herding, and trade.\(^{51}\)

The kinds of wealth that different classes can acquire according to \(\text{Nārada}\) is (somewhat) in line with these occupations:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{vaiśeśikāṃ dhanāṃ jñeyaṃ brāhmaṇasya trilakṣaṇam} & | \\
pratigrahena yal labdhāṃ yājyuṣṭaḥ śiṣyataś tathā & || \\
\text{trividhāṃ kṣatriyasyāpi prāhur vaiśeśikaṃ dhanam} & | \\
yuddhopalabdham kāraś ca daṇḍaś ca vyavahārataḥ & || \\
vaiśeśikaṃ dhanāṃ jñeyaṃ vaiśyasyāpi trilakṣaṇam & | \\
kṛṣigorakṣāṇijyaiḥ śūdrasyaibhyas tv anugrahāt & ||^{52}
\end{align*}\]

There are three kinds of wealth particular to a brāhmaṇa: that which is obtained by acceptance of gifts, from sacrificers, and from students.

There are three kinds of wealth particular to a kṣatriya: that acquired in wars, royal revenues, and fines from court cases. There are three kinds of wealth particular to a vaiṣya: agriculture, animal husbandry, and commerce. A śūdra’s wealth comes from whatever the three higher classes are willing to give him.\(^{53}\)

\(^{51}\) Olivelle (2000) (where the markers \(<a>\) etc. are added by the current author)
\(^{52}\) NSmV 1.48-50
\(^{53}\) Lariviere (2003)
Trautmann (1981, p. 285) discusses the conflict arising between spiritual and worldly power, between brahmins and king: “The conundrum may be formulated thus: in respect to the king, is the brahmin his superior or his dependent? The question is addressed in every age, […]”

E. The āśrama system

(1) The early period

Olivelle (1993) is a ground-breaking book on the āśrama system. He summarizes the original meaning of āśrama in the following words:54

(1) It referred to the place and by extension the life of exceptional Brahmins.
(2) The life of these Brahmins centered around the maintenance of and the offering of oblations in the sacred fire. They are also depicted as performing tapas (“austerities”) […].
(3) They were married and had children. The presence of a wife […] is absolutely necessary for the performance of the fire sacrifice.
(4) They lived apart from normal society, even though it is not altogether certain whether the āśramas were always located in the wilderness.

Olivelle distinguishes the “early period” from the classical one. In both āśrama theories, a male Brahmin would typically study the Vedas in a guru’s house. In the early period, he would then have the choice of taking up one and only one āśrama for the rest of his life: householder, forest hermit, or renouncer. Gautama hints at this theory with these words:

54 Olivelle (1993, p. 24)
tasyāśramavikalpam eke bruvate |
brahmacārī grhastho bhikṣur vaikhānasah |
teṣām grhastho yonir aprajanatvād itareṣām

He has a choice, some assert, among the orders of life: student, householder, mendicant, or anchorite. The householder is the source, because the others do not produce offspring.

As argued by Olivelle (1993, pp. 83–86), Gautama finally argues for “a single order of life” (ekāśramya) and thus turns against this option (vikalpa) theory by pointing to the authority of the Vedas in this matter (G Dh 3.36).

(2) The classical period

In the classical period, the āśrama system envisions life stages: studying, acting as a householder with wife and children, becoming a hermit and a renouncer, in that order. The following quote by Yājñavalkya clearly refers to the classical formulation:

grhād vanād vā kṛtvēṣṭim sarvavedasadakṣiṇām |
prājāpatyām tadante tān agnīn āropya cātmānī ||
adhitavedo japakṛt putravān annado ’gnimān |
śaktyā ca yajñakṛn mokṣe manāh kuryāt tu nānyathā ||

From either home or forest—after making a sacrifice to Prajapati at which all his possessions are given as sacrificial gifts and at its conclusion depositing the fires in his self;

55 G Dh 3.1-3
56 Olivelle (2000)
57 G Dh 3.36, Olivelle (2000)
58 Y Sm 3.56-57
after studying the Veda, engaging in soft recitation, begetting sons, donating food, maintaining the sacred fires, and performing sacrifices according to his ability—he should set his mind on renunciation, not otherwise.\(^{59}\)

Or consider Manu:

\(^{10}\)  
\begin{align*}
\text{vedāṇ adhiṣṭya vedau vā vedam vāpi yathākramam} & | \\
\text{aviplutabrahmacaryo grasthāśramaṃ āvaset} & |^{60}
\end{align*}

After he has learnt in the proper order the three Vedas or two of them, or at least one, without violating his chastity, he should undertake the householder’s order of life.\(^{61}\)

The theology of the triple debts supplies an argument for fulfilling the obligations of studentship and marriage before a man might consider becoming a renouncer:

\(^{11}\)  
\begin{align*}
\text{ṛṇāni trīṇyapākṛtya mano mokṣe niveśayet} & | \\
\text{anapākṛtya mokṣaṃ tu sevamāno vrajaty adhāḥ} & ||
\end{align*}

adhiṣṭya vidhivad vedāṇ putrāṃ cotpādyā dharmataḥ |

\begin{align*}
\text{iṣṭvā ca śaktito yajñair mano mokṣe niveśayet} & || \\
\text{anadhīṣṭya dvijo vedān anuptādyā tathātmajān} & |
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{anīṣṭvā caiva yajñaiś ca mokṣam icchan vrajaty adhāḥ} & ||^{62}
\end{align*}

Only after he has paid his three debts, should a man set his mind on renunciation; if he devotes himself to renunciation without paying

\(^{59}\) Olivelle (2019)  
\(^{60}\) MDh 3.2  
\(^{61}\) Olivelle (2005)  
\(^{62}\) MDh 6.35-37
them, he will proceed downward. Only after he has studied the Vedas according to rule, fathered sons in keeping with the Law, and offered sacrifices according to his ability, should a man set his mind on renunciation; if a twice-born seeks renunciation without studying the Vedas, without fathering sons, and without offering sacrifices, he will proceed downward.\textsuperscript{63}

Here, the theology of the three debts to the seers (studying the Vedas), to his forefathers (fathering a son), and gods (offering sacrifices) is clearly alluded to.

\section*{F. Grounds for litigation}

Manu enumerates 18 grounds for litigation:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{teṣām ādyam ṛṇādānaṃ nikṣepo 'svāmivikrayaḥ |
saṃbhūya ca samutthānaṃ dattasyānapakarma ca ||}
\item \textit{vetanasyaiva cādānaṃ saṃvidaś ca vyatikramaḥ |
krayavikrayānuśayo vivādaḥ svāmipālayoḥ ||}
\item \textit{sīmāvivādadharmaś ca pāruṣye daṇḍavācike |
steyamaṃ ca sāhasaṃ caiva strīsaṃgrahaṇam eva ca ||}
\item \textit{stripumdharmo vibhāgaś ca dyūtam āhvaya eva |
etāny aṣṭādaśaitāni vyavahārasthitāv iha ||\textsuperscript{64}}
\end{itemize}

Of these,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{the first is non-payment of debts;}
\item \textit{deposits;}
\item \textit{sale without ownership;}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{63} Olivelle (2005)
\textsuperscript{64} MDh 8.4-7
partnerships;
non-delivery of gifts;
non-payment of wages;
breach of contract;
cancellation of a sale or purchase;
disputes between owners and herdsmen;
the Law on boundary disputes;
verbal assault;
physical assault;
theft;
vIOlence;
sexual crimes against women;
Law concerning husband and wife;
partition of inheritance; and
gambling and betting.
These are the eighteen grounds on which litigation may be instituted in this world.\textsuperscript{65}

Generally speaking, contracts had to be fulfilled. In case of norm conflicts, the following rule (from \textit{Nārada}) is evoked:
\begin{verbatim}
<13> kriyarṇādiṣu sarveṣu balavaty uttarottarā |
pratigrahādhikrīṭeṣu pūrvā pūrvā garīyasī ||\textsuperscript{66}
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{65} Olivelle (2005) (where the markers \textit{<a>} etc. replace the (i) markers set by the translator)
\textsuperscript{66} NSm\textsuperscript{V} 1.85
In all matters such as debt, etc. the last action is more binding than any preceding one. In the case of gifts, deposits, or purchases, the first action is more binding than any later one.67

A similar verse is YSm 2.23. Lariviere (2003, p. 301) explains: “The point of this verse is that the status of transactions which fall under the eighteen titles of law is determined by the last event in the sequence of the transaction. That is, the repayment of the loan (which, obviously, comes after the making of the loan in the first place) is the binding act since it eliminates the original debt. Exceptions to this are matters such as gifts, deposits, or purchases, where the first person to have accepted a gift, or to have accepted a deposit, or to have made a purchase is the one who has the claim to that item.”

67 Lariviere (2003)
Part Two:

Indian (and other emic) perspectives on giving and taking

Premodern Indian, Roman, and Christian perspectives are presented. These are emic concepts, part of the “description” in Freiberger’s comparative process (subsection II.C(2)). The quotations also serve to provide future reference. The longest chapter is on dharmic giving.
IV. Vedic perspectives

The Vedic texts on giving and taking concentrate on sacrifices and the *daksīṇā* (fee?) obtained by officiating priests. We will also mention teaching and rituals, both Vedic and post-Vedic.

A. Reciprocity in Vedic sacrifices

The Vedic sacrifice was grounded on reciprocity as the locus classicus, found in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā, shows:

<14> \[ \text{pūrṇā darvi pārāpata} \]
\[ \text{sūpūrṇā pūnar āpata} \]
\[ \text{vasnēva vikṛṇāvahā} \]
\[ \text{īṣam ūrjam śatakrate} \]
\[ \text{dehi me dādāmi te} \]
\[ \text{ni me dhēhi ni te dadhe} \]
\[ \text{nihāraṃ innē me} \]
\[ \text{harā nihāraṃ} \]

O ladle, fly away filled,
And well filled do thou fly back;
Like wares, O Śatakraτu,
Let us barter food and strength.
Give thou to me; I shall give to thee;
Bestow upon me; I shall bestow upon thee;

68 TS I.8.4.1
Accept my offering; 
I shall accept thy offering.\(^{69}\)

A commentator, Mādhava Āchārya, expounds:

<15> \(he\) darvi tvāṃ śaraniḍkāsena pūrṇa satī purāpata indraṃ pratigaccha 
tatprasādād dhanena tajjanyabalena supūrṇā satī punar asmān
pratyāgaccha | he śatakrato āvāṃ vasneva vikrīṇāvahai yathā loke
kaścit svakīyaṃ dhanaṃ dattvā tāṇḍulaḍikam krīṇāti tadvad aham in-
drāya tubhyāṃ śaraniṣkāsaṃ dattvā tvatta iṣam ūrjam ca krīṇāmi \(^{70}\)

O ladle, being filled with the disappearing cream, fly away, go towards
Indra. Being well filled again by wealth through his favour, return to us
by the power produced by him. O Śatakratu, let us two barter as (one
barters about) prices. As someone gives his own wealth in this world
and buys grain etc., in that same manner I give disappearing cream to
you, Indra, and buy food and strength.

The relationship was perceived as durable:

<16> asmāṁ avaṃtu te śatām asmānt sahaśram iṣṭāyaḥ  |
asmān viśvā abhiṣṭayaḥ ||
asmāṁ ihā vrṇīṣva sakhyāya svastāye |
mahō rāyē divitmate ||\(^{71}\)

Let your hundred means of help help us, us your thousand, us all your
superior powers.

\(^{69}\) Keith (1967) 
\(^{70}\) TS I.8.4.1 
\(^{71}\) ṚgV 4.31.10-11
Choose us here for comradeship, for well-being, for great, heavenly wealth.72

The dependence goes both ways as is seen from the following hymn for Indra:

<17> ná soma imdram ásuto mamāda nābrahmāṇo maghávānaṁ sutāsah |
tásmā ukthāṁ janaye yáj jújośan nṛvān návīyah śrṇāvad yáthā nah ||73

Soma, unpressed, does not exhilarate Indra, nor do pressings unaccompanied by sacred formulations (exhilarate) the bounteous one. For him I beget a hymn that he will enjoy, a newer manly one, so that he will listen to us.74

Oberlies (1998, p. 273) argues that the necessary pressing alleviates the asymmetric relationship between Indra and the humans.

One expression of the Vedic reciprocity is the water cycle analyzed by Wilden (2000) and hinted at in theṚgveda:

<18> samānám etád udakám úc caityáva cāhabiḥ |

bhūnim parjányā jinvanti dīvam jinvantyagnáyāḥ ||75

This water remains the same: it goes up and down throughout the days. Thunderstorms vivify the earth, and fires vivify heaven.76

The middle Vedic Kaṭhaka Saṃhitā expresses the water cycle in this manner:

72 Jamison and Brereton (2014)
73 ṚgV 7.26.1
74 Jamison and Brereton (2014)
75 ṚgV 1.164.51
76 Jamison and Brereton (2014)
42

<19> yā vā āhutir udayate sāmuto vrṣṭim cyāvayati. svayaivāhutyā divo vrṣṭim ninayati. 77

The libation that goes up from here makes the rain move from there.
With his own libation, he leads rain down from heaven. 78

**B. Vedic hospitality**

In Vedic times, hospitality towards strangers seems to have been one way of gifting. Only worthy guests should be honoured:

<20> pāśaṇḍino vikarmasthān baiḍālavratikāṇ chathān |
haitukān bakavrttiīṁś ca vānmātrenāpi nārcayet 79

He must never honor the following even with a word of welcome: ascetics of heretical sects; individuals engaging in improper activities, observing the “cat vow,” or following the way of herons; hypocrites; and sophists. 80

**C. Vedic dakṣiṇā**

A dakṣiṇā is something like a fee for priests who perform sacrifices. Consider a few verses from this dakṣiṇā hymn. The first one hints at an identification of the sacrifice (to gods) with the dakṣiṇā (to the priests):

<21> 3daīvī pūrtīr dākṣiṇā devayajyā nā kavāribhyo nahi tē prṇāṃti |
áthā nāraḥ práyatadaṅkaṇāso ’vadyabhiyā bahāvah prṇāṃti ||

77 KS 25.5
78 After Wilden (2000, p. 132).
79 MDh 4.30
80 Olivelle (2005)
The priestly gift (daśīṇa) is the divine bestowal, a sacrificial offering to the gods (devayajyā); it is not for the stingy, for they do not bestow. The priestly gift gives the horse; the priestly gift the cow; the priestly gift the lustrous and what is golden. The priestly gift wins the food that is our very lifebreath. He who understands makes the priestly gift his armor.

The benefactors (bhūja) have not died, nor have they gone to a failed end; the benefactors are not harmed, nor do they falter. What is this whole world and the sun, all this does the priestly gift give to them.

A sacrifice without daśīṇa is likewise considered unimaginable by Kṛṣṇa in the Gītā:

<22> vidhihīnam asṛṣṭānnaṃ mantrahīnaṃ adakṣiṇam |
śraddhāvirahitaṃ yajñaṃ tāmasaṃ paricakṣate ||

---

81 ṚgV 10.107.3, 7-8
82 Jamison and Brereton (2014)
83 MBh 6.39.13
And a sacrifice where the rules are ignored and there is no food distributed, no fees paid, no mantras, and no faith, is heavy with *tamas*, they say.\(^{84}\)

Somewhat irreverently, in the following “charming little hymn”\(^{85}\) the wish to obtain the *dakṣiṇā* seems similar to the hope for good business of carpenters and the like:

\begin{verbatim}
<nānānāṁ vā u no dhīyo vi vratāni jānānām |
tākṣā riṣṭhāṁ rutāṁ bhiṣāg brahmā sunvāntam icchatindrāyendo pāri srava ||\(^86\)
\end{verbatim}

Truly our thoughts are various, and the business matters of peoples are different:
a carpenter seeks the damage, a healer the break, a priest a man who presses soma. - O drop, flow around for Indra.\(^{87}\)

**D. Teaching sons, Vedic and post-Vedic**

In the Vedic and post-Vedic periods, teaching was done within families. It seems that the idea of keeping traditions alive was well on the families minds as the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad seems to convey:

\begin{verbatim}
<24> athātaḥ samprattih | yadā praiṣyan manyate 'tha putram āha tvaṁ 
brahma tvam yajñas tvam loka iti | sa putraḥ praty āhāham 
brahmāham yajño 'ham loka iti | yad vai kim cānūktaṃ tasya sarvasya
\end{verbatim}

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\(^{85}\) Jamison and Brereton (2014, p. 1363)

\(^{86}\) ṚgV 9.112.1-2

\(^{87}\) After Jamison and Brereton (2014).
Next, the right of transfer. When a man thinks that he is about to die, he tells his son: “You are the brahman! You are the sacrifice! You are the world!” The son replies: “I am the brahman! I am the sacrifice! I am the world!” All the vedic learning that has been acquired is subsumed under “brahman”; all the sacrifices are subsumed under “sacrifice”; and all the worlds are subsumed under “world”. That is the full extent of this whole universe—“By becoming the Whole, may he assist me from here.” Therefore, they say that an educated son opens up the world, and for this reason people educate their sons.89

E. Rituals, Vedic and post-Vedic

Rituals, that are to bring about worldly effects, are performed long after the Vedic period. For example, Brahmins may serve as ritual protectors of state. With respect to Śaiva officiants, Sanderson tells about an inscription from the 12th c. where “an army from Sri Lanka had invaded the mainland, removed the door of the Rāmeśvaram temple, obstructed the worship, and carried away all the temple’s treasures” whereupon a Śaiva officiant “was engaged by the emperor to

88 BĀU 1.5.17
89 Olivelle (1998)
perform a ritual that would bring destruction on those responsible for this desecration. According to the inscription, the ceremony was continued for twenty-eight days and at its end the invading army was indeed defeated.”

It is clear that success in these ways would ensure “close links with the institution of kingship and thereby with the principal source of patronage”. See, for example, the Atharvavedapariśiṣṭa:

<25> The kingdom of that king in whose realm dwells an Atharvavedic master of the rites for warding off ills will prosper, free of all calamities. The kingdom of that king in whose realm he is not present is oppressed by diverse dangers. It sinks like a cow in the mud. Therefore to that Atharvan [chaplain] whose senses are controlled the king should show exceptional honour at all times, by means of gifts, marks of distinction, and demonstrations of respect.

In some traditions, the Atharvavedic knowledge of a purohita was a requirement for serving as a chaplain.

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90 Sanderson (2004, pp. 233–234)
91 Sanderson (2004, p. 232)
92 AP 4.6.1–3
93 Sanderson (2004, p. 233)
V. Economics and politics in *artha* and *dharma* texts

Some few quotations on economic relationships between private agents are presented here. Apart from successful transactions, Indian authors dealt with problematic exchanges. The last section briefly mentions the state’s giving to worthy recipients.

A. Services (*śuśrūṣā*)

(1) **Five kinds of karmakaras**

Services are performed by five different kinds of people according to Nārada:

<26>  
śiṣyānteśvāsibḥṛtakāś caturthas tv adhikarmac |  
ete karmakarāḥ proktā dāsās tu grahajādayaḥ ||  

The laborers are: a student, an apprentice, a hired man, and an overseer. The slaves are those born in the house, and the like.  

Excepting the *adhikarmac* (overseer) and the *śisya* (pupil) the other three kinds of labourers are dealt with in the following subsections. Against Nārada’s list, one might add partnerships, especially those of officiating priests, and the renumeration of officials.

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94 NSmV 5.3  
95 Lariviere (2003)  
96 *artheśv adhikṛto yah syāt kuṭumbasya* (one who has been charged with responsibilities pertaining to family matters) in NSmV 5.22, Lariviere (2003).  
97 See chapter XV.  
98 See subsection V.A(5) and (6).
(2) **Hired man**

The hired man (*bhṛtaka*) is a legal institution clearly falling into the category of *dānagrahaṇa*. See Nārada:

<27> \( bhṛtakas \) trividho jñeya uttamo madhyamo \( 'dhamah \) |  
\( śaktibhaktyanurūpā syād eśām karmāśrayā bhṛtih \) (wage, HW) ||  
\( uttamas tv āyudhiyo 'tra madhyamas tu krṣīvalah \) |  
\( adhamo bhāravāhah syād ity evaṁ trividho bhṛtah \)\(^{99}\)

There are three kinds of hired men: highest, middle, and lowest. Their wages depend on what they do, how well they do it, and their loyalty. This is the threefold devision of hired men: soldiers are the highest, farmers are the middle, and bearers are the lowest.\(^{100}\)

In return for the services, the hired man can expect wages, either by agreement or by default:

<28> \( bhṛtānāṃ vetanasyokto dānādānavidhikramah \) |  
\( vetanasyānapākarma tad vivādapadam smṛtam \) ||  
\( bhṛtāya vetanam dadyāt karmavāmī yathākramam \) |  
\( ādau madhye 'vasāne vā karmāno yad viniṣcitam \) ||  
\( bhṛtāv aniṣcitāyām tu daśabhāgam samāpnuyuḥ \) |  
\( lobhagobījasasyānāṃ vaṇiggopakrṣīvalah \)\(^{101}\)

There is a series of rules about payment and non-payment of wages for hired men. This title is called Non-payment of Wages. The employer should regularly pay the wages to the hired man as agreed: in advance

\(^{99}\) NSmV 5.20-21
\(^{100}\) Lariviere (2003)
\(^{101}\) NSmV 6.1-3
of the work, during the work, or at the end. Unless there has been a special agreement with the hired man, a merchant, herdsman, or farm worker should receive one-tenth of the profit, cows, or produce respectively.\textsuperscript{102}

Detailed rules about the mutual obligations of master and servant are given by Kauṭilya (KAŚ 3.14.1-17) and in the Buddhist Upāsakālaṅkāra (UJA 4.75, 94-97).

(3) **Apprentice**

Consider, next, apprenticeship. An apprentice (\textit{antevāsin}) resides in his teacher’s house and learns a craft (\textit{śilpa}) from him.

The \textit{dāna} offered by the \textit{ācārya} is described by Nārada as follows:

<29>  
\begin{verbatim}
svaśilpam icchann āhartuṃ bāndhavānām anujñayā |
ācaryasya vaset ante kālam krtvā suniścitam ||
ācārcaḥ śikṣayed enam svaghrhād dattabhajanam |
na cānyat kārayet karma putravac cainam ācaret ||\textsuperscript{103}
\end{verbatim}

One who wishes to learn his own craft should, with the permission of his relatives, reside with a master for a well-defined period of time. The master should instruct him and feed him from his own household; he should not make him do any other work, and he should treat him like a son.\textsuperscript{104}

The \textit{ācārya’s} \textit{grahaṇa} is described in these two verses:

\textsuperscript{102} Lariviere (2003)  
\textsuperscript{103} NSmV 5.15-16  
\textsuperscript{104} Lariviere (2003)
Even if he has been fully instructed, the apprentice must stay for the entire duration, and the profit from the work he does during this time belongs to his master. When the time comes, the apprentice who has learned his craft should pay every respect to his master, take his leave, and go home.\textsuperscript{106}

It is instructive to compare an apprentice (\textit{antevāsin}) with a student (\textit{śiṣya}). Both reside in the teacher’s house and both learn from the teacher, the former a craft (\textit{śilpa}), the latter the Veda.\textsuperscript{107}

\textbf{(4) Slaves}

Slavery can come about by different venues, some of which belong to the \textit{dānagrahana} category:

\begin{quote}
\textit{grhaṭajas tathā krīto labdho dāyād upāgataḥ |}\\
\textit{anākālabhrtaḥ tadvadādhattaḥ svāminā ca yah ||}\\
\textit{mokṣīto mahataḥ carṇāt prāpto yuddhāḥ\textsuperscript{107} paṇe jitaḥ |}\\
\textit{tavāham ity upagataḥ pravrajyāvasitaḥ kṛtaḥ ||}\\
\textit{bhaktadāsaḥ ca vijñeyas tathaiva vaḍavābhṛtaḥ |}\\
\textit{vikretā cātmanaḥ śāstre dāsāḥ pañcadasā smṛtāḥ ||\textsuperscript{108}}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{NSmV 5.18-19}  
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Lariviere (2003)}  
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{yaddh° in NSmV 5.25b is a typo.}  
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{NSmV 5.24-26}
<a> One born into a household,
<b> one who was purchased,
<c> one who was acquired,
<d> one who was inherited,
<e> one who was supported in time of famine,
<f> one who was pledged by his master,
<g> one freed from a large debt,
<h> one who was obtained by battle,
<i> one who was won in a wager,
<j> one who came forward and said, “I am yours,”
<k> one who gave up world renunciation,
<l> a bonded laborer,
<m> one who becomes a slave for maintenance,
<n> one who takes up with a female slave, and
<o> one who sells himself
—these are the fifteen slaves mentioned in the texts.\textsuperscript{109}

Davis (2018) discusses slaves and slavery in the Smṛticandrikā. He stresses that slaves are (definitionally)

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{asvatantra} (“lacking legal independence or self-governance”)\textsuperscript{110},
  \item \textit{aśubhakarma} (“carrying out impure work”)\textsuperscript{111}, and
  \item \textit{parārtha} (“obliged to benefit another”)\textsuperscript{112}.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{109} Lariviere (2003) (where the markers <a> etc. are added by the current author)
\textsuperscript{110} Davis, Jr. (p. 2)
\textsuperscript{111} Davis, Jr. (p. 3)
\textsuperscript{112} According to SC 460, the better concept might be \textit{atyantapārārthya} (total obligation to benefit another). See Davis, Jr. (p. 3).
Kauṭilya deals with “rules concerning slaves and laborers”\textsuperscript{113} (\textit{dāsakarmakarakalpaḥ}) in the first topic of \textit{KAŚ} 3.13. In particular, he writes about how an ārya can reobtain freedom.

\begin{enumerate}[\itemindent=0pt]
\item[(5)] \textbf{Partnerships of officiating priests}
\end{enumerate}

Immediately following the above mentioned chapter on slaves and labourers, Kauṭilya covers some specific rules for employees (\textit{bhṛtaka}) and partnerships in \textit{KAŚ} 3.14. The latter topic is about how to divide the wage (\textit{vetana}) among several “employees from an association or associates in a partnership” (\textit{saṃgha-bhṛtāḥ saṃbhūyasamutthātāraḥ})\textsuperscript{114}. Both in the general case and in the special subcase of “priests officiating at a sacrifice” (\textit{yājaka}) the payment follows the rule:

\begin{quote}
\textit{yathāsaṃbhāṣitaṃ vetanaṃ samam vā}\textsuperscript{115}

the wages either as agreed upon or in equal shares\textsuperscript{116}
\end{quote}

Generally, contracts are to be kept.\textsuperscript{117} “Bad” contracts, however, do not enjoy the protection of the legal order:

\begin{quote}
\textit{anāhitāgniḥ śatagur ayajvā ca sahasraguḥ | surāpo vrṣalibhartā brahmaḥ gurutalpagaḥ || asatpratigrahe yuktah stenaḥ kutsitayājakah | adośas tyaktum anyonyaṃ karmasamkaranāścayāt ||}\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{113} Olivelle (2013)
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{KAŚ} 3.14.18
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{KAŚ} 3.14.18 and, with the very same wording, \textit{KAŚ} 3.14.28
\textsuperscript{116} Olivelle (2013)
\textsuperscript{117} See section III.F or subsection XIX.F(1).
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{KAŚ} 3.14.37-38
An owner of 100 cows who has not established the three sacred fires, an owner of 1,000 cows who has not offered a sacrifice, one who drinks liquor, a husband of a Śūdra woman, a murderer of a Brāhmaṇa, a man who has sex with his elder’s wife, one addicted to receiving gifts from evil persons, a thief, and someone who officiates at the sacrifices of degraded persons—in such cases it is not a fault to abandon each other, because of the certainty of defiling the rite.\textsuperscript{119}

\textbf{6) Renumeration of officials}

Kauṭilya suggests generous payments to officials:

\textit{ṛtvigacaryaamāntripuropoḥitasenāpatiyuvarājarajamātrājamāhiṣyo}

\textit{śatcatvāriṃśatsāhasrāḥ | etāvatā bharaṇenāṇspadyatvam akopakaṃ}

\textit{caiśāṃ bhavati | dauvārikāntarvaśikapraśāstrsamāhartsamnidhātāraś}

\textit{caturviṃśati sāhasrāḥ | etāvatā karmanyā bhavanti} \textsuperscript{120}

Officiating priest, teacher, Counselor-Chaplain, Chief of the Armed Forces, Crown Prince, queen mother, and chief wife of the king—these receive 48,000 Paṇas. With this level of renumeration, they would not become susceptible of instigation or liable to revolt. Chief Gate Guard, Head of the Palace Guard, Administrator, Collector, and Treasurer—these receive 24,000 Paṇas. With this level of renumeration, they become upright in their work.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{119} Olivelle (2013)
\textsuperscript{120} KAŚ 5.3.3-6
\textsuperscript{121} Olivelle (2013)
B. **Unsuccessful transactions**

1. **A list**

It was very clear to the Indian authors on vyavahāra that things may go wrong in several ways:

- The seller may not be the owner.\(^\text{122}\)
- The seller may not deliver after agreeing on a contract.\(^\text{123}\)
- The buyer may refuse to accept the item after agreeing on a contract.\(^\text{124}\)
- The seller may not have informed the buyer about a defect.\(^\text{125}\)
- The item (including a bride or groom) may be defective.\(^\text{126}\)
- The item can be returned by the buyer after a trial period if defects become apparent.\(^\text{127}\)

2. **Rescission for merchandise**

This section and the text deal with legal (accepted) cancellation (rescission) of buying/selling contracts irrespective of whether a defect has been observed. In Manu and in Kauṭilya, the technical term anuṣaya means “rescission” \(\leftarrow\) “wish to rescind” \(\leftarrow\) “regret”.

\(^{122}\) Noonan, Jr. (1984, p. xiii) observes that bribery is “criminal and consensual”.
\(^{123}\) See, for example, VDh 5.127-128, YDh 254, NSmV 8, possibly MDh 8.219-221, or KAŚ 3.15.1-4. Additional material on krayavikrayānuṣaya can be traced with Kane (1973, pp. 489–495). See Wiese (2017).
\(^{124}\) See, for example, VDh 5.129, YDh 255, NSmV 9.3, 16, possibly MDh 8.219-221, or KAŚ 3.15.9.
\(^{125}\) See, for example, MDh 8.219-224 or KAŚ 3.15.14-16.
\(^{126}\) See, for example, KAŚ 3.15.12-18.
\(^{127}\) See, for example, YDh 177, NSmV 9.5-6 or KAŚ III.15.17-18.
Turning to the specific reason for abortive transactions, see Manu on the topic of rescission:

<35>  
krītvā vikrīya vā kiṃcid yasyehānuśayo bhavet |
sō ’ntar dasāhāt tad dravyaṃ dadyāc caiva dadīta ca ||¹²⁸

After buying and selling anything, if someone here regrets his decision, he may return or take back that article within ten days.¹²⁹

In contrast to Manu, Nārada has an asymmetric rule: If the seller cancels a contract, the buyer can claim damages, while the buyer can cancel on the same day:

<36>  
vikrīya paṇyaṃ mūlyena kretur yo na prayacchati |
sthāvrasya kṣayaṃ dāpyo jaṅgamasya kriyāphalam ||¹³⁰

krītvā mūlyena yat paṇyaṃ duṣkrītaṃ manyate krayī |
vikretuḥ pratideyam tat tasminn evāhny avikṣatam ||¹³¹

One who sells something for a certain price and fails to deliver it to the purchaser must be made to compensate him for any loss pertaining to immovables and for the lost profits from movables. … When someone has purchased something and paid for it, and then decides it was wrong to have done so, he may return it, undamaged to the seller on the same day.¹³²

¹²⁸ MDh 8.222
¹²⁹ Olivelle (2005)
¹³⁰ NSmV 8.4
¹³¹ NSmV 9.2
¹³² Lariviere (2003)
The most intricate rules on rescission are offered by Kauṭilya:¹³³

For someone who has entered into a contract as a seller of a merchandise and who does not deliver it, the fine is 12 Paṇas, except in the case of unexecutable transactions due to defect [of the product] or due to force majeure. For traders [as sellers], [the period for] cancellation [to be granted by the buyers] is one day; for agriculturists, three days; for cattle herders, five days; For its (tasya referring to cancellation = anuśaya) violation, the fine [to be paid by the buyers] is 24 Paṇas or one tenth of the value of the merchandise. For someone who has entered into a contract as a buyer of a merchandise and who does not accept it, the fine is 12 Paṇas, except in the case of unexecutable transac-

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¹³³ Olivelle (2005) and Olivelle (2013, pp. 6–25) propose the distinction between “Kauṭilya Recension” and “Śāstric Redaction” where the current Arthaśāstra version is mainly the result of the “Śāstric Redaction”, carried out by a dharmaśāstra paṇḍit. This scholar tried to bring the Arthaśāstra into line with the standard dharmaśāstric ideology. He may also have been responsible for commentarial interventions, marginal glosses that were added to the text later on. Wiese (2017) argues for an even more reduced Kauṭilya Recension.

¹³⁴ KAŚ 3.15.1, 5, 8, 9, 10
tions due to a defect [of the product] or due to force majeure. Cancel-
lution [as an option to be exercised by the buyer], moreover, is identical
to cancellation [as an option to be exercised] by the seller.\textsuperscript{135}

It is clear from the above Sanskrit texts that \textit{krī} does not only have the everyday
meaning of “to buy” where the buying process is finalized and irrevocable.\textsuperscript{136}
Instead, it can also mean “to enter into a contract as a buyer” where the buying
process may still meet obstacles. Similarly, \textit{vi-krī} may also mean “to enter into a
contract as a seller”.

The sensible regulation for perishable goods reads:\textsuperscript{137}

\begin{quote}
\texttt{7ātipātikānāṃ panyānāṃ ‘anyatrāvikreyam’ ity avarodhe\textsuperscript{138} nānuśayo
deyah |}\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

\texttt{7Cancellation is not to be granted [by sellers] for perishable merchan-
dise if there is the hindrance that they could not be sold else-
where/otherwise.}\textsuperscript{140}

Note the contrast of

- KAŚ 3.14.2 with \textit{anuśayam labhate} (“he obtains rescission”) and
- KAŚ 3.15.7 with \textit{anuśayam dadāti} meaning “he grants rescission”

\textsuperscript{135} Wiese (2017)
\textsuperscript{136} See also Kane (1973, p. 495) on this point.
\textsuperscript{137} KAŚ 3.15.7 might well have been added later on, as part of the “Śāstric
Redaction”.
\textsuperscript{138} Wiese (2017) discusses the less preferred readings, in particular as an instru-
mental \textit{avarodhena}.
\textsuperscript{139} KAŚ 3.15.7
\textsuperscript{140} Wiese (2017)
Closely related to these regulations on rescission are the following topics that focus (i) on the duties of transactors to inform about defects (of a bride or a groom, of slaves or animals) and (ii) on trial\textsuperscript{141} periods.

\textbf{(3) Rescission for immovable property}

Consider now rescission for immovable property. It seems that immovable property was often auctioned off (see subsection XIV.B(3)). Immediately following the corresponding rules, Kauṭilya continues:

\begin{verbatim}
6vikrayapratikroṣṭā śulkaṃ dadyāt 7asvāmipratikroṣe caturviṃṣatipāṇo
daṇḍah 8saptaratrād ūrdhvam anabhisarataḥ pratikruṣṭo vikrīṇīta
9pratikruṣṭātikrame vastuni\textsuperscript{142} dviśato daṇḍah, anyatra caturviṃṣati-
pāṇo daṇḍah \textsuperscript{143}
\end{verbatim}

6The [successful] bidder at the sale should pay the duty. 7For bidding by one who [after successful bidding] does not become the owner [i.e., cancels the deal], the fine is 24 Paṇas. 8The auctioneer [identical with the owner] may sell [the house = veśma in KAŚ 3.9.3] of [the successful bidder] who does not turn up after seven nights. 9If he sells in case of a transgression [perpetrated] by the auctioneer, involving immovable property, the fine is 200 Paṇas, otherwise [if no transgression is involved] 24 Paṇas.\textsuperscript{144}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{141} The topic of experience goods has been introduced in the economic literature by Nelson (1970).
\textsuperscript{142} Kangle (1969a, p. 109) opts for vāstu rather than vastu.
\textsuperscript{143} KAŚ 3.9.6-9
\textsuperscript{144} Wiese (2017) after Olivelle (2013)
\end{footnotes}
According to this translation, \(^{145}\) [only] the successful bidder pays the duty (KAŚ 3.9.6). This bidder is obliged to honor his part of the deal and become an owner by paying for the immobile property (KAŚ 3.9.7). If, however, the buyer does not turn up within a few days (he may need time to collect the money needed), the auctioneer is free to look out for an alternative buyer (KAŚ 3.9.8). However, the auctioneer should also honor his part of the deal and is punished if he sells prematurely to an alternative buyer (even if the latter pays more).

C. Non-payment of debts (ṛṇādāna)

Davis, Jr. (2010, p. 71) observes: “Debt or obligation becomes in Hindu legal texts a paradigmatic metaphor for describing all human relationships. Human life in the view of the texts is posited between two kinds of debt or obligation: debts given by birth, the so-called triple debt, and debts voluntarily taken on.” The former (congenital) debt has been alluded to in <11>.

Turning to “debts voluntarily taken on”, among the 18 grounds for litigation enumerated by Manu, non-payment of debts (ṛṇādāna) is the first.\(^{146}\) This primary position of non-payment of debt is also present in the lawbooks of Yājñavalkya and Nārada.\(^{147}\) Judging from the importance attributed to this topic, legal disputes on this matter seemed to have occurred quite often. For example, Manu on the court proceeding:

<40>  
adhamarṇārthasiddhyartham uttamarṇena coditaḥ |
dāpayed dhanikasyārtham adhamarṇād vibhāvitam ||

\(^{145}\) Both Kangle (1969b) and Olivelle (2013) understand asvāmin (KAŚ 3.9.7) in the usual manner as “one who is not an owner”.
\(^{146}\) See <12><a>, p. 33.
\(^{147}\) See the table in Olivelle (2005, p. 14).
apahnave ’dhamarnasya dehīty uktasya saṃsadi |
abhiyoktā diśed deśaṃ karaṇaṃ vānyad uddiśet ||

When a creditor petitions for the recovery of money from a debtor and the facts are established, the king should compel the debtor to return the money to the creditor. … When the debtor, told in court to pay up, denies the charge, the plaintiff should produce a document or offer some other evidence.

Indeed, the topic of witnesses is covered in the context of non-payment of debt in several mūla texts. This is understandable by the importance of the topic of non-payment of debt and by the importance of witnesses in that context. However, quite naturally, the nibandhas arrange the topic of witnesses with other discussions of legal procedure.

Nārada 1.2-21 contain detailed rules about whether the debt incurred by a dead person is to be cleared by sons, grandsons, etc., whether a father or husband is responsible for the debt incurred by his son or wife, respectively, whether a wife has to pay a debt made by her husband or her sons, etc. There is no need to look at these rules in the context of this book.

D. How to acquire wealth

Private agents can earn by normal economic means what they should finally give to deserving agents:

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148 MDh 8.47, 52
149 Olivelle (2005), Olivelle (2005, p. 307)
150 See Davis, Jr. (2010, p. 75).
<41> alabdhamaṃ arthamaṃ lipseta labdhaṃ rakṣet avekṣayā |
  rakṣitaṃ vardhayen nityaṃ vrddhaṃ pātreṣu nikṣipet ||¹⁵¹

Money—

If you don’t have it, try hard to earn it! When you have earned it, you
should guard it well! And as you guard it, always make it grow! When
it has grown, give it to worthy men.¹⁵²

Only the kṣatriya class may use violence See Manu:

<42> alabdhamaṃ caiva lipseta labdhaṃ rakṣet prayatnataḥ |
  rakṣitaṃ vardhayec caiva vrddhaṃ pātreṣu nikṣipet ||
  etac caturvidhaṃ vidyāt puruṣārthaprayojanam |
  asya nityam anuṣṭhānam samyak kuryād atandritah ||
  alabdhamaṃ iccheda daṇḍena labdhaṃ rakṣed avekṣayā |
  rakṣitaṃ vardhayed vrddhyā vrddhaṃ dānena nikṣipet ||¹⁵³

The king should seek to acquire what he has not acquired, preserve di-
gently what he has acquired, augment what he has preserved, and dis-
tribute what he has augmented on worthy recipients. These he should
recognize as the four means of securing the goals of man¹⁵⁴; and he
should execute them properly and tirelessly every day. What he has not
acquired, he should seek to acquire with military force; what he has ac-
cquired, he should preserve with vigilance; what he has preserved, he

¹⁵¹ PT 1.6
¹⁵² Olivelle (2006)
¹⁵³ MDh 7.99-101
¹⁵⁴ See section III.A. However, Manu probably refers to MDh 2.224 (see Oli-
velle (2013, p. 159)) where mokṣa is not mentioned.
should augment through profitable investments; what what he has augmented, he should distribute through gifts.\footnote{Olivelle (2005)}

KAŚ 1.4.3 is somewhat similar. There, the “worthy recipient”\footnote{Olivelle (2013)} is called a tūrthā. Importantly, this concept of worthy recipients is central to the Brahmanical theory of the gift, the topic matter of the following chapter. Noting the quite parallel verses in the Pañcatantra, Olivelle (2005, p. 297) remarks that MDh 7.99 has “the hallmarks of a proverbial saying”.

VI. Dharmadāna (Brahmanical theories of the gift)

A main topic of this book is dharmic giving. The Indian perspectives are presented here quite extensively. The corresponding chapter on the modern perspectives on dharmadāna is chapter XX.

A. From performing sacrifices to gift-giving

From section D onwards, I basically follow the structure given by Lakṣmīdhara. The first three sections are preliminary. The first one (the current section A) points to the close connection between offering to gods and gifting. The locus classicus is the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa:

\begin{verbatim}
<43>  dvaya v vai deva devaḥ | ahaivā devaḥ ātha yē brāhmaṇāḥ śuśruvāṁso
  'nucanās tē manusyadevaś tēṣām dvedhāvvmibhaktā eva yajña āhutaya
  eva devānāṁ dāksiṇā manusyadevānāṁ brāhmaṇānāṁ śuśruvūśām
\end{verbatim}

\footnote{Olivelle (2005)}
anūcānānām āhutibhir evā devān prīnāti dāksinābhīr manuṣyadevān
brāhmaṇānām chuṣruviśo 'nūcānāṁs tā enam ubhāye devāḥ prītāḥ
sudhāyāṁ dadhati ||¹⁵⁷

Verily, there are two kinds of gods: for, indeed, the gods are the gods; and the Brāhmans who have studied and teach sacred lore are the human gods. The sacrifice of these is divided into two kinds: oblations constitute the sacrifice to the gods; and gifts to the priests that to the human gods, to the Brāhmans who have studied and teach sacred lore. With oblations one gratifies the gods, and with gifts to the priests the human gods, the Brāhmans who have studied and teach sacred lore. Both these kinds of gods, when gratified, place him in a state of bliss (sudhā).¹⁵⁸

See also the Smṛticandrikā:

<yāgahomadānavidhibhir devatoddeśapūrvakadravyatyāga-
tatpūrvakaprakṣepaparasvatvaphalakadravyatyāgā anuṣṭhāpyante>¹⁵⁹

Injunctions which teach the actions of sacrifice (yāga), offering (homa), and giving (dāna) bring about (respectively) the action of giving up a substance preceded by a reference to a deity, the action of casting (the substance into the fire etc.), preceded by this, and the action of giving up a substance which results in another’s ownership.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ ŚB 2.2.6
¹⁵⁸ Eggeling (1882-1890).
¹⁵⁹ SC 4.2.10
¹⁶⁰ Benson (2010)
Sometimes, offering and gifting are considered to lie on an equal plane as in Manu:

<45> śraddhayesṭaṃ ca pūrtaṃ ca nityaṃ kuryāt prayatnataḥ |
śraddhākṛte hy akṣaye te bhavataḥ svāgatair dhanaīḥ ||

One should as a matter of routine obligation painstakingly offer sacrifices and donate gifts with a spirit of generosity, for these two things, when performed with a spirit of generosity and with well-acquired wealth, become imperishable.\

However, the special prakāra called kāmyadāna (see <64>) seems to be of a lower type:

<46> apatyavijayaisvaryastrībhālārtham yad ijyate |
ijyāsamjñāṃ tu tad dānam kāmyam ity abhidhīyate ||

When a person performs a sacrifice for the sake of offspring, victory, lordship, women, or sons, that—although bearing the name sacrifice—is said to be an Optional Gift.

B. Defining giving

“Giving” means “transferal of ownership” of some “object” (widely construed) by a “giver” to some “receiver”. This is in line with the Mitākṣarā commentary (YSmM) on the Yājñavalkya Smṛti (YSm) where dāna is glossed as

161 DK 1.39
163 DK 1.25
giving is the cessation of one’s own ownership and the production of another’s ownership.\footnote{YSmM 2.27}

Immediately following is the explanation of parasvatvāpādana:

And the production of another’s ownership occurs if that other person appropriates [the object in question]. Appropriation comes in three forms: mental, verbal, or bodily. There “mental” has the form of intention expressed by “this is mine”.

\textbf{C. Dānadharma as a part of dharma}

Generally, giving gifts is high on Old India’s moral agenda. For example, the law text ascribed to Yājñavalkya stipulates:

Abstention from injuring, truthfulness, refraining from theft, purification, restraining the organs, self-control, forbearance, honesty, and giving gifts—these are the means of fulfilling dharma for everybody.\footnote{Olivelle (2019)}
In contrast to other rules, this one is very general in not referring to specific classes (varṇa), life-stages (āśraya), status (like rājadharma), or occasion (like penance, prāyaścitta).\footnote{Davis, Jr. (2010, p. 18)}

Hyperbolically,\footnote{Consult Davis, Jr. (2010, pp. 18–19) on how the commentator Vijñāneśvara downplays this verse’s putative meaning.} dāna is deemed to be the very essence of dharma:

\begin{verbatim}
<50>  deṣe kāla upāyena dravyaṁ śraddhāsamanvitaiḥ |
pātre pradīyate yat tat sakalāṃ dharmalakṣanam ||
\end{verbatim}

When an article is given by individuals imbued with the spirit of generosity, at a proper place and time, to a worthy recipient, and following the proper procedure—that constitutes the complete distinguishing mark of dharma.\footnote{YSm 1.6}

\section*{D. Causes, bases, components etc. of giving}

Indian dharmaśāstras structure (dutyful) giving in different manners. The Dānakāṇḍa structures the subject matter as follows\footnote{Brick (2015, pp. vii–viii).}:

- the nature of gifting (dānasvarūpa) with subheadings 1. causes (hetu), 2. bases (adhiṣṭhāna), 3. components (aṅga), 4. effects (vipāka), 5. kinds (prakāra), 6. types (vidha), and 7. means of destruction (nāśa)\footnote{DK 1.2 and Brick (2015).}
- things that should and should not be given (deyādeya)\footnote{DK 2}
• the definition of proper and improper recipients (pātrāpātralaksana)\textsuperscript{177}
• different types of gift rituals\textsuperscript{178} concerning
  o the great gifts (mahādāna), see section VII.B
  o the mountain gifts (parvatadāna)
  o etc.

The structure offered in the Dānakāṇḍa is not fully transparent. I will follow the dānasvarūpa subheadings (see the first bullet above) with some modifications.

E. The first cause: śraddhā

Consider the first bullet (cause) in the above the dānasvarūpa enumeration.

First, with respect to the two causes, consider

\[\text{nālpatvaṃ vā bahutvaṃ vā dānasyābhhyadayāvaham |} \]
\[\text{śraddhā śaktiś ca dānānāṃ vrddhikṣayakare hi te ||}\textsuperscript{179}

Whether small or large, the size of a gift does not bring about its benefits, but rather the spirit of generosity and the means available to the donor associated with a gift—indeed, only these two things cause prosperity or ruin.\textsuperscript{180}

Śraddhā is also addressed as a component (aṅga), see first bullet. In the above translation, śraddhā is understood as “spirit of generosity”. However, this is but one of two possible meanings. According to Brick (2015, pp. 54–58), the basic

\textsuperscript{177} DK 3
\textsuperscript{178} DK 4
\textsuperscript{179} DK 1.3
\textsuperscript{180} After Brick (2015), who translates śakti as capability here. We follow Brick’s translation of DK 1.38.
meaning is “faith” or “conviction about the certainty of rewards”. This translation of “faith” is supported by Hemādri’s gloss āstikyabuddhi\textsuperscript{181} and the translation “conviction about the certainty of rewards” by Madanasimha’s gloss phalāvaśyambhāvanīscaya.

Summarizing Köhler (1973), Brick (2015, pp. 56–57) explains the semantic shift from “conviction about the certainty of rewards” to “spirit of generosity” as follows: “[Ś]raddhā initially denotes trust, confidence, or even faith in general, but early on comes to denote specifically trust or faith in the efficacy of prescribed ritual acts—the first meaning of the term in the dānanibandhas. Significantly, a person would express this specific form of trust through munificent gifts to priests and other persons. Thus, śraddhā soon begins to refer to a spirit of generosity or ‘joy in gifting’ (Spendenfreudigkeit)—the word’s second meaning in the dāna literature. These two significations of the term, therefore, have the relationship of cause and effect, for trust in the efficacy of prescribed ritual acts results in a spirit of generosity. As a consequence, it is often difficult to discern in which of these two meanings the term is being used. Perhaps, in many cases śraddhā has both meanings, so that discerning between these two senses of the word is fundamentally misguided.”

Śraddhā in the second sense is explained as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
<52> saumukhyādyabhisampītir arthiṇāṁ darśane sadā |
satkrītiś cānasūyā ca tadā śraddheti kīrtate ||\textsuperscript{182}
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{181} Hem: 13, fifth line from bottom
\textsuperscript{182} DK 1.14
When there is excessive joy, a happy face, and the like whenever one sees petitioners, as well as hospitality and a lack of envy, then there is said to be a spirit of generosity.\textsuperscript{183}

Brick (2015, p. 57) comments: “… a recipient would want a donor to be as generous as possible and not to begrudge him for accepting his offerings. Hence, he would naturally want donors to possess not only trust in the efficacy of their gifts, but also a spirit of generosity.” It seems that a quite natural way to look at dāna ideology is to suppose that Brahmins as receivers try to influence donors in specific manners, beneficial to the Brahmins themselves. This question is taken up again in chapter XXI.

\textbf{F. The second cause: śakti}

Śakti (covered extensively under the heading of deyādeya, the second bullet) refers to the relationship between the gift given by a donor and his means:

\begin{quote}
<53> svakuṭumbāvirodhena deyaṃ dārasutād rte |
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
nānvaye sati sarvasvāṃ yac cānyasmāi pratiśrutam \textsuperscript{184}
\end{quote}

So long as it does not hurt his family, a man can give away any of his property except for his wife and his sons, [but] not the entirety of his wealth if he has descendants, nor anything he has promised to another.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{183} Brick (2015)
\textsuperscript{184} DK 2.5
\textsuperscript{185} After Brick (2015)
Thus, a donor is not allowed to give if that implies hardship for his family. 
Nārada adds other reasons for adeyatva even in a “very serious calamity” (āpatsu kaśṭāsu):

<54>  anvāhitam yācitakamādhiḥ sādhareṇaṃ ca yat |
      nikṣepah putradāraṃ ca sarvasvaṃ cānvaye sati ||
      āpatsv api hi kaśtāsu vartamānena dehinā |
      adeyāny āhur ācāryā yac cānyasmai pratiśrutam ||\(^{186}\)

The teachers say that the following should not be given away even by one who is suffering a very serious calamity: a deposit entrusted to an intermediary, a deposit for a particular purpose, a pledge, property held in common, a deposit, a son, a wife, all of one’s property if there are heirs, and what has been promised to someone else.\(^{187}\)

In order to stick somewhat closely to the dānasvarūpa list, we will deal with non-śakti reasons for prohibiting gifts in the later section K.

**G. Six bases (motivations) of giving**

Second (in the above dānasvarūpa list of section D), Devala enumerates six different bases or motivations (adhiṣṭāna) for giving:

<55>  dharman artham ca kāmaṃ ca vrīḍāharṣabhayāni ca |
      adhiṣṭhānāni dānāṃ saḍ etāni pracakṣate ||
      pātrebhya dīyate nityam anapeksya prayojanam |
      kevalaṃ tyāgabuddhyā yad dharmadānaṃ tad ucyate ||
      prayojanam apeksyaiva prasaṅgād yat pradiyate |

\(^{186}\) NSmV 4.4-5

\(^{187}\) Lariviere (2003)
tad arthadānam ity āhur aihikaṃ phalahetukam ||
strīyānamṛgayākśānāṃ prasaṅgād yat pradīyate |
anarheṣū ca rāgeṇa kāmadānam tad ucyate ||
saṁsadi vṛīḍayā śrutyā cārtho ‘rthibhyāḥ prayācitaḥ |
pradīyate cet tad dānaṃ vṛīḍādānaṃ iti smṛtam ||
dṛṣṭvā priyāṇi śrutvā vā harṣavat yat pradīyate |
harṣadānaṃ iti prāhur dānaṃ tad dharmacintakāḥ ||
ākrośānarthahimsṛṇāṃ pratīkārāya yad bhayāt |
dīyate apakartṛdbhya bhayadānaṃ tad ucyate ||¹⁸⁸

1. Duty (dharma),
2. worldly gain (artha),
3. passion (kāma),
4. shame (vṛīḍā),
5. joy (harṣa), and
6. fear (bhaya)—
these, they say, are the six bases of gifting.

1. When a person gives as a matter of routine obligation to worthy recipients independently of any specific purpose, it is called a Gift Based On Duty (dharmadāna).

2. When a person gives a gift as the occasion presents itself only dependent upon some particular purpose and motivated by worldly reward, the call it a Gift Based On Worldly Gain.

¹⁸⁸ DK 1.4-10
3. When a man gives a gift that is occasioned by women, racing, hunting, or playing dice or when he gives a gift to some unworthy individual out of affection, it is called a Gift Based On Passion.

4. If a person as asked for wealth in the middle of an assembly, promises it to the petitioners out of shame, and gives it to them, tradition calls that a Gift Based On Shame.

5. When a person joyfully gives a gift after seeing or hearing pleasant things, those who understand the Law (dharma) call that a Gift Based On Joy.

6. When a man gives a gift out of fear to those who wrong him or as a remedy for centure, misfortune, or violent men, that is called a Gift Based On Fear.\textsuperscript{189}

H. The components of giving

Turning to the third bullet in the dānasvarūpa list of section D, the six components (dānānāṃ aṅgāni) mentioned by Devala (DK 1.11) are these:

- the giver (dātṛ)
- the receiver (pratigrahītṛ), see subsection I
- the spirit of generosity (śraddhā), see subsection E
- the lawful gift (deyāṃ dharmayuk)
- the right place (deśa), and
- the right time (kāla)\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{189} Brick (2015) (where the markers 1. etc. and some Sanskrit words are added by the current author)

\textsuperscript{190} All these translations from Brick (2015)
Concerning the donor, one can point to the following quote:

\[
\text{apāparogī dharmātmā ditsur avyasanah śuciḥ} \\
anindyājivakarmā ca șabdhir dātā praśasyate \|^{191}
\]

A donor who is without sinful diseases, righteous, desirous to give, free from calamities, pure, and engaged in an irreproachable livelihood is praised due to these six qualities.\(^{192}\)

As observed by Brick (2015, p. 50), “the dānanibandhas do not place especially stringent requirements upon donors, as they leave the vast majority of people eligible to bestow gifts”.\(^{193}\)

According to Manu, accepting gifts is fraught with danger:

\[
\text{pratigrahasamartho ’pi prasaṅgaṁ tatra varjayet} \\
\text{pratigrahaṇa hyasyāśu brāhmaṁ tejah praśāmyati} \| \\
\text{na dravyānām avijñāya vidhiṁ dharmyaṁ pratigrahe} \\
\text{prājñāḥ pratigrahaṁ kuryād avasīdann api kṣudhā} \| \\
\text{hiranyamḥ bhūnim aśvaṁ gām annam vāsas tilān ghṛtam} \\
\text{avidvān pratigrhrṇāno bhasmībhavati ārṇuvat} \| \\
\text{hiranyamḥ āyur annam ca bhūr gaus cāpyoṣatas tanum} \\
\text{aśvaś caksus tvacāṁ vāso ghṛtam tejas tilāḥ prajāḥ} \| \\
\text{atapās tvanadhitīyānaḥ pratigrahārucir dvijaḥ} \\
\text{ambhasyaśmaplavenaiva saha tenaiva majjati} \| \\
\]

\(^{191}\) DK 1.12  
\(^{192}\) Brick (2015)  
\(^{193}\) It is easy to misinterpret Brick (2015, p. 51)’s remark that “the only outward characteristic of a prospective donor that seems to matter much at all is his/her financial ability”. See sections VI.F, XX.C and XX.G.
Even if he is qualified to accept gifts, he should avoid becoming addicted to that practice, for by accepting gifts his vedic energy is quickly extinguished. Without knowing the procedure prescribed by Law for accepting things, a wise man should never accept a gift even if he is racked by hunger. When in ignorant man accepts gold, land, a horse, a cow, food, clothes, sesame seeds, or ghee, he is reduced to ashes like a piece of wood. Gold and food burn up his life-force; a cow and land, his body; a horse, his sight; clothes, his skin; ghee, his energy; and sesame seeds, his offspring. When a twice-born neither engages in ascetic toil nor recites the Veda and yet loves to receive gifts, he will sink along with the donor, as a man would sink in water along with his stone float. An ignorant man, therefore, should fear any kind of gift; for by accepting even a trifling gift, an ignorant man sinks like a cow in the mud.  

I. The effects of giving (in particular the worthy recipient) and the means of destruction

The fourth dānasvarūpa subheading concerns the “effect” (vipāka) of gifting. For example,

---

194 MDh 4.186-191
195 Olivelle (2005)
196 DK 1.2, 18, Brick (2015)
It is taught that a gift can yield six kinds of effects: negative effects, no effects, reduced effects, proportionate effects, increased effects, and imperishable effects. …

Typically, these effects are thought of as otherworldly. Importantly, the effects depend on the quality of the receiver:

A gift to a non-Brahmin yields an equal reward; a gift to one who is a Brahmin in name only yields twice that; a gift to one who is learned yields one-hundred-thousand-times that; and a gift to one who has mastered the Vedas is infinite.200

Whether or not a given Brahmin is indeed worthy of receiving a gift, can be (i) examined according to the following criteria:

---

197 DK 1.18
198 Brick (2015)
199 DK 3.58
200 Brick (2015)
201 VaDh 6.23
Discipline, austerity, self-control, liberality, truthfulness, purity, vedic learning, compassion, erudition, intelligence, and religious faith—these are the characteristics of a Brahmin.\(^{202}\)

and (ii) tested by the following means:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{śīlaṃ saṃvasatā jñeyaṃ śaucam saṃvyavahārataḥ} & \\
\text{prajñā saṃkathanāj jñeyā tribhiḥ pātram pariśyate} & \quad \text{\cite{DK3.1}}
\end{align*}
\]

One can know a person’s virtue by living with him, his purity by interacting with him, and his wisdom by talking with him. A recipient should be tested in these three things.\(^{204}\)

However, the texts warn against undignified manners of testing:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{praśnapūrvam tu yo dadyād brāhmaṇāya pratigraham} & \\
\text{sa pūrvam narakaṃ yāti brāhmaṇas tadanantaram} & \quad \text{\cite{DK3.1}}
\end{align*}
\]

When a man gives a gift to a Brahmin after interrogating him, he goes to hell first, the Brahmin right after him.

“After interrogating him” means “after interrogating him as follows: ‘If you recite such and such a chapter or more without faltering, then I will give you this much.’”\(^{206}\)

---

\(^{202}\) Olivelle (1998)  
\(^{203}\) DK 3.1  
\(^{204}\) Brick (2015)  
\(^{205}\) DK 3.1  
\(^{206}\) Brick (2015)
Thus, the worthier the recipient, the more meritful the gift. The topic of merit is also dealt with in the seventh and final item in the dānasvarūpa list. I group it together with the fourth item. Both items deal with merit, the fourth one in a positive frame, the seventh one in a negative frame. Devala enumerates three means of destruction, namely recounting, bragging, or regretting:

<63>  

|  
| isṭaṁ dattam adhītaṁ vā vinaśyaty anukīrtanāt |
| ślāghānuśocanābhyyāṁ ca bhagnatejo vipadyate ||
| tasmād ātmakṛtaṁ puṇyaṁ na vrthā parikīrtayet |
| bhuktavān iti taṁ prāhus tam eva kṛtavādinaḥ ||207 |

What is sacrificed, gifted, or learned perishes by recounting it; and through bragging about or regretting it, its power is destroyed so that it comes to naught. Therefore, a person should not announce in vain a meritorious deed he has done. Indeed, of a man who declares what he has done, they say that he has already enjoyed it.208

### J. The kinds of gifts and the types of gifts

#### (1) The four kinds

The fifth item in the dānasvarūpa list of section D concerns four kinds (prakāra) of gifts:

<64>  

|  
| dhruvam ājasrikaṁ kāmyaṁ naimittikam iti kramāt |
| vaidiko dānamārgo 'yaṁ caturdhā varṇyate dvijaiḥ ||
| prapārāmataḍāgādi sarvakālaphalaṁ dhruvam |
| tad ājasrikam ity āhur diyate yad dine dine ||

DK 1.32-33

apatyavijayaiśvaryastrībālārtham yad iıyate |
ijyā saṃsamjñām tu tad dānam kāmyam ity abhidhīyate ||
kālāpekṣam kriyāpekṣam arthāpekṣam iti smṛtau |
tridhā naimittikaṃ proktam sahomam homavarjitaṃ ||²⁰⁹

The Lasting Gift, the Continual Gift, the Optional Gift, and the Occasional Gift—Brahmins describe these, in this order, as the fourfold Vedic path of gifting. Lasting Gifts are things, such as cisterns, parks, water-tanks, that bear fruit all of the time. When something is given each day, they call it a Continual Gift. When a person performs a sacrifice for the sake of offspring, victory, lordship, women, or sons, that—although bearing the name sacrifice—is said to be an Optional Gift. And it is proclaimed within the tradition that Occasional Gifts are of three kinds: those dependent upon time, those dependent upon action, and those dependent on wealth. Such gifts may or may not be accompanied by oblations.²¹⁰

(2) The three types of gifts

A different, but related to the kinds-of-gifts taxonomy is provided by the sixth item from the dānasvarūpa list of section D. According to the material value of the gifted objects, three types of gifts are distinguished: uttama (high), madhyama (middle), and adhama (low).²¹¹ For example, the highest type is defined as follows:

²⁰⁹ DK 1.23-26
²¹⁰ Brick (2015)
Gifts of food, curd, honey, protection, cows, land, gold, horses, and elephants are the High Gifts, because they are gifts of high substances.\(^{213}\)

Middle Gifts comprise  ācchādanāvāsamariboghausadhāni ca dānāni madhyamāni (clothes, housing, enjoyment, and medicine).\(^{214}\)

**K. Prohibitions for giving for non-śakti reasons**

(1)  *Datta versus adatta*

Leaving the dānasvarūpa list, consider these examples for gifts by Nārada that are “legitimate” or “illegitimate”:

<66> purnamālayam hṛtis tuṣṭyā snehāt pratyupakārataḥ |
strīśulkānugrahārtham ca dattaṁ dānavido viduḥ ||\(^{215}\)

Those who know about gifts say that the following are legitimate gifts: proceeds of commerce, wages, something given out of gratification or out of affection or gratitude, bride price, and a gift given for a favor.\(^{216}\)

<67> adattam tu bhayakrodhasokavegarujānvitaiḥ |
tathotkocarīhāsavyatyāsacchaluṣrayogataḥ ||
bālamūḍhāsvatrantrārtamattāmattāpavarjitaḥ |
kartā mamāyaṁ karmeti pratilābhecchaya ca yat ||

\(^{212}\) DK 1.27  
\(^{213}\) Brick (2015)  
\(^{214}\) DK 1.29, Brick (2015)  
\(^{215}\) NSmV 4.7  
\(^{216}\) Lariviere (2003)
An illegitimate gift is one which is given by someone out of fear, anger, sorrow, impulse, or infatuation, as a bribe, as a joke, through a switch or deceit; one which is given by a child or an idiot, one who is not independent, one who is distressed, one who is intoxicated or insane, or who wishes to get something in return thinking, “He will do such and such for me.” So, too, is a gift illegitimate when it is given out of ignorance thinking that an unworthy recipient is worthy, or that it will be used for a worthy purpose and it turns out not to be the case.

Comparing these quotations with those from section F, we turn to the question of what the difference between (a)deya and (a)datta might be.

(2) **Deya versus datta (juridical aside)**

NSmV 4.2 leaves no doubt that the four terms deya, adeya, datta, and adatta are vyavahāra terms. The question of how to distinguish deya (and adeya) from datta (and adatta) has perplexed scholars for some time. See Table 2. Apparently, Kane (1973, p. 472) understands the terms quite differently from Lariviere (2003, p. 341):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kane</th>
<th>Lariviere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

217 NSmV 4.8-10
218 Lariviere (2003)
219 See subsection III.B(2).
Table 2: How to understand adeya and adatta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>adeya</th>
<th>• forbidden</th>
<th>• gift took place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• null and void</td>
<td>• voidable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adatta</td>
<td>• voidable</td>
<td>• null and void</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• may be set aside</td>
<td>• no gift ever took place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by the court on</td>
<td>• HW: not given (in the first place)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the application of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the donor himself</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• HW: (finally) not given</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference may not be vital because “under normal circumstances, neither datta or deya gifts are voidable once the gift has been accepted”. If the current author were forced to take sides on the strength of the two previous subsections, he would support Lariviere’s usage against Kane’s.

Adeya would then mean “ungivable” or “without permission to give”, or, in Lariviere’s words, voidable. In contrast, adatta means not “not given in the first place”, i.e., “no gift ever took place” in Lariviere’s words.

A comparison of (voidable) gifts in <53> and <54> with (void) gifts in <67> suggests the following difference: With respect to voidable gifts, third parties (deposit givers, family members, …) are negatively affected. Void gifts occur when the givers are unfit (for reasons of intoxication, age, …).

To the current author, this still does not go all the way to understand the practical differences. Note that vyavahāra “prohibitions […] were devised in an atmosphere which assumed the King’s ability to ‘put things right’”, as Derrett (1976, p. 214) points out. Thus, adeya (voidable) and adatta (void) refer to gifts that do not benefit from the king’s and his courts’ support. One may speculate that voidable gifts are those where the third party (or perhaps the donor himself) turn to the court to undo the gift. In contrast, void gifts may be rectified by the king on his own initiative. A comparison is provided by aparādha and chala as “crimes with regard to which the king himself can initiate a lawsuit”.\textsuperscript{221}

L. A difficult passage on reciprocity

Reciprocity was discussed by the dānadharma authors:

\begin{quote}
<68> mṛtavatsā yathā gaur vai trṣṇālubdhā tu duhyate |
aparasparadānāni lokyātrā na dharmavat ||
adṛṣṭam aśnute dānaṃ bhuktvā caiva na drśyate |
punar āgamananāṃ nāsti tasya dānam anantakam ||\textsuperscript{222}
\end{quote}

Non-reciprocal gifts are like milking a cow whose calf has died and which is consumed with thirst. [As] a worldly matter, they do not pertain to the Law. A [dharmic] giver obtains an unseen gift and is not seen enjoying that gift, since he does not return to this world and his gift is endless.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{221} See LaS and compare Wiese and Das (2019, pp. 54–55).
\textsuperscript{222} DK 0.22-23
\textsuperscript{223} After Brick (2015), who translates: “Non-reciprocal gifts are like milking a cow whose calf has died and which is consumed with thirst. They are a worldly matter and do not pertain to the Law. For a giver obtains an unseen gift and is
The understanding underlying the above translation is as follows: A cow can be milked because the calf is dead and does not need the milk. If the cow is not given water, reciprocity is not obeyed. Think of a comma after apara-
paradānāni. This translation is in line with the standard position taken in the dharmadāna literature.

In contrast, Brick (2015) translates “[n]on-reciprocal gifts are … a worldly mat-
ter”. Reading DK 0.22 and DK 0.23 closely together, Brick finds this “puzzling” because it “clearly implies that dharmic gifts are reciprocal”\(^{224}\) and that the reciprocity is seen in adṛṣṭam aśnute dānam (DK 0.23a). Brick then explains in what sense dharmic gifts might be reciprocal in DK 0.22-23: “[D]harmic gifts are reciprocal, but the reciprocity takes place between giver and cosmos, not be-
tween giver and receiver. Importantly, this conforms to the general Brahmanical theory of gifting and a karmic worldview.”\(^{225}\) When confronted with the inter-
pretation given by me, David Brick reluctantly upholds his translation.\(^{226}\) Thus, not seen enjoying that gift, since he does not return to this world and his gift is endless.”

\(^{224}\) Brick (2015, p. 63: fn. 4)

\(^{225}\) Brick (2015, p. 63: fn. 4)

\(^{226}\) In a personal communication, David Brick calls this passage “extremely opaque”. While later dānanibandhas borrowed abundantly from the Dānakāṇḍa, they seem to have disregarded this particular passage according to his recollec-
tion. He then goes on to argue: “In any case, I have carefully thought about the matter again and am still going to stick with my old interpretation, tortured as it is. Your idea of understanding there effectively to be commas around lokayātra is quite clever. Thus, DK 0.22 would be talking about a subset of aparaspara gifts, namely, those that are lokayātra (a “worldly matter”). Dharmic gifts would be aparaspara gifts of the non-lokayātra type. This certainly would better con-
form to the standard Dharmaśāstra position that dharmic gifts are non-reciproc-
al. Nevertheless, there are two reasons I’m unconvinced by this reading, one minor and one more significant.
according to Brick’s interpretation, a reciprocal gift (parasparadāna) involves three (!) parties which, I submit, is difficult to justify in English or Sanskrit.\textsuperscript{227} In any case, the use of “bilateral” in the definition <131> makes clear the current author’s stance against this understanding.

VII. Special cases of gifts

Somewhat outside, but clearly related to, the realm of dānadharma are special cases of gifts such as brides, great gifts, and knowledge.

A. Marriages

According to the Mānava Dharmaśāstra 3.20-35, eight types of marriages exist. They are ordered in terms of praiseworthyness:

\begin{verbatim}

My minor reason for doubting your interpretation is simply that reading commas around lokayātrā strikes me as highly unusual and unnatural in Sanskrit texts, at least ones of this genre. I would have liked to see a participle of some type to make this explicit. This is just a gut feeling for me.

My more significant reason is DK 0.23. I think we both agree that this verse should be read in connection with DK 0.22 and that its understood subject is a giver of a dharmic gift, because otherwise it is just baffling. And if we make these assumptions, it sure seems to me that DK 0.23 is intentionally describing a dharmic gift as\textit{ paraspara} (“reciprocal”), for it says that one obtains an unseen gift/dāna. Nowhere else in the literature the giver of a dharmic gift was to receive a dāna. I don’t believe this is a coincidence.

So, in short, I think that the unnaturalness of your interpretation of 0.22d from a grammatical point of view combined with the explicit mention of receiving an unseen dāna in 0.23a makes your interpretation rather unlikely. But I could well be wrong.\textsuperscript{227} However, this usage of the word “reciprocity” is not uncommon at all. See, for example, the “dāna-punya reciprocity” mentioned by Thapar (2010, p. 104) or the “transcententally bestowed countergift” in Trautmann (1981, p. 281).

\end{verbatim}
When a man dresses a girl up, honors her, invites on his own a man of learning and virtue, and gives her to him, it is said to be the “Brāhma” Law.

When a man, while a sacrifice is being carried out properly, adorns his daughter and gives her to the officiating priests as he is performing the rite, it is called the “Divine” Law.

When a man accepts a bull and a cow, or two pairs of them, from the bridegroom in accordance with the Law and gives a girl to him according to rule, it is called
the “Seer’s” Law.\textsuperscript{30} When a man honors the girl and gives her after ex-horting them with the words: “May you jointly fulfill the Law,” tradition calls it the “Prājāpatya” procedure.\textsuperscript{31} When a girl is given after the payment of money to the girl’s relatives and to the girl herself according to the man’s ability and out of his own free will, it is called the “Demonic” Law.\textsuperscript{32} When the girl and groom have sex with each other voluntarily, that is the “Gāndharva” marriage based on sexual union and originating from love.\textsuperscript{33} When someone violently abducts a girl from her house as she is shrieking and weeping by causing death, may-hem, and destruction, it is called the “Fiendish” procedure.\textsuperscript{34} When someone secretly rapes a woman who is asleep, drunk, or mentally de-ranged, it is the eighth known as “Ghoulish,” the most evil of mar-riages.\textsuperscript{229}

\textbf{B. Mahādāna and parvatadāna}

Similar to dharmadānas, mahādānas are also meritorious:

\begin{quote}
<70> athātah sampravakṣyāmi mahādānānukīrtanam |
dānadharmē 'pi yan noktaṃ viṣṇunā prabhaviṣṇunā ||
sarvapāpakṣayakaram nṛṇāṃ duḥsvapnanāśanam |
yat tat śoḍaśadhā proktaṃ vāsudevena bhutale ||
punyaṃ pavitram āyuṣyaṃ sarvapāpaharaṃ śubham |
pūjitaṃ devatābhiś ca brahmaviṣṇuṣivādibhiḥ ||\textsuperscript{230}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{229} Olivelle (2005)
\textsuperscript{230} DK 4.1.1-3
I will now give an account of the Great Gifts, which mighty Viṣṇu has not even stated under the Law of Gifting; which destroys all sins and eradicates men’s nightmares; which, as Vasudeva says, comprises sixteen parts on earth; which is meritorious and purifying and leads to a long life; which is auspicious and removes all sin; and which is revered even by gods such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva.\textsuperscript{231}

The “sixteen parts” refer to sixteen different Great Gifts, from the “Gift of the Man on the Balance” to the “Pot of the Elements”. The first four gifts are listed in the following Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Objects given to non-officiating receivers</th>
<th>Objects given to guru/ dvija/ rtvik and their dakṣinā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gift of the Man on the Balance</td>
<td>unspecified gifts to downtrodden, destitute, distinguished people\textsuperscript{232}</td>
<td>gold and villages to preceptor and officiating priest\textsuperscript{233}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift of the Golden Womb</td>
<td>honour many more people wholeheartedly\textsuperscript{234}</td>
<td>gold to exemplary Brahmin priest\textsuperscript{235}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{231} Brick (2015)
\textsuperscript{232} DK 4.1.66. Brick (2015)’s translation of dīna, anātha, and viśiṣṭa, respectively.
\textsuperscript{233} DK 4.1.65. Brick (2015)’s translation of guru and rtvik, respectively.
\textsuperscript{234} DK 4.2.22. Brick (2015)’s translation of te pūjyāḥ sarvabhāvena bahavaḥ
\textsuperscript{235} DK 4.2.19, 22. Brick (2015)’s translation of dvijapuṃgava
Consider the following part of the description for the Gift of the Wish-Granting Tree:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{kalpapādapadānākhyaṃ atāḥ param anuttamam} & | \\
\text{mahādānaṃ pravakṣyāmi sarvapātakanāśanam} & || \\
\text{punyam dinam athāśādyā tulāpuruṣadānavat} & | \\
\text{punyāhavācanam kuryāl lokeśāvāhanam tathā} & | \\
\text{ṛtvinmaṇḍapasambhārabhūṣanācchādanādikam} & || \\
\text{kāñcanaṃ kārayed vrksam nānāphalasamanvitam} & | \\
\text{nānāvihagastraṇī bhūṣanācchādanāni ca} & || \\
\text{ṣaktitas tripalād ārdhvam ā sahasrāt prakalpayet} & | \\
\text{ardhaklptasuvareṣyas kārayet kalpapādapam} & || \\
\text{[...]} & \\
\text{anena vidhinā yas tu mahādānam niṣvedayet} & | \\
\text{sarvapāpaviniṃktaḥ so’śvamedhaphalam labhet} & ||
\end{align*}
\]

\[236\] DK 4.3.14. Brick (2015)’s translation of *dvija*
\[238\] DK 4.3.14. Brick (2015)’s translation of *dvija*
\[239\] DK 4.4.1-4, 16
Next, I will explain the unsurpassable Great Gift called the Gift of the Wish-Granting Tree, which destroys all sins. When an auspicious day arrives, as in the Gift of the Man on the Balance, a man should have Brahmins declare the day auspicious, summon the World-Protectors, appoint officiating priests, have a pavilion constructed, and procure equipment, ornaments, clothes, etc. He should have a golden tree made that is adorned with various fruits; and on it he should place assorted birds, clothing, ornaments, and garments. He should acquire between three and one thousand *palas* of gold according to his means and have the Wish-Granting Tree constructed with half of the acquired gold. […] When a man gives the Great Gift in accordance with the rules here prescribed, he is freed from all sins and obtains the reward of a Horse-Sacrifice.^[240]^ Tellingly, in contrast to dharmic gifts, the great ones are compared to Vedic rituals, as is clear from the last verse above. Inden (1979) suggests that Hindu *mahādānas* mirrored Buddhist *dāna* and *pūjā* ceremonies.

This section finishes by acknowledging the descriptions of mountain gifts in the literature:

<72>  
\[meroḥ pradānaṃ vakṣyāmi daśadhā munisattama | \]
\[yatpradānān naro lokān āpnoti surapūjitān || \]
\[purāṇeṣu ca vedeṣu yajṇevāyataneṣu ca | \]
\[na tat phalam adhīteṣu kṛteṣviha yad aśnute || \]
\[tasmād vidhānaṃ vakṣyāmi parvatānāṃ anuttamam | \]
\[prathamo dhānyaśailaḥ syād dvitīyo lavanācalah || \]

I will now explain the ten-fold Gift of Mount Meru, O best of sages, through giving which a man attains worlds venerated by the gods. Even if a man recites the Vedas and the Purāṇas at sacrifices and temples, he still does not obtain the reward that one acquires by offering these ten gifts on earth. Therefore, I will explain the unsurpassable rules for the Mountain Gifts. The first such gift is the Grain-Mountain; the second is the Salt-Mountain; the third is the Jaggery-Mountain; the fourth is the Gold-Mountain; the fifth is the Sesame-Mountain; the sixth is the Cotton-Mountain; the seventh is the Ghee-Mountain; the eighth is the Jewel-Mountain; the ninth is the Silver-Mountain; and the tenth is the Sugar-Mountain. I will properly explain the rules for these gifts in this order.242

C. Knowledge

The gift of knowledge is supreme:

sārvadharmamayaṁ brahma pradānebhyo 'dhikāṁ tataḥ
pradādat tat samāpnoti brahma-lokaṁ avicyutaṁ ||243

241 DK 5.1.1-6
242 Brick (2015)
243 YDhM 1.210
Brahma, that is, the Veda, which consists of all the dharmanas, is greater than those gifts. Therefore, by gifting it a man obtains the world of Brahma, himself remaining imperishable.\textsuperscript{244}

The commentator \textit{Vijñāneśvara} explains this verse by the peculiarity that we have, here, the production of ownership (\textit{parasvatvāpādana}) without cessation of ownership by the giver (\textit{svasvatvanivṛtti}):

\texttt{<74> atra ca brahmadāne parasvatvāpādanamātraṃ dānāṃ svatvanivṛtteḥ kartum aśakyatvāt}\textsuperscript{245}

And here, in the case of the gift of the Veda, ‘gifting’ denotes merely the production of another’s ownership, since ownership here cannot be made to cease\textsuperscript{246}

\section*{VIII. Buddhist perspectives}

While this book stresses the Brahmanical theories of the gift more than the Buddhist ones, the following quotations are meant to allow the reader comparative perspectives. I might have added Jain perspectives as does Heim (2004), but decided against it.

\textsuperscript{244} Olivelle (2019)
\textsuperscript{245} YSmM 1.210 (1.212)
\textsuperscript{246} Brick (2015, p. 33)
A. Orientation

Structuring Buddhist theories on gifting seems even more difficult than structuring Brahmanical Dānadharma. I mostly rely on the Upāsakajanālāṅkāra, the “Ornament of Lay Followers”247 whose first chapters are listed here:

I. “Explanation of the Morality of the Refuges” (Saranasīlaniddeso)
II. “Explanation of Morality” (Sīlaniddeso)
III. “Explanation of Austere Practices” (Dhutaṅganiddeso)
IV. “Explanation of Livelihood” (Ājīvaniddeso)
V. “Explanation of the Ten Bases of Pure Actions” (Dasapuññaakiriya-vatthuniddeso)

With respect to I, going to the Buddha for refuge (saraṇāgamana) is of central importance in Buddhist texts (see next section B). Note, however, that often-times, three types refuge are mentioned: refuge to the Buddha, refuge to the Doctrine and refuge to the Order.248

Under the heading of “morality” (sīla, see II), the so-called “precepts” (sīla or sikkhāpada249) are discussed. They refer to lists of five, eight, or ten moral prohibitions like not killing or not stealing.250 Thus, they are negatively framed.

Omitting the third chapter, the “explanation of livelihood” contains advice, moral and this-worldly, to householders. We will quote from that fourth chapter extensively. Turning to the topic of the fifth chapter, the following list is of particular relevance:

_________________________

247 Agostini (2015), for the list of chapters below
248 See, for example, UJA 1.11.
249 See UJA 2.12.
The “ten bases of pure action” (dasapuññakiriyavatthūni) or the “ten [acts of] righteousness” (dasadhammāni)\textsuperscript{251} that are to be fulfilled “every day” (dine dine)\textsuperscript{252} are
1. dāna (“giving”),\textsuperscript{253}
2. śīla (“morality”),
3. bhāvana (“mental cultivation”),
4. apacāyana (“reverence”),
5. veyyāvacca (“service”),
6. pattidāna (“giving of good fortune”),
7. anumodana (“rejoicing [in others’ good fortune]”),
8. dhammasavaṇa (“listening to the Doctrine”),
9. dhammadesanā (“teaching to the Doctrine”), and
10. diṭṭhijjukamma (“straightening one’s view”).

Dāna is addressed under the first, but also under later headings (see subsection E below). The second item is about the precepts just mentioned:

Niccasīlādivasena pañca aṭṭha dasa va sīlāni samādiyantassa pa-
ripūrentassa\textsuperscript{254}

Morality is the intention that occurs when one undertakes [and] fulfilts the five, eight, or ten precepts as one’s permanent morality or as other types […] \textsuperscript{255}
B. Going for refuge and gifting

Going for refuge is closely related to gifting. Indeed, refuge may be taken in the context of identifying the donor with the given object as present in the following citation:

<77> Bhagavato attānaṃ pariccajāmi, dhammassa saṅghassa attānaṃ pariccajāmi, pariccatto yeva me attā, pariccattam yeva me jīvitaṃ, jīvitaṃ tapariyantikaṃ Buddham saraṇam gacchāmi, Buddho me saraṇam tāṇaṃ lenaṃ parāyanan.256

I donate myself to the Blessed One, I donote myself to the Doctrine and to the Order. I have donated myself, I have donated my life. Until the end of my life, I go to the Buddha for refuge. The Buddha is my refuge, my protection, my shelter, my ultimate support.257

One manner of going to the Buddha for refuge is called prostration (panipāta):

<78> Tattha ñātibhayācariyadakkhiṇeyyavasena catubbidhesupanipătesu dakkhiṇeyyapanipătesu eva saraṇāgamanaṃ hoti, na itarehi258

Prostrations are of four types: for a relative, out of fear, for a master, and for a worthy recipient of gifts. The act of going for refuge takes place only by the prostration for a worthy recipient of gifts, not by the others.259

256 UJA 1.120.1
257 Agostini (2015)
258 UJA 1.129
259 Agostini (2015)
C. Stories

(1) The Jātaka of the hare

In the Buddhist Jātaka (birth story) of the hare, the extremely beautiful, strong, energetic, ascetic, kind etc. hare\textsuperscript{260} stresses the value of giving:

<79> Strive to increase your merit through giving, the ornament of virtue.
For merit is the best support for creatures who wander the perils of rebirth.\textsuperscript{261}

(2) The story of king Kappina and his queen

Ānanda quotes the story of king Kappina who became a follower of the Buddha.\textsuperscript{262} Upon learning of her husband’s and his ministers’ joining the Buddha, his queen is also intent on honouring the three jewels, i.e., the Buddha, the doctrine, and the order. She tells the ministers’ wives:

<80> Ammā, so tāva rājā hutvā magge ṭhitako va tīhi satasahassehi tīni ratanāni pūjetvā khelapiṇḍam viya sampattiṃ pahāya ‘pabbajissāmi’ ti nikkhanto. Mayā pana tinnaṃ ratanānaṃ sāsanaṃ sutvā tīni ratanāni navasatasahassehi pūjitāni. Na kho pan’esā sampatti nāma rañño eva dukkhā mayham pi dukkhā yeva. Ko rañño chaḍditam khelapiṇḍam jannukehi patiṭṭahitvā mukhena gañhissati? Na mayham sampattiyā attho, aham pi satthāraṃ uddissa gantvā pabbajissāmi\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{260} BB 6.1-2
\textsuperscript{261} BB 6.8, Meiland (2009a)
\textsuperscript{262} UJA 1.186-208
\textsuperscript{263} UJA 1.203
Dear ladies, just now he was the king, but he stood on the road, honoured the three jewels with three hundred thousand [coins], abandoned his fortune like a mass of saliva, and departed to receive ordination. As for me, upon hearing the news about the three jewels, I honoured the three jewels with an additional nine hundred thousand [coins]. Indeed, this [material wealth] is not what we call ‘fortune’: painful to the king, it is painful to me as well. Who will get down on his knees to take into his mouth a mass of saliva discarded by the king? To me, there is no use for this fortune: I too shall go to the Teacher and receive ordination.264

D. A simile for the giving triad

In order to explain the relationship between the three fields of merit, Ānanda uses a long list of similes, among them the following:

<81> Sunāviko viya Buddho, nāvā viya dhammo, tāya pārappatto viya satthikajano saṅgho. […] Dhanado viya Buddhho, dhanam iva dhammo, yathādhippāyaladdhadhano jano viya sammāladdha-ariyadhano saṅgho.265

The Buddha is like a good ferryman. The Doctrine is like a boat. The Order is like caravan people who have reached the other shore on it. […] The Buddha is like a donor of wealth. The Doctrine is like wealth. The Order, which has received the noble wealth, is like people who have received wealth in accordance with their desires.266

264 Agostini (2015)
265 UJA 1.101, 103
266 Agostini (2015)
E. Giving in the context of the bases of pure actions

(1) **Dāna as the first base of pure action**

Turning to the “ten bases of pure action” (see subsection A), the importance of dāna is clear from its first position in that list. Ānanda cites from Saddhammopāyana:

<82> *Annādidānavatthūnam*  
cāgo so buddhipubbako  
ye taṁ dānan ti dīpentī  
*Buddhā dānaggadāyino*\(^{267}\)

A gift is a donation of food and other objects of giving, accompanied by good understanding. So explain the Buddhas, who give the foremost gift.\(^{268}\)

Ānanda then comments:

<83> *Dānavatthupariyesanavasena dinnassa somanassacittena anussaraṇavasena ca pavattā pubbabhāgacchābhāgacetanā pi etth’ eva saṅgahāṁ samodhānāṁ gacchati*\(^{269}\)

Included and classified with this very [basis of pure actions] are also the prior and subsequent intentions, which occur by way of looking for

\(^{267}\) UJA 5.3  
\(^{268}\) Agostini (2015)  
\(^{269}\) UJA 5.3
an object of giving and by way of recollecting with a happy thought what has been given.\textsuperscript{270}

In this manner, “three intentions in all” (\textit{tisso pi cetanā}) are important: before, during, and after the act of giving.\textsuperscript{271} Similarly,

\begin{verbatim}
<84>  Pubb’ eva dānā sumano
       dadaṃ cittaṃ pasādaye
       datvā attamano hoti
       esā yaṅnassa sampadā\textsuperscript{272}

Happy before giving, one should clear one’s mind while giving; after giving, one is delighted: this is the accomplishment of charity.\textsuperscript{273}
\end{verbatim}

\textit{Dāna}’s benefits are manyfold:

\begin{verbatim}
<85>  Ānisāṃsesu pana, dānasamvibhāgānisamso\textsuperscript{274} evam veditabbo:
       Dānam nām’ etam dasapāramitāsu paṭhamapāramī, catusu
       saṅghavatthu paṭhamasaṅghavatthu, dānāsīlabhāvanāsaṅkhātesu
       paṭhamo puññakiriyavatthu, sabbabodhisattānaṃ sañcaraṇamaggo,
       sabbabuddhānaṃ vaṃso.\textsuperscript{275}

As for their benefits, the benefit of giving and sharing should be understood as follows: this giving is the first perfection among the ten perfection, the first basis of sympathy among the four bases of sympathy,
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{270} Agostini (2015)
\textsuperscript{271} UJA 5.3-4, Agostini (2015)
\textsuperscript{272} UJA 5.27
\textsuperscript{273} Agostini (2015)
\textsuperscript{274} This is the reading by Agostini (2015, p. 241: fn. 2) instead of \textit{dāne samvibhāgānisamso}.
\textsuperscript{275} UJA 5.25
the first basis of pure actions among those called giving, morality, and mental cultivation, the path taken by all Bodhisattas, the road frequented by all Buddhas.\textsuperscript{276}

However, these benefits refer the listener to other lists, among them the very list covered in this subsection! Note that \textsuperscript{84} above is cited within the context of benefits.

Depending on the manner of gifting, the giver obtains large worldly benefits:

\textsuperscript{86} As a matter of definition, a “good man’s gifts” (\textit{sappurisadānāni})\textsuperscript{277} are given
1. \textit{saddhāya} (“with faith”),
2. \textit{sakkaccā} (“with respect”),
3. \textit{kālena} (“in time”),
4. \textit{anaggahitacitto} (“with an unconstrained heart”), and
5. \textit{attānañ ca parañ ca anupahacca} (“without harming himself or anybody else”).

The good man can expect to be “rich, having much wealth and much property”. And, more specifically, depending on the five manners listed above:

1) “[H]e is handsome, good-looking, fair, and possessed of the utmost beauty of complexion.”
2) “His children, wife, slaves, servants, or employees obey him, lend ear onto him, and direct their thoughts to his orders.”

\textsuperscript{276} Agostini (2015)
\textsuperscript{277} UJA 5.34-36, Agostini (2015), for this word and the rest of the citations in this subsection.
3) “[A]t death his goods are abundant.”
4) “[H]e directs his mind to the enjoyment of the five great sensual qualities [that please the five senses].”
5) “[N]or does any harm come to him from anywhere, from fire or from water, from the king or from thieves or from unaffectionate heirs.”

Ānanda glosses “with an unconstrained heart” (anaggahitacitto) (see 4.) by “with a heart not enveloped by stinginess” (macchariyena apariyonad-dhacitto).\textsuperscript{278}

Long lists of the benefits of giving are enumerated:

\begin{verbatim}
<87> Dānaṃ tānaṃ manussānaṃ |
dānaṃ bandhuparāyanam ||
dānaṃ dukkhādhipannānaṃ |
sattānaṃ paramā gati ||
[...]
pītim udāraṃ vindati dātā |
gāravam asmiṃ gacchati loke ||
khyātim anantaṃ yāti ca dātā |
vissasanīyo hoti ca dātā ||\textsuperscript{279}
\end{verbatim}

Giving is the protection of men. Giving is the support of friends. Giving is the best way out for sentient beings fallen into suffering. [...]

\textsuperscript{278} UJA 5.37, Agostini (2015)
\textsuperscript{279} UJA 5.49-50
A giver finds sublime joy, is respected in this world. A giver goes to an endless renown, and a giver is trustworthy.\textsuperscript{280}

Unsurprisingly, the effects of giving depend on the receiver:\textsuperscript{281} Lots of merit is produced by giving to a “single stream-enterer”\textsuperscript{282} (ekassa sotāpannassa\textsuperscript{283}), but even more through others:

\texttt{<88>\[\text{\[\ldots\]}\text{Tato ekassa sakadāgāmino, tato ekassa anāgāmino, tato ekassa arahato, tato ekassa paccekabuddhassa, tato Sammāsambuddhassa, tato Buddhapamukhassa saṅghassa}\textsuperscript{284} \[\ldots\] Greater than this is the fruit of a gift done to a single once-returner, [and progressively greater is the fruit of a gift done] to a single non-returner, to a single worthy one, to a solitary Buddha, to a Perfectly Awakened Buddha, and to the Order headed by the Buddha.\textsuperscript{285}}

\begin{enumerate}
\item [2] \textbf{Service as a dāna-like activity}

The fifth basis of pure action is called service that differs from the fourth one, reverence:

\texttt{<89>\[\text{Cīvarādisu paccāsārahitassa asaṅkiliṭṭhena ajjhāsayena sa-}\text{mañabrāhmaṇavuddhānāṃ vattapaṭivattakaraṇavasena}\text{gilānūpaṭṭhānavasena ca pavattā cetanā veyyāvaccaaṃ nāma. Veyyāvaccāpacāyanānāṃ hi ayaṃ vīseso: Vayasā guṇena ca jeṭṭhānam}}

\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{280} Agostini (2015)
\textsuperscript{281} Compare section VI.I.
\textsuperscript{282} Agostini (2015). See UJA 1.184 where such a person is described as a sort of novice.
\textsuperscript{283} UJA 1.183
\textsuperscript{284} UJA 1.183
\textsuperscript{285} Agostini (2015)
gilānānañ ca taṃ taṃ kiccakaraṇaṃ veyyāvaccam, sāmīcikiriyā apacāyanan ti.²⁸⁶

Service is the intention that occurs by way of performing all kinds of duties for ascetics, brahmīns, and elderly people, and by way of helping the sick, without expecting robes or something in return, with an undefiled attitude. For this is the difference between service and reverence: service is any performance of duties for one’s superiors, by age or virtue, and for the sick; reverence is an act of homage.²⁸⁷

Unsurprisingly, there are also benefits to providing service to others, among them friends in times of distress:

<90>  Āpadāsu sahāyanam lābhā naṭṭhatthasiddiyā
carīvārasampadā ceti veyyāvaccaphalam matā
[...]
Yo gilānam upaṭṭhāti so upaṭṭhāti maṃ iti
mahākāruṇikenā pi so bhusam parivaṭṭito.²⁸⁸

Finding friends in times of distress, the achievement of desired goals, and an excellent retinue are thought to be the fruit of service.
[...]
Even the very compassionate [Buddha] praised him strongly: ‘Whoever nurses sick man, nurses me.’²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ UJA 5.11
²⁸⁷ Agostini (2015)
²⁸⁸ UJA 5.57
²⁸⁹ Agostini (2015)
(3) **Pattidāna as a dāna-like activity**

*Pattidāna* (the sixth basis) seems to consist of good wishes with respect to merit:\(^{290}\)

<91> \[ Dānādikaṃ yaṃ kiñci sucāritaṃ kammaṃ katvā asukassa nāma patti hotu, sabbasattānaṃ vā hotū ti evaṃ attanā katassa parehi sādhāraṇabhāvaṃ paccāsimsanavaseṇa pavattā cetanā pattidānaṃ nāma. Kim pan’ evaṃ pattim dadato puññakkhayo hotī ti? Na hotī. Yathā ekadīpaṃ jāletvā tato dīpasahassaṃ jālentassa paṭhamadīpo khīṇo ti na vattabho. […] Evam eva pattim dadato parihāni nāma na hoti, vaḍḍhi yeva pana hotī ti daṭṭhabbo.\(^{291}\)

When a good action, a gift or anything else, is done, the giving of good fortune is the intention that occurs by way of wishing that others share what has been done by oneself thus: ‘May such-and-such or all sentient beings have my good fortune.’ But does one who gives one’s good fortune incur an exhaustion of one’s own merit? No, just as it should not be said that when one, having lighted a lamp, lights a thousand lamps from it, the first lamp is exhausted. […] Just so, for one who gives one’s good fortune, there is certainly no loss, but only increase [of merits].\(^{292}\)

In the *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra*, we find this remark on the benefit of giving good fortune:

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290 Note, however, that UJA 5.14 contradicts the main meaning expounded here.
291 UJA 5.12
292 Agostini (2015)
Attiatham anapekkhitvā parattham diyate yato karuṇākataṅṇutāyogā pattidānam visesitam.\textsuperscript{293}

The giving of good fortune is outstanding because it is given for another’s benefit, without expecting one’s own benefit, through compassion and gratitude.\textsuperscript{294}

\begin{itemize}
\item[(4)] \textbf{Dhammadesanā as a dāna-like activity}
\end{itemize}

\textit{Dhammadesanā} is also seen as a gift:

\begin{quote}
Āmisakiṅcikkanirampekkhacittassa attano pagunam dhammaṃ […] desentassa, tath’eva niravajjijjājyanādikam upadisantassa ca pavattā cetanā dhammadesanā nāma.\textsuperscript{295}
\end{quote}

Teaching the doctrine is the intention that occurs when one, without expecting any material gain whatsoever in one’s mind, teaches the Doctrine with which one is well-acquainted […] and when one teaches blameless subjects of [ordinary] learning.\textsuperscript{296}

The benefits of teaching dhamma are transcendental, rather than this-worldly:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Sabbadānaṃ dhammadānam |} \\
\textit{jinātī ti jino ‘bravī ||} \\
\textit{desayī desakavaro |} \\
\textit{desetā dullabho ti ca ||} \\
\textit{Attho padīyamāno hi |} \\
\textit{tato khippaṃ vigacchati ||}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{293} UJA 5.59 \\
\textsuperscript{294} Agostini (2015) \\
\textsuperscript{295} UJA 5.16 \\
\textsuperscript{296} Agostini (2015)
\end{flushleft}
'The gift of the Doctrine surpasses all other gifts,' so said the Conquerer. And the best of teachers also taught, ‘A teaching is hard to find.’ For when wealth is given out, it then disappears quickly. When the Doctrine is given out, it increases on both sides.

Knowledge of the intrinsic nature of phenomena, awareness of the dangers of the world of rebirth, and penetration of the truths: they all arise from teaching.\(^{298}\)

Dhammadāna does not expect any material gain. Inversely, however, the idea of the monks’ reciprocating the reception of material gifts by teaching the Doctrine is well documented:

\[^{95}\]

_Gihīnam upakarontānaṃ niccam āmisadānato,_

_karotha dhammadānena tesāṃ paccūpakārakaṃ_\(^{299}\)

\(^{297}\) UJA 5.61
\(^{298}\) Agostini (2015)
\(^{299}\) UJA 1.57
To those householders who are supporters from their constant giving of material things, render a service in return by the giving of the Doctrine.\textsuperscript{300}

While \textit{dhammadāna} here in \textless 95\textgreater  etymologically corresponds to \textit{dharmadāna} in \textless 55\textgreater, these two terms are not to be confounded with each other. \textit{Dhammadāna} is a genetive tatpuruṣa (“giving of the doctrine”) while \textit{dharmadāna} is a karmad-hāraya “a dharmic giving”.

\section*{F. Less idealistic viewpoints for householders}

The previous subsection stressed the importance of giving from the point of view of the Ten Bases of Pure Actions. These prescriptions are put into perspective in other parts of Buddhist lay literature, in particular in the “explanation for livelihood” (see subsection A).

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{The six-quarters theory}
\end{enumerate}

According to the Upāsakajanālaṅkāra, “six quarters must be protected” (\textit{cha disā parivajjitabbā})\textsuperscript{301}:

\begin{verbatim}<96> Mātā pitā disā pubbā, ācariyā dakkhiṇā disā, puttadārā disā pacchā, mittāmaccā ca uttarā.
Dāsakammakarā heṭṭhā uddhaṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇā,
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{300} Agostini (2015)
\textsuperscript{301} UJA 4.6, Agostini (2015)
etā disānamasseyya
alam attho kule gihē

[...]
Ācariyā dakkhiṇeyyatāya dakkhiṇā disā ti

[...]
Samaṇabrāhmaṇā guṇehi upariṭṭhitabhāvena uparimā disā ti veditabbā ti³⁰²

One’s mother and father are the eastern quarters,
one’s teachers are the southern quarters,
one’s children and wife are the western quarters,
and one’s friends and companions are the northern quarter.

Servants and employees are the nadir,
ascetics and brahmins are the zenith.
The quarters should be honoured by a houseman
who is truly beneficial to his clan.³⁰³

[...]
One’s teachers are the southern quarter (dakkhiṇ-) because they are
worthy recipients of gifts (dakkhiṇ-).

[...]
Ascetics and brahmins should be understood as the zenith (upari-) be-
cause they rank higher (upari-) in their virtues.

³⁰² UJA 4.67-68
³⁰³ Agostini (2015)
Thus, a good householder is not an extremist. It should be noted that gifting is not directly mentioned in the context of teachers. However, when turning to “ascetics and brahmins”, the Upāsakajanālaṅkāra provides this list:

<97> Mettena kāyakammena, mettena vacīkammena, mettena manokammena, anāvaṭadvāratāya, āmisānuppadānenā

[He minister to them] by affectionate bodily action, by affectionate verbal action, by affectionate mental action, by not closing the door on them, by providing for their material needs.

Here, “material needs” is explained as “meal of rice gruel for those who observe the precepts”.

(2) The four-parts theory

The Upāsakajanālaṅkāra advises to split one’s riches into four parts:


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304 Indeed, in UJA 4.71, Agostini (2015), five ways in which a pupil should “minister to his teachers” are listed, among them “by attending upon them, and by respectfully acquiring the training”, but not by gifting.
305 UJA 4.77
306 Agostini (2015)
307 UJA 4.100
308 UJA 4.102
Therefore, one should divide one’s riches into four parts and enjoy them using one part. With two parts one should promote one’s job, agriculture, commerce, and so on. But the fourth part should be stored and kept aside for emergencies.\textsuperscript{309}

Of course, this passage prompts the question of how donations are to be financed. The answers are far from clear-cut:

\textit{Tasmā yathā vibhavaṃ saddhāmurūpaṃ catūhi ekena vā koṭṭhāsena puññakaraṇaṃ icchanto Bhagavā tad atthāya visuṃ koṭṭhāsaṃ anuddharitvā catudhā bhogam vibhajī ti veditabbam.}

\textit{Aṭṭhakathācariyā pana bhuñjitabbakoṭṭhāsato ‘bhikkhūnam pi ka-panaddhikavaṇībbakādīnam pi dānaṃ dātabban\textsuperscript{310} ti vadanti. Taṃ ādikammikassa dānapatipattiyaṃ otaraṇatthāyā ti veditabbam. Otiṇṇo hi kamena so viya Bhagavā attano maṃsalohitam pi dātum samattho bhaveyyā ti.\textsuperscript{311}}}

Therefore, the Blessed One, in his wish that pure actions [no matter if done] with one or four parts [of one’s income], be proportionate to one’s wealth and reflect one’s faith, did not allocate a separate part for that purpose, but divided wealth into four parts. It should be understood thus.

And yet, according to the masters of the commentaries, it is out of the part allocated to food—they say—that “one must make gifts both to monks and to poor men, travellers, wayfarers, and the like”. [But] one

\textsuperscript{309} Agostini (2015)
\textsuperscript{310} Inverted commas added by current author. Agostini (2015, p. 221: fn. 4) mentions that this quotation is due to the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī.
\textsuperscript{311} UJA 4.105-106
should understand this [view] as aimed at introducing a beginner to the practice of giving. For after being [thus] introduced, he would gradually become capable of giving even his own flesh and blood as the Blessed One did [in his past lives].

The householder’s wife is also engaged in the giving of food and other items:

<100> [...] sāyaṇhe ca gehe bhuñjantānaṃ sabbesaṃ bhojanaṃ dāpetvā, ye aladdhabhojanā tesam pi bhojanaṃ sampādetvā […]. Amaccharī hutvā dānasamvibhāgaratā hoti. […] Yā pana akkodhanā hoti, sā abhirūpā hoti. Yā dānam deti, sā mahābhogā hoti.

[...] [I]n the evening she has food given to all who eat in the house and prepares food also for those who have no food. [...] Being unstingy, she likes giving and sharing. [...] [I]f she does not grow angry, she becomes beautiful [in another life]. If she makes gifts, she becomes wealthy.

Giving should be focused on the Buddhist order:

<101> Pañcahi bhikkhave, dhammehi samannāgato upāsako upāsakacaṇḍālo ca hoti, upāsakamalaṇ ca upāsakapatikiṭṭho ca. Katamehi pañcahi? Asaddho hoti, […] bahiddhā dakkhiṇeyyaṃ pariyesati, tattha ca pub-bakāraṃ karoṭi [ti …] Monks, a lay follower endowed with five qualities is the outcaste of law followers, the dirt of lay followers, the vilest of lay followers.

312 Agostini (2015)
313 UJA 4.107-110
314 Agostini (2015)
315 UJA 4.116
What five? He has no faith, [...] he looks for a worthy recipient outside this [Buddhist order] and there he first offers his services.\(^{316}\)

If householders are approached by alms seekers, they may not like to give and resort to a lie:

\(<102>\quad \textit{Api ca gahaṭṭhānaṁ attano santakaṁ adātukāmatāya natthī ti ādi-nayappavatto appasāvajjo.}\(^{317}\)

Moreover, householders do not wish to give their goods, and therefore [they falsely say,] “I do not have [anything to give].” When [false speech] occurs in this and similar ways, it is little blameworthy.\(^{318}\)

While giving does not belong to the (negatively framed) precepts, it is first in the list of (positively framed) bases of pure actions:

\(<103>\quad \textit{Api ca gahaṭṭhānaṁ attano santakaṁ adātukāmatāya natthī ti ādi-nayappavatto appasāvajjo.}\(^{319}\)

Moreover, householders do not wish to give their goods, and therefore [they falsely say,] “I do not have [anything to give].” When [false speech] occurs in this and similar ways, it is little blameworthy.\(^{320}\)

**G. Taking what is not given**

The Upāsakajanālaṅkāra defines the five factors of what constitutes “taking what is not given”:

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\(^{316}\) Agostini (2015)
\(^{317}\) UJA 2.123
\(^{318}\) Agostini (2015)
\(^{319}\) UJA 2.123
\(^{320}\) Agostini (2015)
Idāni tad anantaram niddīṭhassa adinnādānassa
1. parapariggahitattam
2. parapariggahitasaññitā
3. theyyacittam
4. upakkamo
5. tena ca haraṇan
ti pañc’ eva aṅgāni veditabbāni.\textsuperscript{321}

Now, next is explained “taking what is not given”. Its five factors should be known:
1. something is someone else’s property;
2. one is aware that is is someone else’s property;
3. the thought to steal;
4. the onset of the action;
5. as a result of that [onset], taking away [that property].\textsuperscript{322}

Depending on the modes of taking, one is concerned with theft, robbery, and the like.

\section*{H. Grounds for evil actions}

Ānanda lists four grounds of evil actions: partiality, enmity, fear, and delusion.\textsuperscript{323} Applied to giving one obtains:

\textit{Tathā kiñci bhājento,}\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{321} UJA 1.129
\textsuperscript{322} Agostini (2015)
\textsuperscript{323} UJA 4.9, in a slightly different order
1. ‘ayaṃ me sandiṭṭho vā sambhatto vā ’ ti premavasena atirekaṃ deti,
2. ‘ayaṃ me veri ’ ti dosavasena ūnakaṃ deti
3. ‘ayaṃ imasmiṃ adīyamāne mayham anattham pi kareyyā ’ ti bhīto kassaci atirekaṃ deti
4. momūhattā dinnādinnam ajānanto kassaci ūnakaṃ kassaci adhīkaṃ deti.\textsuperscript{324}

Thus, while distributing something,
1. one gives more out of love, [thinking:] “This is my acquaintance” or else “my companion”;
2. one gives less out of enmity, [thinking:] “This is my enemy”;
3. one gives more to someone, fearing that “If I did not give it to him, he could even harm me”;
4. one gives less to someone and more to someone [else], without realizing what is being given or is not being given out of delusion.\textsuperscript{325}

\textbf{IX. Seneca on \textit{beneficium} and fellowship}

Dharmic giving can be put into perspective by comparing it with the theory of fellowship by the Roman philosopher Seneca. He stresses the importance of thankfulness apparently absent in \textit{dānadharma}. Section XIX.B presents a small probabilistic model on \textit{beneficium}.

\textsuperscript{324} UJA 4.13, with numbers added by current author
\textsuperscript{325} Agostini (2015), with numbers added by current author
A. Preliminary definition

Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 and 1 BCE – 65 CE)\textsuperscript{326} was a Roman philosopher belonging to the Stoic school of philosophers. He is credited with several plays and philosophical treatises. For our purpose, “\textit{de beneficiis}” (on benefits)\textsuperscript{327} is of special relevance. Indeed, it can be fruitfully contrasted with Brahmanical \textit{dāna} theory. Both theories have a moral impetus, advising agents on how to give and on how to receive. In contrast to the Brahmanical \textit{dāna} theory, Seneca stresses thankfulness and the receiver’s wish to reciprocate. Since this way of thinking about gifts is closer to the typical modern mind than the Brahmanical manner, Seneca provides a useful alternative against which to look at the Indian material. The similarities in these two manners of approaching gifting as well as the differences are worth stressing.

Seneca, then, provides the following definition of a \textit{beneficium}:
\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{<106>} \textit{Quod est ergo beneficium? Beniuola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo in id, quod facit prona et sponte sua parata. Itaque non, quid fiat aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente, quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo.}\textsuperscript{328}
\end{quote}

So what is a benefit? It is a well-intentioned action that confers joy and in so doing derives joy, inclined towards and willingly prepared for doing what it does. And so it matters not what is done or what is given,

\textsuperscript{326} Asmis et al. (2011, pp. vii–ix)
\textsuperscript{327} See the monograph by Griffin (2013).
\textsuperscript{328} BEN 1.6.1
but with what attitude, since the benefit consists not in what is done or
given, but rather in the intention of the giver or agent.\textsuperscript{329}

Consider also the two meanings of beneficium:
\begin{quote}
\textit{Sic beneficium est et actio, ut diximus, benefica et ipsum, quod datur per illam actionem, ut pecunia, ut domus, ut praetexta; unum utrique nomen est, uis quidem ac potestas longe alia.}\textsuperscript{330}
\end{quote}

In the same way, a benefit is two things: it is, as I have said, a benevolent action; and it is also the thing that is given through such an action, such as money, a house, a magistracy. They share a name but their meaning and significance are very, very different.\textsuperscript{331}

It was clear to both the \textit{dharmadāna} authors as to Seneca that the manner of gifting is of vital importance.

\section*{B. Giving with a friendly face}

Seneca and the Indian \textit{dharmadāna} authors share the concern of giving with a friendly face. Seneca explains:
\begin{quote}
\textit{Gratus adversus eum esse quisquam potest, qui beneficium aut superbe abiecit aut iratus inpegit aut fatigatus, ut molestia careret, dedit?}\textsuperscript{332}
\end{quote}
Can anyone be grateful to a person who arrogantly tosses off the benefit, angrily throws it in his face, or gives it only out of weariness, to avoid further hassle?333

Similarly, śraddhā in the sense of spirit of generosity (subsection VI.E) is explained with words like “excessive joy, a happy face”. It seems that śraddhā as “conviction about the certainty of rewards” has no obvious correlate in Seneca’s thinking. See, however, the advantage of fellowship.

C. Giving in line with one’s means

According to both Seneca and the Indian dharmaśāstra authors, giving should be generous, but within reasonable limits. According to the Roman philosophers, <109> Respiciendae sunt cuique facultates suae uiresque, ne aut plus praestemus, quam possumus, aut minus334

We must each pay attention to our capacities and abilities to avoid giving either more or less than we are able to give.335

This idea is covered by the Indian concept of śakti (subsection VI.F) where the interests of the donor’s family are to be respected.

D. The worthy recipient

Seneca argues that the recipient should be selected carefully:

333 Griffin, M. and Inwood, B. (2011)
334 BEN 2.15.3
335 Griffin, M. and Inwood, B. (2011)
Nec mirum est inter plurima maximaque uitia nullum esse frequentius quam ingrati animi. ... Prima illa est, quod non eligimus dignos, quibus tribuamus. Sed nomina facturi diligenter in patrimonium et uitam debitoris inquirimus, semina in solum effetum et sterile non spargimus: beneficia sine ullo dilectu magis proicimus quam damus.336

And it is no surprise that among the large number of extremely grave vices, none is more common than those stemming from an ungrateful mind. The first is that we do not select worthy recipients for our gifts. By contrast, when we are going to lend money we make a thorough inquiry into the inherited assets and lifestyle of our debtor; we do not sow seed onto ground that is exhausted and infertile. But our benefits we cast off without any discrimination, rather than actually giving them.337

The reason for carefully selecting a receiver is that the donor expects thankfulness:

Cum accipiendum iudicauerimus, hilares accipiamus profitentes gaudium, et id danti manifestum sit, ut fructum praesentem capiat [...] Qui grate beneficium accipit, primam eius pensionem soluit.338

Once we have decided to accept, we should do so with a cheerful acknowledgement of our pleasure. This should be made apparent to the giver so that he gets an immediate satisfaction; [...] Receiving a benefit with gratitude is the first installment of repayment.339

336 BEN 2.22.1
337 Griffin, M. and Inwood, B. (2011)
338 BEN 1.1.2
339 Griffin, M. and Inwood, B. (2011)
In Indian dharmadāna texts, the worthy recipient is called a pātra. This concept is very prominent and has occurred above in <55>, <130>, and <143>.

E. Beneficium without the expectation of reciprocity

For Seneca, bestowing benefits is about a donor’s giving freely and voluntarily, as a token of friendship, and about the receiver’s gratitude (<111>), but never about reciprocity in a narrow-minded business-type manner. Seneca characterizes the donor’s attitude as follows

<112> Beneficiorum simplex ratio est: tantum erogatur; si reddet aliquid, lucrum est, si non reddet, damnum non est. Ego illut dedi, ut darem. Nemo beneficia in calendario scribit nec avarus exactor ad horam et diem appellat. Numquam illa uir bonus cogitat nisi admonitus a reddente; alioqui in formam credendi transit. Turpis feneratio est beneficium expensum ferre.\(^{340}\)

The bookkeeping for benefits is quite simple. A certain amount is disbursed; if there is any repayment at all, then it is a profit. If there is no repayment, it is not a loss. I gave it only in order to give. No one records benefits in an account book and then, like a greedy collection agent, demands payment at a set day and time. A good man never thinks about his gifts unless he is reminded by someone wishing to repay them. Otherwise the benefits are converted into loans. Treating a benefit as an expenditure is a shameful form of loan-sharking.\(^{341}\)

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\(^{340}\) BEN 1.2.3

\(^{341}\) Griffin, M. and Inwood, B. (2011)
Or, consider this argument of Seneca’s:

<113> Quotiens, quod proposuit, quisque consequitur, capit operis sui fructum. Qui beneficium dat, quie proponit? prodesse ei, cui dat, et uoluptati esse. Si, quod uoluit, efficit pervenitque ad me animus eius ac mutuo gudio adfecti, tuit, quod petit. Non enim in uicem aliquid sibi re-did uoluit; aut non fuit beneficium, sed negotiation.\textsuperscript{342}

Whenever someone achieves his intent, he gets the fruits of his labors. What is the intention of the person who gives a benefit? To be useful to the recipient and to give him pleasure. If he achieved this objective and if his intention got through to me and we felt mutual pleasure, then he got what he was aiming at. For he did not want to be given something in exchange; otherwise it was not a benefit but a business deal.\textsuperscript{343}

Clearly, a dharmadāna is even more anti-reciprocal than a beneficium. After all, a dharmadāna is not an arthadāna (see <55>).

F. Virtue and advantage (fellowship)

Seneca stresses again and again that benefits should be bestowed because benefitting others is a virtue. The fact that this (beautiful) virtue is accompanied by advantages (attractions) does not preclude choosing the virtue for its own sake:

<114> Non ideo per se non est expetendum, cui aliquid extra quoque emolumenti adhaeret; fere enim pulcerrima quaeque multis et aduenticiis comitata sunt dotibus, sed illas trahunt, ipsa praecedunt.\textsuperscript{344}

\textsuperscript{342} BEN 2.31.2
\textsuperscript{343} Griffin, M. and Inwood, B. (2011)
\textsuperscript{344} BEN 4.22.4
It is not that something is not to be chosen for its own sake, just because some extraneous advantage attaches to it. The most beautiful things are in fact often accompanied by a host of added attractions, but it is the beauty that leads and the attractions follow along.\footnote{Griffin, M. and Inwood, B. (2011)}

The main advantage of bestowing benefits, above virtue or beauty, is fellowship (societas). This advantage is clear from the following long passage:

\begin{quote}
Vt scias per se expetendam esse grati animi adfectionem, per se fugienda res est ingratum esse, quoniam nihil aeque concordiam humani generis dissociat ac distrahit quam hoc uitium. Nam quo alio tuto sumus, quam quod mutuis iuuamur officiis? hoc uno instructior uita contraque incursiones subitas munitior est, beneficiorum commercio. Fac nos singulos, quid sumus? praeda animalium et uictimae ac bellissimus et facillimus sanguis, quoniam ceteris animalibus in tutelam sui satis virium est; quaecumque uaga nascebantur et actura uitam segregem, armata sunt, hominem cutis pro tegmine inbecilla cingit, non unguium uis, non dentium terribilem ceteris fecit, nudum et infirmum societas munit. Duas res deus dedit, quae illum obnoxium validissimum facerent, rationem et societatem; itaque, qui par esse nulli posset, si seduceretur, rerum potitur. Societas illi dominium omnium animalium dedit; societas terris genitum in alienae naturae transmisit imperium et dominari etiam in mari iussit; hoc morborum inpetus arcuit, senectuti adminicula prospexit, solacia contra dolores dedit; hoc fortes nos facit, quod licet contra fortunam aduocare.\footnote{BEN 4.18.1-3}''
That gratitude is an attitude to be chosen for itself follows from the fact that ingratitude is something to be avoided in itself, because nothing dissolves and disrupts the harmony of mankind as this vice. For what else keeps us safe, except helping each other by reciprocal services? 

Taken one by one, what are we? The prey of animals, their victims, the choicest blood, and the easiest to come by. Other animals have enough strength to protect themselves, and those that were born to wander and lead isolated lives are armed. But man is covered with a delicate skin: he has neither powerful claws nor teeth to instill fear in others; naked and weak as he is, it is fellowship that protects him. God has granted two things that make this vulnerable creature the strongest of all: reason and fellowship. So the being that on its own was no match for anything is now the master of all things. Fellowship has given him power over all animals; fellowship has conferred on this terrestrial creature control of another’s sphere and ordered him to rule even by sea. It is this that has checked the incursions of disease, provided support for his old age, and given him comfort in his sufferings; it is this that makes us brave because we can call on it for help against Fortune.  

X. Christian perspectives (Augustinus)

Preparing the illuminative mode (one of the two modes within Freiberger’s four-fold configuration of a comparative study), some highly selective Christian perspectives are offered.

347 Griffin, M. and Inwood, B. (2011)
A. Umbra excusatiunculae non excusans

Giving everything during one’s lifetime (sarvasva (<53>) and sarvavedasadakṣīṇā (<9>)) is discussed in Indian texts. As an aside, “everything” may refer to one’s very existence as is indicated in the Buddhist context where the ātmā (Sanskrit) or the attā (Pali) is donated (see <77>). Similarly, Jesus requests his disciples: “If anyone wants to come with me, he must forget self, carry his cross, and follow me.”

The early Father of the Church Basilius (4. c. CE) is very strict (at least in theory) about “giving everything to the poor”. In particular, he does not accept family and children as a valid excuse:

<116> Numne iis qui matrimonio junguntur, scripta sunt Evangelia: Si vis perfectus esse, vende quae habes, et da pauperibus?

You do not claim that the evangelium has not been written for married coupled, the evangelium that requires: If you want to be perfect, sell everything you own and give it to the poor.

And, furthermore:

<117> nonne cunctis liberis propinquior tibi est anima tua?

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348 Mt_E 16.24
349 As Bruck (1956, pp. 6–7) explains, Basilius nevertheless sided with the less stringent requirements of “Fac locus Christo cum filiis tuis” (see the next section).
350 Basilius, Homilia in divites, chapter 7, in Migne (1857, col. 298). The original is in Greek, but the author’s knowledge of Greek is even poorer than his command of Latin.
351 After Bruck (1956, p. 6)
352 Basilius, Homilia in divites, chapter 7, in Migne (1857, col. 299)
Is not your soul for you closer than all your children?\textsuperscript{353}

This position is echoed by the ascetic Salvianus who was born in Trier and wrote “Ad Ecclesiam” after 435 CE and “De gubernatione Dei” around 439 CE.\textsuperscript{354} Salvianus also demanded to give away everything during one’s lifetime, but in any case after death, i.e., they demanded to bequest everything. Salvianus’ motivation is clear from this admonition:

\begin{quote}
\textit{nolite thesaurizare uobis thesauros in terra, thesaurizate autem uobis thesauros in caelo}\textsuperscript{355}

Do not amass riches for on earth, instead, amass riches for you in heaven
\end{quote}

And consider

\begin{quote}
\textit{non quero, ut pro peccatis tuis totum deo tradas quod habes: hoc solum redee quod debes}\textsuperscript{356}

I do not require that, for your sins, you give God everything that you possess; return only what you owe\textsuperscript{357}
\end{quote}

According to Bruck (1956, p. 108) this means to bequest everything. Very similar to Basilius above, Salvianus does not consider the love of one’s children a good excuse of not “giving God everything”, rather this is just

\begin{quote}
\textit{umbra excusatiunculae non excusans}\textsuperscript{358}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{353} After Bruck (1956, pp. 107–108)
\textsuperscript{354} Letsch-Brunner (2001)
\textsuperscript{355} Salvianus, Ad ecclesiam, Liber I, § 21, in Pauly (1883, p. 230)
\textsuperscript{356} Salvianus, Ad ecclesiam, Liber I, § 61, in Pauly (1883, p. 243)
\textsuperscript{357} After Bruck (1956, pp. 107–108)
\textsuperscript{358} Salvianus, Ad ecclesiam, Liber III, § 9, in Pauly (1883, p. 271)
\end{flushright}
the shade of miserable excuse that does not excuse anything\textsuperscript{359}

Indeed, the lord himself has decreed:

\begin{quotation}
&lt;121&gt; \textit{qui amat filium aut filiam plus quam me, non est me dignus}\textsuperscript{360}

whoever loves his son or daughter more than me is not fit to be my disciple\textsuperscript{361}
\end{quotation}

And the effects of not giving everything are grim:

\begin{quotation}
&lt;122&gt; \textit{torquearis [...] tenebris exterioribus [...] eneceris et ardentibus sine fine flammis non decoquaris}\textsuperscript{362}

you are tormented, killed in utmost darkness, and boiled in flames that burn without end
\end{quotation}

The giving to monks is, at least partially, justified by equity reasons. What should the monks do with the donations obtained?

\begin{quotation}
&lt;123&gt; \textit{dicitis, quid opus sit religiosis iusta patrimonii portione? respondeo: ut religionis fungantur officio, ut religiosorum rebus religio ditetur, ut donent ut largiantur ut illis habentibus cuncti habeant non habentes}\textsuperscript{363}

You say what work might be [effected] by the monks through the just portion of the inheritage? I anwer: so that they are effective in the service of religion, so that religion is enriched by the monks’ deeds, so
\end{quotation}

\textsuperscript{359} After Bruck (1956, pp. 107–108)
\textsuperscript{360} Salvianus, Epistola VIII, § 6, in Pauly (1883, p. 218), quoting Mt_L 10.37 (\textit{qui amat filium aut filiam super me, non est me dignus}) in Weber (1994, p. 1541)
\textsuperscript{361} Mt_E 10.37
\textsuperscript{362} Salvianus, Ad ecclesiam, Liber III, § 78, in Pauly (1883, p. 295)
\textsuperscript{363} Salvianus, Ad ecclesiam, Liber III, § 23, in Pauly (1883, pp. 275–276)
that they give, so that they donate, so that, since those [monks] possess, all possess who do not possess\textsuperscript{364}

Bruck (1956, p. 117) observes that \textit{justa portio} which should be the whole of one’s wealth according to Salvianus, constitutes a \textit{contradictio in adiecto} which stresses Salvianus’ disapproval of just giving Jesus Christ a “fair” share (next section).

\textbf{B. Fac locus Christo cum filiis tuis}

In a more moderated manner, Augustinus and others championed the idea of considering Jesus Christ a son who obtains his fair share of the heritage.\textsuperscript{365} Augustinus expresses this idea in the following manner:

\texttt{<124> Fac locus Christo cum filiis tuis, accedat familiae tuae Dominus tuus, accedat ad prolem Creator tuus, accedat ad numerum filiorum tuorum frater tuus. […] Duos filios habes, tertium illum computa: tres habes, quartus numeretur …}\textsuperscript{366}

Make place for Christ together with your sons; your Lord should approach your family; your creator should approach your descendants; your brother should approach to the number of your sons. […] You have two sons, consider him the third one. You have three, he should count as the fourth one.

\textsuperscript{364} After Bruck (1956, p. 111)
\textsuperscript{365} Bruck (1956, pp. 88–100) argues for Hieronymus, rather than Augustinus, as the inventor.
\textsuperscript{366} Augustinus, Sermo 86, caput 11, in Migne (1845, col. 529)
“Modern perspectives” comprise economics, sociology, and marketing. Since economic concepts are used more extensively than others and since economics tends to be more mathematical, the following two chapters present economic concepts to be applied later on. Ideas from sociology and marketing will be introduced whenever appropriate. Even economists may not be familiar with chapter XII, with its focus on altruistic models.
XI. Egoistic toolbox

Rather standard microeconomic models are presented in this chapter, from household theory over Edgeworthian and Walrasian models up to non-cooperative game theory. A few ideas on the concept of “power” are discussed in the section on the Shapley value (section XI.I).

A. Introductory remark

Most models used in this book are microeconomic models. In these models, agents have aims that they pursue in a rational manner. Microeconomic decision theory typically builds on some definition of preferences and on a definition of feasibility. Preferences refer to what an agent “likes”. It is usually expressed by way of a “preference relation”. Such a relation makes statements of the form: the agent prefers $x$ over $y$.

Feasibility deals with the set of options available to the agent. The agent may not have $x$ at his disposal, while both $y$ and $z$ are feasible. In that case, the agent will chose $z$ if $z$ is preferred over $y$. That is, on the two pillars of

- the set of feasible actions and
- a preference relation

microeconomics ventures the simple and pretty obvious prediction: the agent will choose a feasible option that is at least as good as any other feasible option.

Microeconomists try to understand economic, social, and other situations by building simplifying models. In this book, we often simplify the $dāna$ situation by treating it as a once-and-for-all situation. This is a clear contradiction to the Manu citation <1> where giving is be to $nityam$, i.e., “a matter of routine obligation”. The common excuse runs like this: Simplifications serve to concentrate on the important aspects of the modelled situation.
Microeconomic models comprise decision theory, noncooperative game theory, and general equilibrium theory. Leaving microeconomics, we turn to cooperative game theory and, in particular, the Shapley value in section XI.1 of this chapter.

Modelling consists of two steps. First, the model itself is described. It is meant to reproduce important elements of reality. But, of course, it is a very simplified mirror of any reality “out there”. The second step consists of producing a theoretical prediction of “what will happen”. Which are the strategies chosen by the agents, which prices will prevail, what are the players’ payoffs? The theoretical predictions are derived by applying so-called solution concepts, such as the Walras equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium, the Shapley value and so forth.

**B. Bundels of goods**

Economists often imagine that agents have “preferences” on a set of “bundles of goods”. In microeconomic models, agent is confronted with goods he considers consuming. Depending on the problem at hand, these goods can stand for

- apples,
- material goods in monetary terms, or
- immaterial goods, such as Vedic learning.

To simplify the analysis, one often deals with one good, only, or with two goods. In the latter case, one considers bundles of goods, comprising

- four apples and two pears,
- Euro amounts and “learning the Ṛgveda”, or
- “Vedic learning”.

Figure 1 shows three bundles of goods. $x_1$ stands for the amount of good 1 (apples, for example) while $x_2$ represents the amount of good 2 (pears). At point A (i.e., point $(y_1, y_2)$) the agent consumes $y_1$ units of good 1 and $y_2$ units of good 2. If one moves from A to B (or to any point north-east of A) the units of good 1 and good 2 increase. In contrast, moving from A to C means that consumption of good 1 increases while consumption of good 2 decreases.

C. Preferences, indifference curves, and utility functions

Each agent is assumed to be endowed with a weak preference relation on the goods space, denoted by $\preceq$ or $\succeq$. $y \preceq z$ or $z \succeq y$ means that the agent finds bundle $(z_1, z_2)$ at least as good as $(y_1, y_2)$. Similarly, $\leq$ is used to express size relations where $5 \leq 7$ means that 7 is at least as large as 5. One uses $y \sim z$ to express that the agent is indifferent between bundles $y$ and $z$ while $y < z$ or $z > y$ means that the agent strictly prefers $z$ over $y$. Every agent’s preferences between any two bundles prefers $z$ and $y$ obey
- either $y \sim z$
- or $y < z$
- or $y > z$.

In this book, I always assume monotonic preferences, i.e., the agents prefer to have more rather than less. In that case, the agent would strictly prefer bundle B over bundle A in Figure 1. As will become clear later on, this assumption does not rule out altruistic preferences.

Economists use two convenient methods to describe preferences: utility functions and indifference curves. Utility functions $U$ attach numbers to bundles such that a better bundle has a higher utility number. Thus, $y \sim z$ can be expressed by $U(y) > U(z)$. Similarly, $y \sim z$ can be translated by $U(y) = U(z)$. The only task of utility functions is to describe preferences in a handy manner.

The second way to describe preferences uses an $(x_1, x_2)$ diagram such as in Figure 2. Given any bundle, one can ask the question which other bundles are considered indifferent from the point of view of the agent. An indifference curve links all these bundles. Consider point $z$. Increase the consumption of good 1 by $y_1 - z_1$. If the agent is to stay indifferent, he needs to give up some amount of good 2. Let us say that the agent stays indifferent if he gives up $z_2 - y_2$ units of good 2 in compensation for obtaining $y_1 - z_1$ units of good 1. He then ends up in point $y$ and we have indifference between point $z$ and point $y$. In the same fashion, one can derive other points on that indifference curve.
Preferences of an agent are characterized by how much of good 2 he is willing to give up for additional consumption of good 1. A discrete version of this “rate of substitution” is given by \( \frac{z_2 - y_2}{y_1 - z_1} \) in Figure 2. If, instead, good 1 is changed by only “a little bit” (\( y_1 \) is very close to \( z_1 \)), one obtains the “marginal rate of substitution” which is abbreviated by MRS. Graphically, it is the absolute value of the slope of an indifference curve at a bundle. Thus, if one additional unit of good 1 is consumed while good 2’s consumption is reduced by MRS units, the consumer stays indifferent. Intuitively, the MRS measures the willingness to pay for one additional unit of good 1 in terms of good 2.

### D. Budget theory

Budget theory is simpler than preference theory. Assume an agent with some income (amount of money) \( m \) at his disposal. The budget is the set of good bundles that the agent can afford, i.e., the set of bundles whose expenditure is not above his income. The expenditure for a bundle of goods \( x = (x_1, x_2) \) at prices
\( p = (p_1, p_2) \) is given by \( p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 \). Thus, the budget is the set of those bundles \( x \) that fulfill the inequality

\[
[1] \quad p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 \leq m
\]

The corresponding equality is called the budget line. Consider Figure 3. The agent can afford bundles A and B, but not C. Point B lies on the budget line, i.e., the agent spends his whole income.

![Figure 3: Affordable and non-affordable bundles](image)

The budget line’s slope is \(- \frac{p_1}{p_2}\), the budget line is negatively sloped. Assume prices \( p_1 = 6 \) and \( p_2 = 2 \). If the agent consumes one extra unit of good 1, he need to give up \( \frac{p_1}{p_2} = \frac{6}{2} = 3 \) units of good 2. We call the absolute value of the budget line's slope the marginal opportunity cost (of consuming one additional unit of good 1 in terms of good 2). It is denoted by MOC (see Figure 4).
In some models, the role of income $m$ is taken over by an “endowment”, i.e., by a bundle of goods that the household possesses. For example, the household may have harvested the bundle $\omega = (\omega_1, \omega_2)$. Imagine that the household sells this bundle for $p_1 \omega_1 + p_2 \omega_2$ and then buys another (or the very same) bundle $x = (x_1, x_2)$ that has to obey

$$[2] \quad p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 \leq p_1 \omega_1 + p_2 \omega_2$$

The household may consume his endowment, but also any other bundle that obeys the above inequality.

### E. The household optimum

The household is the best bundle for the agent or the household. Differently put, it is a (or the) bundle attainable within the household’s budget that lies on a highest indifference curve. Look at the household situations depicted in Figure 5. Are the highlighted points A or B optimal?
In subfigure (a), points A and B do not correspond to an optimum. Every point between A and B is better than A or B. In subfigure (b), point A is the household optimum. In subfigure (c), points A and B are optima but so are all the points in between. Turning to subfigure (d), point A is the best bundle of all the bundles on the budget line.

F. Person-to-person (Edgeworthian) exchange

(1) Introduction

Allocation of goods takes place in two different modes—the first of which being person-to-person. The second mode is impersonal trading, expounded by General Equilibrium Theory (see the next section). A major message is that trade in both modes may benefit all parties involved. A second message (beloved by many economists) is the following: Free markets are wonderful.
Person-to-person does not necessarily imply face-to-face. Indeed, Abu Abdullah Muhammad Ibn Battuta, a fourteenth century prolific traveler and geographer, describes the silent trade that took place along the Volga:

Each traveler ... leaves the goods he has brought ... and they retire to their camping ground. Next day they go back to ... their goods and find opposite them skins of sable, miniver, and ermine. If the merchant is satisfied with the exchange he takes them, but if not he leaves them. The inhabitants then add more skins, but sometimes they take away their goods and leave the merchant’s. This is their method of commerce. Those who go there do not know whom they are trading with ...

(2) Pareto improving exchanges

Exchange (of goods in a wide sense) can be beneficial to all parties involved. This idea is closely related to the concept of “Pareto improvement”. Situation 1 is called a Pareto superior in relation to another situation 2 if no individual is worse off in the first than in the second while at least one individual is strictly better off. Then, the move from situation 2 to 1 is called a Pareto improvement. Situations are called Pareto efficient, Pareto optimal, or just efficient if Pareto improvements are not possible (any more).

367 Cited from Bowles (2004, p. 233)
368 Vilfredo Pareto, Italian sociologist, 1848-1923
Economists often assume that bargaining leads to an efficient outcome under ideal conditions. As long as Pareto improvements are available, there is no reason (so one could argue) not to “cash in” on them. Consider agents who consume bundles of goods (section XI.B). A distribution of such bundles among all agents is called an allocation. In a two-agent two-good environment, allocations can be visualized via the Edgeworth box. Within an Edgeworth boxes, preferences are depicted by indifference curves (XI.C).

Consider Figure 6, an Edgeworth box for two goods 1 and 2 and two agents A and B. The exchange Edgeworth box exhibits two points of origin, one for individual A (bottom left corner) and another one for individual B (top right). The width and the height of the Edgeworth box represent the overall availability of good 1 and good 2, respectively. Every point in the box denotes an allocation: how much of each good belongs to each individual. One possible allocation is the (initial) endowment. It means that agent A commands \( \omega^A = (\omega_1^A, \omega_2^A) \), i.e., A could consume \( \omega_1^A \) units of good 1 and \( \omega_2^A \) units of good 2. Similarly, agent B possesses \( \omega^B = (\omega_1^B, \omega_2^B) \), seen from B’s point of origin. The width of the Edgeworth box is \( \omega_1^A + \omega_1^B \).

\[\text{———}
\]

\(^{369}\) However, the existence of Pareto improvements does not make their realization a forgone conclusion. This is obvious from the famous prisoners’ dilemma (see, for example, Gibbons (1992, pp. 2–5)). See the game-theory section in this chapter.

\(^{370}\) In 1881, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth has written a book with the beautiful title “Mathematical Psychics.”
The agents might decide to consume their respective endowment. However, they can often do better. In Figure 6, consider the two indifference curves that cross at the endowment point. These two indifference curves confine the so-called “exchange lens”. Every point in the exchange lens (other than the endowment point and the other crossing point) represents a Pareto improvement. Both agents can be made better off by moving away from the endowment point to a point within the exchange lens. The reason is that both get to a higher indifference curve, i.e., to an indifference curve that is further away from the agents’ respective origins.

An exchange agreement is a bundle \((x^A, x^B) = ((x^A_1, x^A_2), (x^B_1, x^B_2))\) that obeys

\[
[3] \quad x^A_1 + x^B_1 = \omega^A_1 + \omega^B_1
\]
and the corresponding equality for good 2. This amounts to a “supply equals demand” condition. In Figure 6, such an agreement fulfills $x_1^A < \omega_1^A$ and $x_2^A > \omega_2^A$, i.e., agent A gives $\omega_1^A - x_1^A$ units of good 1 to agent B and obtains $x_2^A - \omega_2^A$ units of good 2 in return.

(3) **Loan contracts**

A particular case is a loan contract. Let there be only one good in the economy that is consumed in two periods. Good 1 stand for consumption of that good in period 1 and good 2 for consumption of that good in period 2. A loan contract reveals an (implicit) interest rate. Turn, again, to the situation where agent A gives $\omega_1^A - x_1^A$ units of good 1 to agent B and obtains $x_2^A - \omega_2^A$ units of good 2 in return. Here, agent A is the creditor. He earns the interest $r$ implicitly given by

$$x_2^A - \omega_2^A = (1 + r)(\omega_1^A - x_1^A).$$

That is, in period 2, agent A obtains back the amount of the good given in period 1, $\omega_1^A - x_1^A$, plus the interest earned on that amount: $r(\omega_1^A - x_1^A)$.

(4) **Pareto-optimal allocations**

Oftentimes, one imagines that individuals achieve better and better points by a series of exchanges. The exchange lens gets smaller and smaller until, finally, no further improvement is possible. In terms of Figure 6, the exchange lens has shrunk to only one point. Then, a Pareto efficient allocation is achieved, i.e., no individual can be made better off without making another (in case of just two agents: the other) worse off.

Consider Figure 7 where the points of tangency between two respective indifference curves are highlighted. Each such point corresponds to a Pareto efficient allocation. The set of those points is called the “contract curve”.


The impersonal-trading mode is formalized in General Equilibrium Theory. Here, the agents are confronted with market prices. At these prices, they choose the optimal (for them) amounts of labour they want to offer (households) or demand (firms) on the labour market and of goods they like to sell (firms) or to buy (households). None of these agents buy or sell from any particular person, but “on the market”, anonymously. At the prevailing prices, they are free to buy or sell as many units as they like.

Two restrictions apply:

- The value of the goods bought by an agent cannot be larger than the value of his endowment. This is equation [2] from section XI.D.
- The amount of goods to be consumed equals the available amounts, i.e., equation [3] and a second one for good 2.
The aim of GET is to find (or to establish the existence of) a so-called Walras equilibrium where

- all actors behave in a utility, or profit, maximizing manner and
- the buying and selling decisions can be fulfilled simultaneously.

Let us consider an exchange economy where agents have endowments, but do not produce. In order to pursue the above questions, one can add the information about the prices into Edgeworth boxes. Starting from the endowment point, (positive) prices $p_1$ and $p_2$ lead to negatively sloped budget lines for both individuals. In Figure 8, two budget lines with a price $p_2$ for good 2 and prices $p_1^l < p_1^h$ are depicted.

![Figure 8: Equilibrium and non-equilibrium prices](image)

One may ask the question whether these prices “work” in the sense of allowing both agents to demand their preferred bundles. If that is the case, the prices and
the bundles at these prices constitute a so-called Walras\textsuperscript{371} equilibrium. In particular, the low price $p_1^l$ is not possible in a Walras equilibrium. The amount of good 1 that agent A likes to consume is $x_1^A$ (in point $D^A$), while agent B likes to consume $x_1^B$ (in point $D^B$) calculated from B’s point of origin. Thus, there is excess demand for good 1 at the low price $p_1^l$:

\[ x_1^A + x_1^B > \omega_1^A + \omega_1^B \]

In contrast, point E represents a Walras equilibrium. First, each agent chooses a best bundle among all the bundles she can afford. Second, these choices are possible, i.e., demand ($x_1^A + x_1^B$) equals supply ($\omega_1^A + \omega_1^B$).

In general, a Walras equilibrium can be defined for many goods and many agents. Thus, one obtains a model of a decentralized market system where individual consumers make their buying and selling decisions on the basis of equilibrium prices. One theoretical question is whether one can be certain that prices for all the goods exist such that the above two conditions (individual optimization and equality of demand and supply) are fulfilled simultaneously. This question is answered within the subfield of economic theory called “General Equilibrium Theory (GET)”\textsuperscript{372}.

General Equilibrium Theory (GET) is also concerned with the relationship between the Pareto efficient outcomes in a person-to-person exchange model (see section F) and the equilibrium outcomes in a model of impersonal exchange.

\textsuperscript{371} Marie-Esprit-Léon Walras, French mathematical economist, 1834-1910

\textsuperscript{372} See Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988). GET does not only deal with consumers and their endowments, but also incorporates firms that employ factors of production (procured by households) in order to produce goods demanded by households.
Under rather general conditions, equilibria in GET are found to be Pareto efficient. This is the so-called First Welfare Theorem. It can be considered a formal expression of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”. If one thinks that Pareto efficiency is a good thing, then, indeed, free markets are wonderful.

H. Noncooperative game theory

Game theory presupposes a set of (usually at least two) players. Noncooperative game theory belongs to microeconomics. The few players have strategies or actions at their disposal and try to maximize their payoffs. In contrast, there are no explicit actions or strategies in cooperative game theory. Section XI.I deals with the Shapley value as the (arguably) most important concept from cooperative game theory.

(1) Strategic games

In strategic games every player simultaneously chooses a strategy and obtains a payoff that depends on the strategy combination, i.e., on the tuple of strategies chosen by all players. This is the topic of this (first) subsection in this chapter. In the section after that, sequential games are dealt with. In these games, players choose action in some prespecified order.

Within the realm of strategic games, the two main solution concepts are “dominant strategies” and “Nash equilibria”.\textsuperscript{373} A dominant strategy is a best strategy irrespective of the other players’ strategies. Not all games exhibit dominant strategies by one or several players. If a player has a dominant strategy, he can

\textsuperscript{373} For example, see Gibbons (1992, pp. 1–12).
safely disregard the other players. Whatever they may choose, he himself cannot do any better than choose the dominant strategy.

If a dominant strategy does not exist for all players, the concept of a Nash equilibrium might be employed. A Nash equilibrium is a particular strategy combination, i.e., a tuple of strategies, one for each player. Then, a particular strategy combination is called a Nash equilibrium if no player can profit from deviating unilaterally. Differently put, given that the other players stick to their respective strategies, each player chooses a best strategy. Thus, the Nash equilibrium imposes a specific kind of stability.

(2) Sequential games

Consider the sequential game between the players 1 and 2 depicted in Figure 9. Some nodes are indexed by the player names (1 or 2). At these nodes players 1 and 2 have to make a choice. Player 1 moves first, at the initial node (the leftmost node). He chooses up or down. Next, it is player 2’s turn who chooses between left and right. When both players have chosen their actions, they obtain the appropriate payoffs or “utilities”. The payoff information is noted near the terminal nodes (the rightmost nodes). The first number indicates the payoff for player 1 and the second number is the payoff for player 2. For example, if player 1 chooses up and player 2 chooses right, player 1 obtains the payoff of 0 and player 2 the payoff of 3.
Backward induction means “looking ahead” by “proceeding backwards”. Before player 1 can decide on his move, he needs to know how player 2 will react to up, or down, chosen by player 1. Thus, backward induction starts with the players that move last. Consider the node where player 2 has to make a decision after player 1 chose up. Comparing the payoffs 5 and 3, player 2 chooses left. The corresponding edge has been reinforced. In contrast, player 2 will choose right if he learns that player 1 has chosen down (this follows from $4 > 1$).

Now, after knowing the choices of player 2, we can look at player 1’s decision. If he chooses up, player 2 will choose left so that player 1 obtains a payoff of 10. If, however, player 1 chooses down, player 2 will choose right so that player 1 obtains 9. Comparing 10 and 9, it is obvious that player 1 should, or will, choose up.

Thus, player 1 choosing up and player 2 choosing left is the predicted outcome. However, this may not be the observed outcome. For example, player 1 choosing up and player 2 choosing right is indicated by the arrows. In that sequence of

![Figure 9: A game tree](image)
events, player 2 would have made a mistake. By $5 > 3$ he could have done better.\(^{374}\)

### I. Shapley value and power

#### (1) General remarks

The Shapley value belongs to the realm of cooperative game theory.\(^{375}\) This theory presupposes \(n\) players that are collected in a set \(N = \{1,2,\ldots,n\}\) and a so-called coalition function \(v\). A subset \(K\) of \(N\) is also called a coalition. \(N\) itself is called the grand coalition. To each coalition, the coalition function attributes a “worth” \(v(K)\). The worths stands for the economic, social, political, or other gain that the particular group of players can achieve. A worth can only be created if at least one player is present, i.e., the empty set \(\emptyset\) creates the worth zero, \(v(\emptyset) = 0\). For ease of notation, one can write \(v(i)\) instead of \(v(\{i\})\), \(v(1,2)\) instead of \(v(\{1,2\})\), and \(v(K \cup i)\) instead of \(v(K \cup \{i\})\).

The aim of cooperative game theory is to specify payoffs for the players. These payoffs depend on the coalition function. Assume just two players 1 and 2. The case with more than two players and the general case are explained in the footnotes and in the appendix. A solution function \(\phi\) defines, for each coalition function \(v\), payoffs \(\phi_1(v)\) and \(\phi_2(v)\).\(^{376}\)

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\(^{374}\) For examples from Old Indian fables, see Wiese (2012a) who argues that the idea of backward induction was already present in those stories.

\(^{375}\) See Shapley (1953).

\(^{376}\) For a general player set \(N\), a solution function defines a payoff vector \(\phi(w)\) that has the entries \(\phi_1(w)\), \(\ldots\), \(\phi_n(w)\).
Cooperative game theory uses two different approaches for arriving at payoff vectors from coalition functions. (i) The algorithmic approach applies some algebraic manipulations on the coalition functions in order to derive payoff vectors. For example, each player might obtain the worth of his one-man coalition plus 5. This solution function would be described by \( \varphi_1(v) = v(1) + 5 \) and \( \varphi_2(v) = v(2) + 5 \).377

(ii) The axiomatic approach suggests general rules of distribution. One axiom might stipulate that the worth of the grand coalition \( \{1,2\} \) is distributed among the players: \( \varphi_1(v) + \varphi_2(v) = w(1, 2) \).378

A second axiom might demand payoff equality. These two axioms together define a specific solution function, namely the one given by \( \varphi_1(v) = \varphi_2(v) = \frac{v(1,2)}{2} \).379

(2) **The algorithmic approach**

The Shapley value’s algorithm builds on the players’ “marginal contributions”. A player’s marginal contribution is the worth of a coalition with him minus the worth of the coalition without him, i.e., the difference he makes. In the two-player case, player 1 has two marginal contributions, the first with respect to the

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377 For a general player set \( N \), the solution function is given by \( \varphi_i(w) = w(i) + 5, \ i \in N \).
378 For \( n \) players, this axiom is expressed by \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \varphi_i(w) = w(N) \).
379 For a general player set \( N \), the solution function is given by \( \varphi_i(w) = \frac{w(N)}{n}, \ i \in N \).
empty set $\emptyset$ (the marginal contribution is $v(1) - v(\emptyset)$), the second with respect to $\{2\}$ (with marginal contribution $v(1, 2) - v(2)$).\(^{380}\)

Player 1’s Shapley value is the average of his marginal contributions, taken over all sequences (rank orders) of the two players. For two players, there are just two sequences, player 1 may be first (sequence $(1, 2)$) or second (sequence $(1, 2)$). Thus, the players’ Shapley values\(^{381}\) are

\[ Sh_1 = \frac{1}{2} (v(1) - v(\emptyset)) + \frac{1}{2} (v(1, 2) - v(2)) \]

and

\[ Sh_2 = \frac{1}{2} (v(2) - v(\emptyset)) + \frac{1}{2} (v(1, 2) - v(1)) \]

(3) \textbf{The axiomatic approach}

For any number of players and any coalition function, the Shapley value fulfills these axioms:

- The sum of the Shapley values equals the worth of the grand coalition, i.e.,

  \[ Sh_1 + Sh_2 = v(1, 2) \]

\[^{380}\] For a general player set $N$, the marginal contribution of player $i$ with respect to a coalition $K$ that does not contain that player is defined by $MC_i(K) = w(K \cup i) - w(K)$.

\[^{381}\] For a general player set $N$, let $R$ be the set of rank orders. For $n$ players, there exist $n! = 1 \cdot 2 \cdot ... \cdot n$ different rank orders. Let $K_i(r)$ denote the set of players in the rank order $r$ up to but not including player $i$. Then, player $i$’s Shapley value is $Sh_i = \frac{\sum_{r \in R} MC_i(K_i(r))}{n!}$. \[\]
in the case of two players. The property means that the grand coalition forms and the Shapley values distribute the worth of the grand coalition among the players.

Any player whose marginal contribution is zero with respect to every coalition obtains the Shapley value of zero.

The payoffs do not depend on the players’ names they bear.

- If a player 1 withdraws\(^{382}\) from the game, another player 2’s damage in terms of his Shapley payoff equals the damage that player 1 endures should player 2 withdraw, i.e.,

\[
\text{withdrawal symmetry: } S_{h_2} - v(2) = S_{h_1} - v(1)
\]

in the case of two players. Consider the left side of the equation. If player 1 withdraws, player 2 does not obtain the Shapley value \(S_{h_2}\) anymore, but the Shapley value of the game of which he is the only player. In that game he obtains the worth \(w(2)\) of his one-man coalition. This is clear from the only rank order that exists in that game as also from the efficiency property.

The axioms of efficiency and withdrawal symmetry lead to the Shapley values in equations [5] and [6] above.\(^{383}\) Cooperative game theorists then say that these

\(^{382}\) Withdrawal means that the player set is reduced by the withdrawing players and that the worths for the remaining players stay the same.

\(^{383}\) Note \(v(\emptyset) = 0\). For more than two players, we need the efficiency axiom \(\sum_{i \in N} S_{h_i} = w(N)\) and the following version of withdrawal symmetry: Consider any subset \(K\) of \(N\). On the basis of \(K\) as the new grand coalition, a \(K\)-game can be defined where the coalitions in that game have the same worth as within the original game. Consider two players \(i\) and \(j\) that are members from \(K\). If player \(i\) withdraws from the \(K\)-game, player \(j\)’s change in his Shapley payoff equals the change that player \(i\) endures should player \(j\) withdraw.
axioms axiomatize the Shapley value. This means, the Shapley value (in its algorithmic form, see subsection (2)) fulfills these axioms and that there is no value different from the Shapley value that also fulfills these axioms. This particular axiomatization is due to Myerson (1980).

(4) **Power-over and withdrawal symmetry**

“Power” is an elusive and multifarious concept. In any definition known to the current author, it refers to an asymmetric relation between people. In order to address the title’s question, I propose a manageable typology of power that may help to structure the discussion (see the matrix below). First, power may refer to actions (“action power”) or to payoffs (“payoff power”). Second, power may mean “power-over” (one actor’s power over another) or “control of valuable events”.

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384 Power is often considered a (or even the) central concept of the social sciences (see Haugaard and Clegg (2005a)). One can easily disagree. First, one cannot help noticing that economics seems to do without (with the exception of technical terms like purchasing power or market power). Second, a huge part of the power literature is concerned with definitional problems (see the handbook by Haugaard and Clegg (2005b)). Third, substantive power-related work uses very different methodologies. Thus, while the words “power” or “power-over” feature in all these disparate areas, a common deeper link is missing nevertheless. See the unpublished paper by Wiese (2012b).

385 This distinction is close to the one between influence and prize power due to Felsenthal and Machover (1998).

386 This understanding is advocated by Weber (1978, p. 53), Emerson (1962), and others.

387 This is the definition by Coleman (1990, p. 133) according to which power “is not a property of the relation between two actors (so it is not correct to speak of one actor’s power over another, although it is possible to speak of the relative power of two actors)”.
The entries given in the matrix are surely debatable. One could defend them by the following remarks:

- Quite naturally, power-over is an asymmetric relationship. One actor gives a command and the second obeys it (action power). One actor robs another one (payoff power over another’s wealth). Power in the sense of control of events is asymmetric in that one actor may be richer or enjoy a
higher rank than the second. Or one may be allowed to study the Vedas while a second is not.

- Purchasing power means that the actor can buy goods and services, i.e., he has control over the event “enjoyment of this or that good or service”. If the purchasing power of agent A is larger than that of agent B, the inverse relation does not hold. That is, purchasing power leads to an asymmetric relation between agents.\textsuperscript{388}

- These four kinds of power are interrelated. For example, a high rank (upper right corner) may be enjoyable as such. However, it may also allow a person certain actions (upper left) or it may be associated with the expectation to find commands obeyed\textsuperscript{389}.

Power-over (second line in the matrix) is especially difficult. According to Max Weber’s famous definition,

“Power” (Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.\textsuperscript{390}

Vanberg (1982, p. 59: fn. 48) observes that in every exchange relationship both sides do what they would not have done without the influence (or existence) of the other party. Indeed, if 1 offers 2 some money to perform a service and 2 obliges, does 1 have power over 2? Or, the other way around, does 2 have power over 1 because he “forces” 1 to give him money for some important (to 1) service? According to everyday usage, 1 exerts power over 2 if 1 obtains the

\textsuperscript{388} Sparkasse advertisement clip (German language)
\textsuperscript{389} This is “domination” in the sense of Weber (1978, p. 53).
\textsuperscript{390} Weber (1978, p. 53)
service for “too little” money (“exploitation”) while 2 exerts power over 1 if 2 asks for “too much” and 1 is in urgent need of the service (“profiteering”, “extortion”, “usury”). In line with this observation, we claim that every fruitful definition of power-over needs a reference point defined by something “usual” or “normal”. It seems quite unavoidable that these reference points contain some measure of arbitrariness and need to be defended rather specifically.

Apparently, every fruitful definition of power-over needs a reference point which may concern a “usual”, “normal”, or “moral” situation. It seems quite unavoidable that these reference points contain some measure of arbitrariness and need to be defended rather specifically. However, the Shapley value allows to work with a non-arbitrary reference point, the “where would you be without me” reference point. As mentioned in subsection XI.I(3), this reference point cannot define an asymmetric relation. In fact, we find symmetry between any two persons A and B: A suffers from B’s withdrawal as much as B suffers from A’s withdrawal.

Consider two examples. The first one is due to Emerson (1962). Imagine two children A and B that often play together. Since they differ in their preferences, they take turns in playing their respective favourite games. In that situation, says Emerson, power-over is balanced as one might expect from withdrawal symmetry. Now, assume that child B in the A-B relationship finds another playing buddy C. Then, power-over is unbalanced. A would suffer more if B decides not to play with A any more than the other way around. After all, B can turn to her new-found alternative C. In that situation, argues Emerson, balancing operations set in that lead to B impose her favorite game on A more often than before. From the point of view of the Shapley value (that was not known to Emerson), the effect of that balancing operation is to restore withdrawal symmetry.
The second example concerns a market where one seller S confronts four potential buyers B1 through B4. The object that S possesses has no value for him, but if any of the buyers manages to obtain this object, a worth of 1 is created. As shown in Wiese (2009), S obtains the Shapley value of $\frac{4}{5}$ in this game with four players, but only the Shapley value of $\frac{3}{4}$ in another game with only three potential buyers. Thus, the seller does not suffer a lot if buyer B1 withdraws. Consider now the change in buyer B1’s Shapley value should the seller withdraw. Without the seller, B1’s Shapley value is zero. In the presence of the seller, B1 will obtain the object with the same probability as any buyer: $\frac{1}{4}$. The seller’s payoff $\frac{4}{5}$ can be understood as the price the successful buyer has to pay to the seller. Since the worth of the object in the hand of buyer B1 is 1, that buyer’s Shapley value is $\frac{1}{4} \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{4}{5} \right) = \frac{1}{20}$. Withdrawal symmetry holds. In this case, the balancing operations consist of the low probability of obtaining the object together with the relatively high price.

**XII. Altruistic toolbox**

This chapter discusses altruism, pure altruism, and the (a priori counterintuitive) possibility of altruistic conflict.

**A. Preliminaries**

For the purpose of this book, I define altruism of a person A towards a person B as A’s inclination or actual behaviour to share wealth, food, or the like, with B, without the expectation on A’s part to benefit from B’s reciprocity or without A’s having benefitted from B in the past. This definition implies that A’s act
would be called altruistic even if it is done for merit, for benefits from third parties (but not those directly linked to B), and the like.

The feeling of altruism or the act of altruistic giving may have diverse motivations that need to be spelled out. Indeed, altruistic giving does not mean giving without any reasons. People interested in making giving possible might try to influence the donors’ motivations. In the Brahmanical theory of the gift, merit (punya) is the otherworldly motivation for giving. In the Christian context, other motivations are adduced.

Legally, gifting for “reasons” of altruism is relatively simple in comparison with dānagrahaṇa or with ṛṇa. Remember that ṛṇādāna is a prominent ground for litigation (section III.F). In the absence of reciprocity, it is difficult to see how a court-case might arise. In particular, gods cannot be sued for not having delivered.

In dānagrahaṇa cases, the reasons for giving are mostly obvious. In contrast, reasons (or arguments, or stories) for altruistic giving need to be supplied. For example, chapter X quotes the Christian church fathers’ manners of convincing believers to donate part of their inheritance to the church. Other arguments underlie dharmic giving.

### B. Models of pure and impure altruism

#### (1) Definitions

Consider $n$ agents. Agent $i$ is endowed with private wealth $W_i$ and considers to donate $D_i$. One distinguishes

- the sum of all donations $D = \sum_{j=1}^{n} D_j$
\[ \text{from } D_{-i} = \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{n} D_j, \text{ the sum of what the agents except agent } i \text{ donate.} \]

Let agent i’s utility be given by

\[ [7] \quad U(C_i, D_i, D_{-i}) \]

Agent i is altruistic in the context of this model if both \( D_i \) and \( D_{-i} \) exert a positive effect on the utility of that agent:

\[ [8] \quad \frac{\partial U(C_i, D_i, D_{-i})}{\partial D_i} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial U(C_i, D_i, D_{-i})}{\partial D_{-i}} > 0 \]

Indeed, whenever \( D_i \) or \( D_{-i} \) increases, the overall donations increase.

A special case of altruism is called pure altruism. In the above framework, an agent gives in order to increase the aggregate gift \( D_{-i} + D_i \). As far as his altruist motives are concerned, he does not care about the components of this aggregate gift, i.e., whether a given amount of \( D = D_{-i} + D_i \) contains a large donation by himself or a small one. This means that his utility function can be written as

\[ [9] \quad U(C_i, D) = U(W_i - D_i, D_{-i} + D_i) \]

Thus, the agent exhibiting pure altruism does not distinguish between the (identical!) bundles

- \( (W_i - D_i, D_{-i} + D_i) \) and
- \( ([W_i + \Delta] - [D_i + \Delta], [D_{-i} - \Delta] + [D_i + \Delta]) \).

Indeed, the bundles are identical. Assuming \( \Delta > 0 \), in the second bundle, the agent has a larger wealth, but he donates extra wealth available to him. Thus, his consumption stays the same. His donation is nullified by the other agents who donate less. Pure altruism means that the agent does not care about the specific
amount donated. He is only interested in the private consumption for himself and in the overall donation benefitting other (needy) people.

In contrast, impure altruism means that the agent derives some satisfaction from donating himself, over and above his interest in realizing a large $D$. For example, many people also give for the “warm glow” they feel from gifting. One is then lead to a model of impure altruism that is due to Andreoni (1990). Other motivations may be related to the merit earned from dharmadāna. In that case, the bundles

- $\left(W_i - D_i, D_i, D_{-i} + D_i\right)$ and
- $\left([W_i + \Delta] - [D_i + \Delta], D_i + \Delta, [D_{-i} - \Delta] + [D_i + \Delta]\right)$.

are not the same. While the agent’s consumption (the first entries in the bundles) and the overall donation (the third entries) are the same, by the warm-glow effect (or the merit to be earned), the agent prefers the second bundle over the first one. The question of pure or impure altruism can only be attacked in the case of more than one donor.

(2) A special case of pure altruism

Assume, now, the particular pure-altruism utility function

$$U(C_i, D) = V(D_i) = (D_{-i} + D_i)^\alpha (W_i - D_i)^{1-\alpha}$$

with $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$. The special case of $\alpha = 1$ amounts to extreme altruism, while $\alpha = 0$ stands for absence of altruism.

Letting $D_{-i}$ constant, the optimal gift chosen by agent $i$ is given by

Form the derivative of utility function $V$ with respect to $D_i$, set this derivative equal to zero, and solve for $D_i$. 

---

$^391$ Form the derivative of utility function $V$ with respect to $D_i$, set this derivative equal to zero, and solve for $D_i$. 
\[ D_i^* = \alpha W_i - (1 - \alpha)D_{-i} \]

Understandably, the gift is a positive function of an individual’s wealth and a negative function of the sum of gifts given by the other agents. If the private-consumption in the utility function is important, i.e., if \( \alpha \) is small, the individual tends to give a smaller portion of his private wealth as a gift and tends to reduce his gift in response to other people’s gifts considerably. Thus, \( \alpha \) measures (pure) altruism in this model.

If one assumes that all the \( n \) agents have the same utility function and the same amount of initial wealth, the Nash equilibrium\(^{392}\) is given by

\[ D_i^N = \frac{\alpha}{1+(1-\alpha)(n-1)}W_i \]

The predicted (predicted by the solution concept of a symmetric Nash equilibrium) amount of a gift depends positively on \( \alpha \) and negatively on \( n \).

C. Egoistic and altruistic conflicts

(1) Setup

In this section, we present the model of altruism that is due to Stark (1993). Consider two agents who are labeled father (F) and son (S) and who consume “corn” in the quantities \( C_F \) and \( C_S \), respectively. The consumption leads to direct pleasure \( V \) (called felicity by Stark) which is a function of the consumption of

\(^{392}\) See subsection XI.H(1). A symmetric equilibrium is found by letting \( D_{-i} = (n - 1)D_i \) in equation [11].
corn. However, the agents do not only care about their own consumption but also about the other agent’s consumption:

\[ U_F(C_F, C_S) = \beta_F V_F(C_F) + \alpha_F V_S(C_S) \]

and

\[ U_S(C_F, C_S) = \beta_S V_S(C_S) + \alpha_S V_F(C_F) \]

Assuming \( \frac{dV}{dC} > 0, \beta_F > 0, \beta_S > 0 \), the agents are greedy in the sense of preferring more corn to a smaller amount of corn. The \( \beta \) s are called felicity factors.

\( \alpha_F \) expresses the level of altruism felt by the father for the son. Vice versa, \( \alpha_S \) stands for the level altruism the son feels for his father. We call preferences with

- \( \alpha > 0 \) altruistic or benevolent,
- \( \alpha < 0 \) malevolent, and
- \( \alpha = 0 \) neutral.

The typical microeconomic model assumes \( \alpha = 0 \) and represents the neutral case. One might translate the biblical command to “love your neighbour as you love yourself”\(^{393}\) by

\[ \alpha = \beta. \]

I follow Stark in assuming

\[ V_F(C_F) = \ln(C_F) \]

and

\[^{393}\text{Mt_E 22.39} \]
\[ V_S(C_S) = \ln(C_S) \]

The overall consumption of corn is given by \( C \). The two agents have to decide on how to divide \( C = C_F + C_S \) among themselves. Thus, the father’s utility can be written as

\[ U_F(C_F, C_S) = \beta_F V_F(C_F) + \alpha_F V_S(C - C_F) \]

We define a conflict measure

\[ conf = \frac{C_F^* + C_S^*}{C} \]

where the individually optimal values \( 0 \leq C_F^*, C_S^* \leq 1 \) are indicated by the asterix. I.e., \( C_F^* \) denotes the corn the father likes to keep for himself while the father wants the son to enjoy \( C - C_F^* \) units of corn. Similarly, the son would like to have \( C_S^* \) units of corn for himself.

The conflict measure \( conf \) allows the following classification:

\[ conf = \begin{cases} < 1, & \text{altruistic conflict} \\ = 1, & \text{agreement} \\ > 1, < 2, & \text{mild egoistic conflict} \\ = 2, & \text{extreme egoistic conflict} \end{cases} \]

Thus, if the corn that the father and the son like to consume themselves is less than the overall endowment of corn, we are confronted with altruistic conflict. In particular, this means \( C - C_F^* > C_S^* \), i.e., the father wants the son to consume more corn than the son wants for himself. Mild egoistic conflict means that one or both agents are willing to consume less than \( C \).

(2) **Results**

From inspecting the father’s utility
we can derive that $\alpha_F \leq 0$ implies $C_F^* = C$ as the utility-maximizing consumption level of the father. The benevolent case is more difficult. Taking the first partial derivative of $U_F$ with respect to $C_F$, one obtains the first order condition

$$\frac{\partial U_F}{\partial C_F} = \beta_F C_F - \frac{\alpha_F}{C-C_F} = 0$$

and hence

$$\left(\frac{C_F^*}{C_S}\right)_F = \frac{\beta_F}{\alpha_F}$$

The second-order condition is fulfilled by $\alpha_F \geq 0$. Similarly, the son’s first-order condition is given by

$$\left(\frac{C_F}{C_S}\right)_S = \frac{\alpha_S}{\beta_S}$$

Thus, $\alpha_F > 0$ and $\alpha_S > 0$ imply

$$\left(\frac{C_F^*}{C_S}\right)_F > \left(\frac{C_F}{C_S}\right)_S \iff \frac{\beta_F}{\alpha_F} > \frac{\alpha_S}{\beta_S} \iff \beta_F \beta_S > \alpha_F \alpha_S \iff \text{conf} > 1$$

The proofs of these assertions are not difficult and need not be produced here. If any of the above inequalities hold, the father wants more for himself than the son is prepared to offer.

Consider Figure 10. Depending on the level of egotism or altruism, father and son have egotistic or altruistic conflicts. Agreement only holds for very specific combinations of parameters, i.e., when we have equalities rather than inequalities in [25]. The agreement line is in the first quadrant where both father and son
are altruistic, but not excessively altruistic. Above this line, there is altruistic conflict.

\[
\begin{align*}
C_F^* &= C \\
C_S^* &= \frac{\beta_S}{\alpha_S + \beta_S} C
\end{align*}
\]

\[\alpha_S = \frac{\beta_F \beta_S}{\alpha_F} \]

**Figure 10: Types of egotistic and altruistic conflict**

Stark’s model is a convenient way to classify preferences. It is not a game-theory model because actions taken or strategies chosen by father or son are not modeled.

(3) **Altruistic conflict in the Buddha’s birthstories**

In the Buddhist Jātaka (birth story) of the hare, altruistic conflict seemingly arises: The hare offers his own body to a travelling brahmin:

\(<125>\) A hare raised in the forest
has no beans, sesame seeds, or grains of rice.
But here is my body to cook on a fire.
Enjoy it today and reside in this ascetic forest.
At the joyous occasion of a beggar’s arrival,
one gives a possession to cater to their needs.
I have no possessions other than my body.
Please accept it. It is everything I own.\textsuperscript{394}

After the brahmin utters some protest, the hare insists:
\begin{itemize}
  \item Giving is a duty and my heart wishes to give.
  \item And it is apt when I have a guest such as you.
  \item An opportunity like this cannot easily be gained.
  \item I rely on you to ensure my gift is not in vain.\textsuperscript{395}
\end{itemize}

Apparently, the hare sees himself in an egoistic conflict. He jumps into the fire. Luckily, the travelling brahmin was Shakra, the lord of the gods in disguise\textsuperscript{396} who rescuse the hare from the fire and praises the hare:
\begin{itemize}
  \item Look you gods who dwell in heaven! And rejoice in the astonishing feat of this Great Being!
  \item See how, in his love of guests,
  \item this creature gave up his body without attachment,
  \item while those of unsturdy nature cannot discard even a used garland without quivering!
  \item His noble generosity and sharp mind seem so contradictory to his animal birth!
  \item His deed is a clear rebuke to both gods and men who have weak regard for merit.\textsuperscript{397}
\end{itemize}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{394} BB 6.29-30, Meiland (2009a, pp. 124–125)
  \item \textsuperscript{395} BB 6.32, Meiland (2009a, pp. 126–127)
  \item \textsuperscript{396} BB 6.22, Meiland (2009a, pp. 120–121)
  \item \textsuperscript{397} BB 6.34-35, Meiland (2009a, pp. 128–129)
\end{itemize}
“To proclaim the Great Being’s exceptional deed ... Shakra then adorned an image of the hare ... on the disc of the moon.”

In this birthstory, the hare begged the traveller to ensure that his “gift is not in vain”. From an economic point of view, a vain gift would be inefficient. A similar idea crops up in the birthstory of the elephant. After the former Buddha had killed himself to offer his flesh to destitute travelers, some of these have this noble idea:

<128> Who could possibly eat the flesh of this virtuous being, who was so determined to help us that he sacrificed his very life for our benefit, showing us greater affection than a loving relative or friend? We should instead repay our debt to him by honoring him with a cremation and due rites of worship.

Other travellers, obviously in consent with the narrator, argue against this view:

<129> For it was to save us that
this unknown kinsman
sacrificed his body,
his guests dearer to him still.
We should then fulfill his wishes,
or his efforts will be in vain.
Such was the affection he gave
all he had as his guest-offering.

\[\text{\footnotesize\ref{398}}\quad \text{BB 6.37, Meiland (2009a, pp. 128–129). Indeed, one word for the moon in Sanskrit is } \text{\textit{\textsc{s\textashine}}}, \text{the one with the hare (\textit{\textsc{s\textashac}}).}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize\ref{399}}\quad \text{BB 30.41, Meiland (2009b, pp. 320–321)}\]
Who would invalidate this act of honor by not accepting it?\textsuperscript{400}

\textsuperscript{400} BB 30.41-43, Meiland (2009b, pp. 320–323)
Part Four:

Modern (etic) perspectives

on Indian (and other) perspectives

In part Two, the premodern (emic) concepts were presented while withholding modern perspectives or judgements. Having provided some economic methodology in the previous part, this part Four is the main part of the book. Modern etic (see subsection II.C(2)) concepts get applied to “old” ideas.
XIII. Structuring the modern perspectives

This chapter is introductory. It discusses reciprocity, presents Trautmann’s taxonomy, provides patterns of giving for the purpose of orientation, and sketches the topics to be covered.

A. Reciprocity

In Indian contexts, dāna may stand for “giving” or for “gifting”. Indeed, in the dharmadāna literature, the second meaning is prevalent. According to Devala,

<130> arthānām udite pātre śraddhayā pratipādanam | dānam ity abhinirdiṣṭam

The bestowing of wealth upon a prescribed recipient with a spirit of generosity is designated as “gifting”.

Thus, gifting is a subcategory of giving. I propose the following definition,

<131> Economic or social exchange is that manner of bilateral giving that fulfills the giver’s (more or less binding) obligation to reciprocate or that aims at creating the receiver’s (more or less binding) obligation to reciprocate. Gifting is a manner of giving without the receiver’s (more or less binding) obligation to reciprocate. Gifting need not be unselfish.

This definition of how to distinguish between economically motivated forms of giving on the one hand and gifts on the other hand has benefitted from Alain

401 DK 1.1
402 Brick (2015)
Testart’s contributions. This author stresses the legal differences between exchanging and gifting. However, the use of “more or less” in the above definition implies that the distinction between gifting and other forms of giving are fuzzy.

Reciprocation seems a somewhat natural expectation. Planitz (1949, p. 152) notes that Old German Law did not regulate donation. In fact, as long as the receiver had not reciprocated in one way or other, the donor was allowed to take back the “gift” at any time. Planitz argues that reciprocity is fundamental to moral and legal reasoning.

In his famous “Essai sur le don”, Marcel Mauss has observed that in quite a few civilizations

les échanges et les contrats se font sous la forme de cadeux, en théorie volontaires, en réalité obligatoirement faits et rendus

exchanges and contracts are made in the form of a gift, in theory voluntary, in reality obligatorily given and received

Or, in Heim’s words, a Maussian gift (or a gift in the sense of sociology’s later paradigm of “social exchange”) is “curiously free yet obligated, appearing to be unilateral while yet forging ties of exchange and mutuality”. Importantly,

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403 See, for example, to Testart (2007)’s “Critique du don”.  
404 According to Planitz (1949, p. 2), “[j]ede Annahme einer Leistung bewirkt die Gebundenheit zur Gegenleistung; denn sittliche wie Rechtsbegriffe können nur reziprok gedacht warden.”  
405 Allen (2014) stresses Mauss’s deep immersion in early India.  
406 Mauss (1923–1924, p. 32) or Mauss (2012, pp. 63–64)  
407 Mauss and Maurer (2016, p. 57)  
408 See, for example Homans (1958) or Gouldner (1960).  
409 Heim (2004, p. xviii)
Mauss devoted several pages to Vedic and Brahmanical gifting.\textsuperscript{410} Thus, Mauss writes about the case of a moral but not legal obligation to reciprocate. To my mind, Mauss seems too eager to discover “potlatch”, the agonistic and antagonistic manner of extravagant giving, in the societies he looked at.\textsuperscript{411} Of course, there is that famous (among Indologists) footnote where Mauss acknowledges that Brahmins would not reciprocate.\textsuperscript{412} Somewhat similar to Maussian concepts is the concept of \textit{societas} (fellowship) advocated by Seneca (chapter IX).

If neither legal nor moral obligations to reciprocate exist, we are in the realm of Brahmin \textit{dharmadāna} or in the realm of Christian charity.\textsuperscript{413} With respect to the former, remember:

\begin{quote}
\begin{multicols}{2}
\begin{verse}
pātreḥḥyo diyaḥ nityam anapeksya prayojanam
kevalaṃ tyāgabuddhāy ād dharmadānam tad ucyate
\end{verse}
\end{multicols}
\end{quote}

When a person gives as a matter of routine obligation to worthy recipients independent of any specific purpose, but simply with the thought of relinquishing his possessions, it is called a Gift Based on Duty.\textsuperscript{415}

The reader is invited to reconsider the discussion of the difficult reciprocity passage in section VI.L.

\textsuperscript{410} Mauss (2012, pp. 189–202) or Mauss and Maurer (2016, pp. 158–169)
\textsuperscript{411} In particular, one need not be convinced by “The \textit{Mahābhārata} is the story of a gigantic potlatch …” (see Mauss (2012, pp. 192–193) or Mauss and Maurer (2016, p. 161)).
\textsuperscript{412} Mauss (2012, p. 193: fn. 3) or Mauss and Maurer (2016, pp. 161-162: fn. 61)
\textsuperscript{413} Of course, in many other cultures, we find giving and gifting relationships. For the purpose of this book, we focus on premodern Indian, early and medieval Christian, and Seneca giving.
\textsuperscript{414} DK 1.5
\textsuperscript{415} Brick (2015).
B. Patterns of giving and gifting and Trautmann’s taxonomy

We have provided a few definitions of altruism in chapter XII. However, this book does not add to the large literature on how to define altruism, reciprocity, gifts, and the like. A bewildering fine-grained net of definitions is found in many places, for example in Mercier Ythier and Kolm (2006). For example, Kolm (2006, p. 12) discusses the “assumption that individual i derives no pleasure from the pleasure that other people derive from the pleasure of other people, or that she finds this pleasure of hers or of other people to be irrelevant for her choice”. Leaving aside subtleties like these, some patterns of giving can be expressed as in Figure 11. Apart from donor, object, and receiver, the motivations for giving are specified.

According to the upper left pattern, a human person A gives to a (human or divine) person B in order to obtain something from B now or in the future, or because A has obtained something from B in the past. This is the reciprocity defined in <131>. Depending on B’s human or divine nature, one might distinguish between two subcases. We start with B as a human actor, i.e., with the plain economic motivation of reciprocity. Here, A gives in order to oblige B to reciprocate, or because he himself is obliged to reciprocate. Oftentimes, the obligation is legal. The Indian dharmaśāstra authors use the term arthadāna which is characterized by prayojanam apeksya (upon some particular purpose) and aihikam phalahetukam (motivated by worldly reward). Thus, the upper left

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416 See, in particular, chapters 1-6.
417 Compare <81> from the Buddhist literature.
418 See <55> above.
pattern refers to thisworldly (economic) affairs or, in the words of classical Sanskrit, *aihika* matters. This word derives from *iha* (“here, in this world”).

According to Trautmann, *aihika* may also refer to *kāmadāna* or *bhayadāna*: “Profane”\(^\text{419}\) is another word for *aihika* or this-worldly and is concerned with “mundane reciprocity”: “any advantage tangible or intangible that a gift may be expected to incur or respond to, such as the favors of a woman [*kāmadāna*, HW, <55>3] or immunity from one’s tormentor [*bhayadāna*, HW, <55>6], is its visible fruit, its *quid pro quo*.” In terms Figure 11, we are concerned with the patterns of the first row, with the left one more than the right one. “Sacred” refers to “transcendental reciprocity”: “Only if the gift is made without this visible quid pro quo in prospect, among other things, can it be presumed that it incurs an invisible fruit, a transcendentally bestowed countergift. […] a working out of the idea of karma—that all acts bring strict retribution according to their moral quality, if not in this life, then in another. It is acts whose fruits or consequences are unseen in the sense that there is a lapse of time between the cause (in this case the pious gift) and its effect that distinguishes it as a dharmic act is not a worldly matter of self-interested action in pursuit of more immediate advantage.” Here, we may point to the lower right pattern.

\(^{419}\) Trautmann (1981, p. 281) for all the following quotations in this paragraph.
Trautmann (1981, pp. 278–285) suggests an analysis on the basis of two pairs of contrasting modes of exchange, “sacred versus profane” (just covered) and “noble versus ignoble”. The noble exchange is the one performed by the kṣatriya class, especially the king. Compare <42>. The kṣatriyas take by force and distribute liberally: “Conquest (jaya), consisting of the open use of force to defeat and kill the previous possessor, gives the kṣatriya clear title, so to say, the title of the previous perishing with him. […] It is ennobling violence, the heroism of the battlefield, that is the kṣatra-dharma. The use of deceit or trickery […] is forbidden, much less to act in a hidden, covert way as does a thief.”\textsuperscript{420} Within the noble exchange, “[t]here is a twofold movement here. On the one hand, the king acquires wealth not by accepting gifts or by commercial transactions, but by force of arms, jaya; he ‘eats’ (bhaks) the people, the tax or tribute he enjoys is

\textsuperscript{420} Trautmann (1981, p. 283) for this and the following quotations in this paragraph.
his rightful portion (*bhāga*) [...]. On the other hand, his expenditures are the un-compelled acts of a purely personal generosity.”

Trautmann (1981, p. 278) talks about “the intersection of two oppositions” which can be translated into a two-times-two matrix (see Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ignoble acquisition of wealth</th>
<th>noble acquisition of wealth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>profane</td>
<td><em>arthadāna</em></td>
<td>King takes by force and uses for worldly purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sacred</td>
<td><em>dharmadāna</em></td>
<td>King takes by force and gives to worthy receivers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5: Trautmann’s taxonomy in the form of a matrix*

Returning to the upper left pattern, B might be an otherworldly actor, a “god”. Then we are in the area of sacrifice where the god benefits from the human actor’s sacrifice and sees to it that the human actor obtains offspring, victory in battle, or the like. While both thisworldly and otherworldly rewards may be addressed by *phala,* otherworldly ones would never be called *aihika.*

\[421\] See DK 1.18 where *duṣphalam nisphalam* etc. clearly refer to otherworldly merit.
Aihika exchange is clearly non-altruistic. Above (section XII.A) I have defined altruism of a person A towards a person B as A’s inclination (or actual behaviour) to share with B in the absence of past or future sharing the other way around. Arguably, one may distinguish between four different manners of motivating the feeling of altruism or the act of (more or less) altruistic giving.

First, refer to the upper right pattern. It is clearly similar to the upper left one, but here B’s obligation is of a moral, rather than a legal kind. B will be thankful for A’s favours and will reciprocate if the opportunity arises, but not otherwise. This is Seneca’s idea of benefits (see chapter IX).

The three patterns depicted in the second row deal with further motivations for gifting. In the lower left pattern, a person A gives to a person B in order to “feel good”, in order to experience “warm glow”. Andreoni (1989, 1990) has shown that warm glow is empirically relevant. That is, a warm-glow giver is not only interested in certain receivers’ obtaining gifts, but also that they themselves belong to these givers (subsection XII.B(2)). The lower middle pattern acknowledges that people other than self might notice A’s liberality. In particular, A’s generosity may entail reputation effects (for example in a mahādāna). Finally, the lower right pattern stresses the “merit” that A may accumulate by giving, the case of dharmadāna. One may understand the second row as depicting motivations stemming from

- A’s inner feelings,
- A’s membership in society, and
- A’s belief in “unseen” effects in a later life or in another world,

respectively.

I suggest to label the second-row givings as gifts. The middle and right patterns in the second row refer to the case where a person A gives to a person B in order
to obtain something from a third party C. In my usage, reciprocity is not involved. In the middle pattern, C is a human actor or “society” (see chapter XIX). In the right pattern, C is an otherworldly actor (a “god”) or a force (for example, “karma”). This is the classical case of a dharmic gift (XX).

Some people (but certainly not the current author) argue that the three gifts in the second row are not altruistic because the giver has a “reason” for his action. To an economist, totally disinterested action in the sense of “not caring either way” is difficult to imagine. More importantly, the Indian authors (on dānadharmā or other topics) seem to argue in a psychological manner by asking about the motivations for specific actions. In any case, not much is won by deciding under which circumstances the giving from A to B in the figure is to be classified as altruistic or not. Note that the current author does not equate altruism with unselfishness. One might argue that the level of altruism increases from top to bottom and from left to right. Some theories of altruism are fleshed out in chapter XII.

Finally, there are the curious cases of getting without giving. In the case of treasure troves, no (obvious) owner exists:

He [the king, HW] should appropriate all the produce of mines. When he finds a treasure-trove, he should give half of it to Brāhmaṇas and deposit the other half in the treasury. When a Brāhmaṇa finds a treasure-trove, he may keep all of it; a Kṣatriya should give a quarter to the king, a quarter to Brāhmaṇas, and keep one half for himself; a Vaiśya

422 Of course, there is nothing wrong with labeling this case as “reverse reciprocity” as does Kolm (2006, p. 25).
should give a quarter to the king, a half to Brāhmaṇas, and keep a quarter for himself; a Śūdra should divide what he has found into twelve portions and give five portions to the king, five to Brāhmaṇas, and keep two portions for himself.\footnote{ViDh 3.55-61. Olivelle (2009)}

Second, theft\footnote{Trautmann (1981, pp. 278, 291) calls theft “negation of exchange” or “null case of exchange theory”.} or robbery are described in some detail in the Buddhist literature.\footnote{See <104> and the paper by Kieffer-Pütz (2011).} We will not delve into these cases. The case of giving without giving up is treated in section XX.L.

### C. Overview of the fourth part

This book is written on the crossroads of Indology and economic theory. Giving and taking (in all different forms) is complicated and finding a suitable structure is a difficult matter.\footnote{In particular, I do not think that gifting can profitably be carved up along the headings of “donor”, “recipient”, “ritual”, and “gift” as does Heim (2004).} I start from the most simple exchange models and introduce increasingly complicated issues one by one, as far as that is possible. Let our presentation of the book’s contents be guided by Figure 12. Starting from the top, if a legal obligation to reciprocate exists, we are in the realm of dānagrahaṇa. Here, the Latin “do ut des”, giving in order to obtain,\footnote{See <14> for the Vedic “dehi me dādāmi te”. It does not really fit here because gods cannot be brought to court for not granting a son in response to a sacrifice.} reigns. The left branch of Figure 12 finds its justification in two quotations from the lawbook of Nārada:

\begin{center}

\end{center}
It is by means of wealth [tena, HW] that sale and purchase, giving and receiving, enjoyment, and all sorts of transactions take place.\textsuperscript{429}

The subject of Non-payment of Debts covers: when debts are to be paid and which are not to be paid, and by whom, when, and how, along with the dharmas for giving and receiving.\textsuperscript{431}

The first quotation shows that “sale and purchase” are particular instances of “giving and receiving”. In a loan (ṛṇa), reciprocation is deferred. According to the second quotation, ṛṇa is seen as another particular instance of “giving and receiving”.

\textsuperscript{428} NSmV 1.44

\textsuperscript{429} Lariviere (2003)

\textsuperscript{430} NSmV 1.1, but, following Davis, Jr. (2010, p. 74), with the variant dānagrahaṇadharmāś ca for dānagrahaṇadharmāc ca in pada c.

\textsuperscript{431} Davis, Jr. (2010, p. 74), not Lariviere (2003) with respect to pada c.
Thus, part Four until about chapter XVIII deals with reciprocal exchange in different contexts. In particular,

- Chapter XIV look at how Indian texts perceive of economic exchange of goods and services. Here, auctions and bribes are also considered.
- Economic exchange may be intended, but may go wrong for a wide variety of reasons as explained in chapter XIV.D. A particular focus is on the topic of rescission.
- Chapter XV revolves around marketing.
  - In the reciprocal relationship of an ācārya with his pupils (roughly speaking: teaching against dakṣinā), which marketing techniques do these ācāryas employ?
  - Can gift-receiving brahmins also be considered from the marketing perspective? How about competition between brahmins (and churches and similar institutions)?
Finally, I turn the table and ask the question whether the dāna theories might lead to a new manner of structuring modern marketing textbooks.

- Chapter XVI explains how the king is also part of reciprocal relationships, in particular with his subjects. Among others, we are dealing with taxes paid by the subjects in exchange for the protection enjoyed.
- The topic of taxes is also covered chapter XVII, but here under the heading of bhayadāna. Giving for that particular motivation, begging and remuneration of officials are also dealt with.
- The patron of a Vedic sacrifice finds himself at the intersection of two exchange relationships, one with the gods and another with the officiating priests. See chapter XVIII.

Leaving the reciprocal part of the book, other motives get explored:

- With a view to Figure 11 and the middle pattern in the second row, chapter XIX deals with gifts that are given to some person in order to gain advantages with respect to other people. While the receiver might see altruism on the giver’s part, the latter’s motivation is aihika.
- It is only in chapter XX that dharmic giving treated. The aim is to provide small economic models that shed some light on this rather intricate Brahmanical theory of the gift.

Finally, part Five wraps up in different manners. We revisit dakṣinā receiving Vedic priests and learned Brahmins in chapter XXI. Are they just self-serving or can a functional theory of the dakṣinā shed a more balanced view? The last chapter takes a look back by
by summarizing commonalities between Vedic sacrifices and Brahmanical dharmadāna on the one hand and by revisiting Marcel Mauss’ theory of the gift,

by asking the question of whether the shift from sacrifices to dharmic givings amounts to a process of secularization, and, finally,

by comparing sacrifices and gifts with the so-called perfect gifts.

XIV. Arthadāna and dānagrahaṇa in the private realm

Straightforward unimpeded exchange seems to be the norm in modern economic textbooks. That things may go wrong was obvious to the Old Indian authors and is clearly obvious to anybody who is engaged in complicated business transactions like have a house built. This section puts a special focus on rescission because of some non-trivial translational problems.

A. Egotism

In the Indian context, the usual words for reciprocal exchange are arthadāna and dānagrahaṇa. In the two modes of exchange explained in chapter XI, the Edge-worthian person-to-person and the impersonal Walrasian one, the words dāna and grahaṇa are not, in general, allocated to the participating parties in a straightforward manner. This problem of who “gives” and who “takes” may be expected to vary in several languages. Compare the somewhat unfortunate German term Arbeitnehmer (literally a person “taking” work) who is a worker remunerated with a wage. Thus, the Arbeitnehmer takes both work (Arbeit) and
money. In contrast, the employer is the *Arbeitgeber* who gives both work and money.

In the GET model, Pareto efficiency results under certain mathematical conditions that we do not elaborate upon here. Apart from efficiency, questions of morality do not enter the standard model. This does not mean that the GET model is about immoral agents, but rather that problems of morality are simply assumed away. In Old-Indian law texts, the difference between greed (*lobha*) and striving for profit (*lābha*)\(^{432}\) is vital, a difference that GET cannot account for.

Buying/selling of small items would normally occur without any problems. Special attention would only be required for special items (labour contracts, selling oneself, buying/selling of immovable property) which is the subject matter of the current chapter. Additionally, unclear cases or legal disputes should be also be expected to be dealt with (see chapter XIV.D).

### B. Auctions

(1) **Auction theory**

In microeconomics, several different auctions are analysed.\(^{433}\) For the purpose of this book, two are relevant, the ascending and the descending auction. In ascending auctions (also called English auctions), the auctioneer raises the price starting with some minimum price. The last bidder still upholding his wish to buy,


\(^{433}\) See McAfee and McMillan (1987).
gets the object for the current price. In a descending auction (Dutch auction), the auctioneer lowers the price starting with some maximum price. As soon as one bidder is prepared to pay the price announced, he obtains the object.

Economists analyze auctions in terms of the bidders’ “willingness to pay”. This technical term stands for the amount of money that makes a bidder indifferent between obtaining the object for that amount and not obtaining the object. These are the main theoretic differences between these two auctions. Under the English auction, the best any bidder can do is to keep on voicing his interest for the object until his willingness to pay is reached and to drop out at that moment. As a consequence, the successful bidder obtains the object for the second-highest willingness to pay. The Dutch auction is more complicated. If a bidder announces his willingness to buy, he has to pay the current price. He may hope to obtain the object for a lower price if he waits some time. Of course, he then risks to see another bidder take the object.

(2) **Auctions for traders**

Consider the Arthaśāstra’s book 2 on the activities of superintendents. In particular, chapters 21 and 22 treat the superintendent of customs and the operation of customs. Custom authorities collect both “customs duty” (śulka) and the “increase in price” (mūlyavṛddhi) which might be called “market tax”. According to Kauṭiliya, this tax should work as follows:

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434 Alternatively, the bidders increase the price above the minimum price. If no further bidder can be found to outbid the previous announcement, the last (successful) bidder obtains the object for his last bid.
The Superintendent of Customs should set up the customs house along with the flag facing the east or the north near the main gate. ... The traders should announce the quantity and the price of a commodity that has reached the foot of the flag: “Who will buy this commodity at this price for this quantity?” After it has been proclaimed aloud three times, he should give it to the bidders. If there is competition among buyers, the increase in price along with the customs duty goes to the treasury.

Olivelle (2013, p. 555) argues that Kauṭilya has an auction in mind. He interprets “increase in price” as follows: “This must refer to the increase beyond the asking price that was initially announced. Such an increase caused by the bidding process appears to go to the state rather than to the trader.” Of course, mūlyavrddhi (“increase in price”) clearly points to the ascending auction.

Wiese (2014) explains the optimization problem encountered by traders facing this particular tax.

According to Kauṭilya, the price of the good to be auctioned off should be determined as follows:

KAŚ 2.21.1, 7-9
Olivelle (2013)
This is also the result of an analysis provided by Wiese (2014).
Therefore, the sale of commodities should be made by weight, measure, or number …

This passage seems related to the topic “Surveillance of Traders” where different sorts of unwanted behaviour is dealt with. In particular, excessive prices are disallowed:

He [the superintendent of commodities, HW] should fix for them [the traders, HW], moreover, a profit above the authorized purchase price of 5 percent in the case of local commodities, and of 10 percent in the case of foreign commodities. For those who increase the price beyond that or, in buying and selling realize a profit beyond that, the fine is 200 Paņas for every five Paņas of additional profit per 100 Paņas.

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438 KAŚ 2.21.15
439 Olivelle (2013)
440 Olivelle (2013, pp. 226-228)
441 KAŚ 4.2.28-29
442 Olivelle (2013)
Auctions for immovable property

Somewhat similarly, immovable property can also change hands by way of an auction. There, Kautilya uses the very same expression of *mūlyavṛddhi*:443:

\[
\text{<140> } jñātisāmantadhanikāh krameṇa bhūmiparighrahān kretum abhy-ābhaveyuḥ | tato 'nye bāhyāḥ | sāmantacatvāriṁśatkuṭyeva,
\]

\[
grhipratimukhe veśma śrāvayeyuḥ sāmantagṛāṇavṛddheṣu kṣetram ārāmaṃ setubandhaṃ taṭākam ādhāraṃ vā maryādāsu yathāse-tubhogam 'anenārghena kaḥ kretā' iti | trir āghuṣītam avyāhatam kretā kretuṁ labheta | spardhayā vā mūlyavardhane mūlyavṛddhiḥ saśulkā kośam gačchet.444
\]

Relatives, neighbors, and creditors, in that order, should have the first right to purchase landed property; after that outsiders. They should auction a residence in front of the house and in the presence of 40 neighboring families; a field, a park, an embankment, a reservoir, or a pond, at its borders and in the presence of elders from neighboring villages, saying: “In conformity with its boundary lines, who will buy this at this price?” When it has been announced three times without being countered, the man who wishes to buy gets to purchase it. If the price increases because of competition, on the other hand, the increase in price together with the duty goes to the treasury.445

Again, Kautilya has an ascending auction in mind.

443 KĀŚ 3.9.5 is similar to KĀŚ 2.21.9. KĀŚ 3.9.3 has śrāvayeyuḥ. This causative literally means “they should make hear” and Olivelle (2013) sensibly translates as “they should auction”.

444 KĀŚ 3.9.1-5

445 Olivelle (2013)
C. Bribes

Bribery is “improper reciprocation with an officeholder for an act intended by society to be gratuitous”.\textsuperscript{446} Thus, bribery squarely falls into the domain of ar-thadāna which is aihika.\textsuperscript{447} Usually, a transaction would be considered a bribe because it is a transaction benefitting the agents involved, but doing harm to outsiders. The Sanskrit word for bribery is utkoca which is counted among the illegitimate (adatta) gifts (see <67>).

Remember “markets are wonderful” from sections XI.F and G. This result depends (inter alia) on the absence of “external effects” or “externalities”. “Extern” refers to outside the market transaction in question. Externalities can be positive or negative. For example, if some person A produces something and sells to another person B, the (negative) externality affecting a third person C may consist of environmental damage done in the production process. Positive externalities also exist, for example when the bees of a bee keeper pollinate the trees in an apple orchard.

An important part of economics is about the question of how to deal with externalities. In the case of negative externalities, one may think of

- prohibiting the externality producing,
- specifying specific production or consumption procedures,
- taxing the unwanted products,

\textsuperscript{446} Noonan, Jr. (1984, p. 685). Further expounding of the definition is not necessary here, but Noonan, Jr. (1984) has a lot to contribute, also on the difficulties of distinguishing between gifts that are reciprocal and bribes (pp. 687-690).

\textsuperscript{447} See <55>2.
and so forth. It seems that the treatment of utkoca by Nārada points to prohibition.

D. … but exchange may go wrong

(1) Utopian exchange

Buying and selling seem straightforward activities. A buyer receives an item from a seller for a price or exchanges apples against bananas. Theoretically, both modes of exchange (see sections XI.F and G) occur under idealized and often utopian conditions:

- Contracts are complete, i.e., they specify all contingencies. This is not possible in real life.
- From the point of view of social exchange theory, Edgeworthian or Walrasian exchange are but a very small part of social exchange. Social exchange often takes place in long time intervals and it is not always clear to the participants who owes what to whom. Social exchange relations exist in markets, between neighbours, colleagues etc. and also comprises Senecan fellowship.
- Many economic exchange models depict a utopian state of affairs in many respects: no theft, no quality problems, no cancellation (rescission) of buying/selling contracts.

The Indian law makers had a particular, but effective manner of dealing theoretically with norm conflicts, see <13> on p. 34. Additionally, they were aware of what might go wrong in exchanges (section V.B). The utopian approach of GET disregards all these practical problems. Of course, economic theory has pro-
gressed, and economists are now able to model situations of asymmetric information (compare the defect mentioned above), of reciprocity, of reputation, and the like with the help of game theory.

**XV. Marketing and competition**

The relationship of marketing with Old Indian texts on giving and taking deserve a special chapter. On the one hand, gurus and Brahmins can be considered as marketing actors. Inversely, on the other hand, ideas from dānadharma may be fruitful for modern marketing.

**A. Marketing**

Marketing textbooks and the marketing instruments are dominated by the familiar 4P (introduced by McCarthy 1960). The 4P are “product”, “place”, “price”, and “promotion” and are addressed as “Marketing Mix”. Van Waterschoot, W. & Van den Bulte, C. (1992) have proposed an “Improved Classification of the Marketing Mix” (pp. 88-91) that I present here. These authors (p. 89) distinguish between

- product instruments (configuration of something valued by the prospective exchange party)
- distribution instruments (placing the offer at the disposal of the prospective exchange party)
- price instruments (determination of the compensation and sacrifices to be brought by the prospective exchange party)
- communication instruments (bringing the offer to the attention of the prospective exchange party and influencing its feelings and preferences about it)
This classification has proved useful and provides the basic structure of marketing thinking and teaching all over the world.

**B. Marketing for ācāras**

1. **The ācāra and his dānagrahaṇa**

The sīṣya (student in his guru’s house) is enumerated among the five different kinds of labourers.449 “The word [guru] originally meant ‘heavy, weighty,’ and calls to mind the Latin expression of a *vir gravis*, ‘a weighty man,’ i.e. a man of importance and dignity.”450 Indeed, Sanskrit guru and Latin *gravis* derive from a common Indo-European word. The guru “who teaches young boys and men in his house the sacred texts of the *Veda*, is called an ācārya – meaning literally either the man ‘who teaches the right conduct’ or, more likely, ‘he who must be approached’”.451

In this section and the next, we cover the relationship of an ācārya with his pupils. See Figure 13 and compare with the upper left pattern in Figure 11 (p. 174). In particular, we consider the ācārya as an economic agent who employs what we would nowadays call marketing techniques.

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448 I liberally cite from Wiese, who applies the famous 4P from marketing to Old Indian texts that deal with gurus. The 4P are “product”, “place”, “price”, and “promotion” and are addressed as “Marketing Mix”. See, for example, Van Waterschoot, W. & Van den Bulte, C. (1992).

449 See <26>, p. 47.

450 Scharfe (2002, p. 277)

While the giving and taking between teacher and pupil are also described in Buddhist contexts,\textsuperscript{452} we concentrate on the classical context. The \textit{dāna} offered by the \textit{ācārya} includes:\textsuperscript{453}

(a) Teaching of the \textit{Veda}:

According the ViDh 27.15-17 or ĀDh 1.19, the period of study begins before the pupil is 8 years (for a Brahmin), 11 years (for a Kṣatriya) or 12 years (for Vaiśya). The length of study varies. If one needs 12 years for each of the three \textit{Veda}s, one has to study 36 years. Indeed, Manu 3.1-2 says: “He should carry out the observance relating to the three Vedas at his teacher’s house, an observance lasting thirty-six years, or one-half or one-quarter of that time, or else until he has learnt them. After he has learnt in the proper order the three Vedas or two of them, or at least one,

\textsuperscript{452} See <96> and UJA 4.71, 84-88. \textit{Dakṣīnā} or \textit{dāna} for teachers are not explicitly mentioned in UJA, in contrast to “material needs” of ascetics and brahmins (see <97>).

\textsuperscript{453} Note the unclear attribution of \textit{dāna} and \textit{grahaṇa} to actors in many exchange relationships (see section XIV.A).
without violating his chastity, he should undertake the householder’s order of life.”

(b) Rituals

_Veda_ teaching occurs in the framework of well-established rituals. In particular, the beginning of the student’s stay in the teacher’s house is called _upanayana_ (leading [the student] near [the teacher by his guardians]). The end of studies is often marked by the ceremony called _snāna_ (bath) and/or _samāvartana_ (returning).

(c) Bed and board

The students obtain lodging and food at the _guru_’s house. In return, the students had to beg for food and to provide personal services to the _guru_. These services and the humility that comes with providing them may also be considered a product given (!) to the students.

The _guru_’s _grahana_ as an _ācārya_ has three components:

(a) Begging for alms:

One of the student’s tasks is to beg for alms. For example, ĀDhS 1.3.25 requests: “Morning and evening he shall go out to beg with a bowl, soliciting from those who are not degraded or heinous sinners, and bringing all he receives to his teacher.” It is likely that the begging efforts were suc-

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454 MDh 3.1-2
455 An overview of Hindu _samskāras_, including educational ones, is given by Pandey (1969).
cessful. In any case, householders were asked to react sympathetic to students begging *gurvartham*, i.e., “for the sake of his teacher”.\(^{456}\) It may even be dangerous not to give (see section XVII.B). Nevertheless, if the student is not successful, it is the teacher’s duty to give him food. Thus, alms begged by the student are an uncertain income for the teacher. Interestingly, stealing for the teacher’s benefit might be allowed.\(^{457}\)

(b) Services in the guru’s house

According to ĀDhŚ 1.4.24, “he should say when he goes to sleep: ‘I have taken care of the man who takes care of the Law.’ ” And ĀDhŚ 1.6.1-2 stipulates: “Every night he should get his teacher ready for bed by washing and pressing his feet, and, when permitted, lie down to sleep himself”.

(c) *Dakṣiṇā*

Before a student leaves his teacher’s house, he is expected to present a gift. The instructions to a departing students might have been as follows: After the completion of vedic study, the teacher admonishes his resident pupil: “Speak the truth. Follow the Law. Do not neglect your private recitation of the Veda. After you have given a valuable gift to the teacher, do not cut off your family line. ... Treat your mother like a god. Treat your

\(^{456}\) This is stipulated in Manu 11.1-2. See Olivelle (2005, pp. 215, 837).

\(^{457}\) ĀDhŚ 1.7.19-21 says: “After learning as much as he can, he should present the fee for vedic study, a fee that is procured righteously and according to his ability. If his teacher has fallen into hardship, however, he may seize it from an Ugra or a Śūdra. Some maintain that it is lawful at all times to seize wealth for the teacher from an Ugra or a Śūdra.” Note: An *Ugra* has a *Kṣatriya* father and a Śūdra mother according to KAŚ 3.7.22.
father like a god. Treat your teacher like a god. Treat your guests like gods.”

(2) The ācāra (and other brahmins) as economic actor?

It is only realistic, I claim, to assume that learned brahmins were competing against each other with respect to students and the king (chapters XVI.B, C). Indeed, the Upaniṣads depict learned Brahmins as economic actors. The teacher’s prayer in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad contains:

<141> ā mā yantu brahmacāriṇaḥ svāhā |
     ā mā yantu brahmacāriṇaḥ svāhā |
     … ||
yaso jane ’sāni svāhā |
śreyān vasyaso ’sāni svāhā ||

Students, may they come to me! Svāhā!
Students, may they flock to me! Svāhā!

…
May I be famous among men! Svāhā!
More affluent than the very rich! Svāhā!

The successful teacher might be called yaujana-śatika, i.e., a guru for whom students travel a long distance – hundred yojanas. However, this marketing and business orientation by a guru would have been frowned upon and comes at a cost. He cannot profit from vedic knowledge both in this world and in the next:

____________________

459 TU 1.4.2-3
460 Olivelle (1998)
When someone acquires vedic knowledge and thereby gains a livelihood in this world, that knowledge will give him no reward in the next world, as also when someone uses his vedic knowledge to tear down the fame of others.\footnote{Olivelle (2009)}

\textbf{(3) The ācāra’s pricing policy}

The concrete amount of \textit{dakṣinā} is left to the student. This arrangement may well have been to the advantage of the teacher, by some process of gift differentiation (corresponding to price differentiation in microeconomics or marketing). That is, a student from an affluent family can and will give more generously than a student from a poor family. Indeed, while a \textit{dakṣinā} is a fee paid to the teacher it is also a gift:

\begin{quote}
\textless{}143\textgreater{} \textit{tathā pātraviśeṣeṇa dānaṃ syād uttarotaram \vline
\text{gurumātrpitṛbrahmavādināṁ dīyate tu yat \vline
\text{tal lakṣagunitam vidyāt puṇyaṁ vā pāpam eva vā}}\text{\footnote{DK 2.30}}\end{quote}

Moreover a gift becomes greater and greater in accordance with the excellence of the recipient. Thus, one should know that when a gift is given to one’s teacher, one’s mother, one’s father, and a Vedic savant, each time the resulting merit or sin becomes increasingly a hundred-thousand times greater.\footnote{Brick (2015)}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[462] ViDh 30.39-40
\item[463] Olivelle (2009)
\item[464] DK 2.30
\item[465] Brick (2015).
\end{footnotes}
Thus, there are good reasons for giving generously to one’s teacher.

(4) **The ācāra’s communication policy: attention**

A *guru* may win a philosophical debate and thus gain the king’s favour, students, and followers in this manner (see chapter XVI.C). A second method to win students is presented in the *Upaniṣads*:

<144> Śvetaketu, the sun of Āruṇi, came one day into the assembly of the land of Pañcāla and approached Jaivali Pravāhaṇa while people were waiting upon him. Seeing Śvetaketu, he said: “Son!” Śvetaketu replied: “Sir?” Jaivali asked: “Did your father teach you?” Śvetaketu replied: “Yes.”

Do you know how people, when they die, go by different paths?”

“No,” he replied.466

*Jaivali* keeps on asking questions to which the boy has no answer. *Jaivali* invites the boy to stay, but the latter runs off to his father *Gautama* and tells him about it.467 The father goes to *Jaivali* and some bargaining begins:

<145> Jaivali gave him a seat and had some water brought for him. Then he presented him with the refreshments due to an honored guest and said: “We will grant a wish to the Reverend Gautama.”

Gautama said in reply: “Now that you have promised to grant me a wish, tell me what you told my boy.”

“But that, Gautama, is in the category of divine wishes,” responded Jaivali. “Why don’t you make a wish of a human sort?”

Gautama replied: “As you know, I have my share of gold, cows,

466 BĀU 6.2.1-2, Olivelle (1998)
467 BĀU 6.2.2-3, Olivelle (1998)
horses, slave girls, blankets, and clothes. Do not be stingy, your honor, in giving me more than that—in giving me the infinite and the boundless.”

“Then, Gautama, you will have to request it in the correct manner.”

“I come to you, my lord, as a pupil.”

With just these words did the people of old place themselves as pupils under a teacher. And Gautama lived there openly as a pupil.468

Thus, in the end, *Jaivali* does not win the boy as student, but his father instead, presumably for a generous remuneration.

(5) **The ācāra’s communication policy: feelings and preferences**

The feelings and preferences of the guru’s customers were quite positive in Ancient India. In particular, the value of teaching was well accepted:

<146>   vittaṃ bandhur vayaḥ karma vidhyā bhavati pañcamī ∣
    etāni mānyasthānāni garīyo yad yad uttaram ||469

Wealth, kin, age, ritual life, and the fifth, knowledge—these are the grounds for respect; and each subsequent one carries greater weight than each preceding.470

Indeed, the teacher has a treasure to offer:

<147>   vidyā ha vai brāhmaṇaṃ ājagāma gopāya mā śevadhīṣ te ’ham asmi ∣
    asūyakāyāνrjave ’yatāya na māṃ bruyā vīryavatī tathā syām ||

468 BĀU 6.2.4-7, Olivelle (1998)
469 MDh 2.136
470 Olivelle (2005)
yam eva vidyāḥ śucim apramattam medhāvinam
brahmacaryopapannam |
yas te na druhyet katama cca nāha tasmai māṃ brūyā nidhipāya brah-
man ||  

Now, vedic knowledge came up to a Brāhmaṇa and said: “Guard me; I am your treasure. Do not disclose me to a man who is envious, crooked, or uncontrolled. Thus I shall wax strong. A man you know to be pure, alert, wise, and chaste, a man who will not become hostile to you under any circumstance—only to such a man should you disclose me, O Brāmaṇa, as to a guardian of your treasure.”

In this manner, the product (teaching of vedic knowledge) is valuable and should not be given to just anybody. This adds to creating the impression of having something very valuable on offer.

Another venue of influencing the students’ outlook on learning from a teacher is via ancestor worship. The value of Veda teaching and reciting is enhanced by the following observation:

<148> śiṣyeṇa brahmārambhāvasānayor guroḥ pādopasāṃgraḥaṇaṃ kāryam |
    praṇavaś ca vyāhartavyaḥ |
    tatra ca yad rco ’dhīte tenāsyājyena pitṛnāṃ trptir bhavati |
    yad yajūṃṣi tena madhunā |
    yat sāmāni tena payasā |

471 ViDh 29.9-10
472 Olivelle (2009)
At the beginning and at the end of a vedic lesson, the pupil should clasp his teacher’s feet and recite the sacred syllable OṂ.
And within this context, when he recites Rg-verse, by that his ancestors become sated with ghee; when he recites Yajus-formulas, with honey; when he recites Sāman-chants, with milk; when he recites Atharvan-formulas, with meat; and when he recites Purāṇas, Itihāsas, Vedic Supplements, and Legal Treatises, with rice.\textsuperscript{474}

Other aspects of winning pupils or followers are argued for by theoreticians of religion. note that “confidence in the explanations offered by a religion will be greater to the extent that its ecclesiastics display levels of commitment greater than that expected of followers.” In the Indian context, the guru is supposed to possess the highest moral, intellectual, and spiritual qualifications. Thus, according to the Upaniṣads the teacher should be “well versed in the Vedas, and focused on brahman.”\textsuperscript{475}

\section*{C. Marketing for prospective pātras}

Within the dharmadāna framework, giving to worthy recipients is encouraged. On the one hand, the texts prescribe how and by whom giving is to be practiced. The manifold advantages of giving are dealt with, or alluded to, in texts of various traditions. On the other hand, the Brahmins had to make themselves eligible

\textsuperscript{473} ViDh 30.32-38
\textsuperscript{474} Olivelle (2009)
\textsuperscript{475} MU 1.2.12, Olivelle (1998)
as donees. They had to engage in some sort of self-marketing.\footnote{This is been observed also by others, for example by Thapar (2010, p. 103).} Indications of these self-marketing activities are also evident from the texts. Self-marketing of receiving Brahmins is relevant in the age of Kali:

<149> \textit{krte pradīyate gatvā tretāyāṃ diyate grhe} \\
\textit{dvāpare prārthayati ca kalau cānugamānvite} ||\footnote{DK 1.63}

In the Kṛta Yuga, a donor goes to the recipient and gives; in the Tretā Yuga, a donor gives a gift in his home; in the Dvāpara and Kali Yugas, a recipient begs, but in the Kali Yuga, the recipient must also pursue the donor.\footnote{Brick (2015)}

Consider \footnote{<60>} and \footnote{<61>}. From the givers’ point of view, these quotations admonish the merit seeker to exercise care in the receiver selection process. From the receivers’ perspective, they tell the Brahmin about the qualities he needs in order to be a worthy \textit{pātra}.

Thus, one might apply these traditional marketing instruments:

- **product instruments**
  
  The \textit{dharmadāna} receiving Brahmins had nothing to offer. They obtained dharmic gifts due to their virtuousness. In a sense, they themselves were the product. They needed to engage in self-marketing in order to be considered “worthy” (see section C). From another perspective, their product was the merit they promised to the donors.

- **distribution instruments**
Successful Brahmins obtained dharmic gifts from neighbours and passers-by. In order to attract the attention of potential donors they needed to be located appropriately.

- **price instruments**
  The concrete amount of a dharmic gift is to be decided by the donor and should be in line with his means. Due to the inherent gift differentiation, this arrangement would benefit the brahmin similarly as the ācārya (see subsection (3)).

- **communication instruments**
  The worth of the merit obtained by the giver was clearly a function of his belief (section VI.E).

## D. Competition between Brahmins or churches

One might think that Brahmins and other potential receivers try to thwart off competitors. This seems to have been relevant already in Vedic times (see <178>). Another indication is <57> from dānadharma which could be understood as a warning of competitors against the dangers of receiving. However, a different reading (with respect to the requirements for becoming a worthy pātra) is also possible. The reader is also directed to chapter XVI which can be seen as a treatment of the marketing activities and competition of gurus with respect to a king.

Zaleski and Zech (1995) summarize theoretical and empirical work on church giving. They focus on the question of whether competition between religious churches increases or decreases giving to churches. There are three arguments why a monopoly church may result in a more religious society and hence to more church giving.
First, “a monopoly church’s ability to penetrate all of a society’s institutions, both religious and secular”. Second, “the fear that competition among churches may be destructive and harm the credibility of religion in general” and “destroy the taken-for-granted elements of religion in a society”. The latter is Berger’s idea of a “sacred canopy”.\textsuperscript{479} It seems that the Indian \textit{dānadharma} together with the basic Brahmanism penetrates the Hindu society, with no real separation between religious and secular. Hence, the Brahmanical tenets have not been, by and large and for long stretches of time, threatened by heresy or heterodoxy. And even when such a treat emerged, the theories of \textit{dāna} were remarkably similar within Indian traditions (of Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Jaina affiliation) and remarkable different from many Western traditions as has been observed Heim (2004, pp. xvi–xxi).

Third, the opportunity to choose between different religious affiliations may be connected to search and information costs. These are indeed present in the Hindu case. Compare <61>.

Inversely, competition may be beneficial to church giving for three reasons.\textsuperscript{480} First, as with product differentiation, people differ in their tastes for religion. It is not quite clear how Brahmanism fares in that respect. On the one hand, there is a basic general understanding of karma, dharma, and the like. On the other hand, heterodox groups like Jains and Buddhists put forward new types of believes. Also, within Brahmanism, several religious-philosophical strands can be

\textsuperscript{479} For these quotations, see Zaleski and Zech (1995, pp. 351–352).
distinguished, in particular the famous six *darśanas* and the atheist *Cārvāka* philosophy.

Second, monopolist churches as monopolist firms get lazy. It seems that the dānadharma system was a highly competitive system where individual Brahmins had to prove their *pātratva*, the fact that they were worthy recipients of gifts. Third, a monopoly religion that is connected with the worldly power may be unpopular, at least with those not benefitting from the particular policies pursued by these powers. Then, a distance between worldly power on the one hand and the recipients of gifts may be helpful. Now, while Hindu kings were sometimes known to give generously to Brahmins or Buddhists, they main *dānadharma* ideology addresses laymen who are supposed to give to individual Brahmins or Buddhist *saṅghas*.

**E. Modern marketing theory from the *dānadharma* perspective**

(1) **Restructuring marketing by way of *dānadharma***

This section tries to connect (i) Old-Indian theories on gifting with (ii) alternative manners to structure marketing ideas. This particular perspective is instructive for both *dāna* theory and marketing.\(^{481}\) More concretely, against the above 4P (section A), I suggest an alternative *dānadharma* inspired approach. Why not

\(^{481}\) It seems that the Buddhist list of four defilements of giving (gifting?) (as seen in <105>) is a little less relevant from this point of view.
structure the vast marketing knowledge according to the six bases or motivations (*adhiṣṭhāna*) as listed in <55>?

One would then take a customer’s perspective and ask about his or her motivations for deciding on an object that is for sale. He may buy for either one (or a combination) of these six motivations: duty (*dharma*), worldly gain (*artha*), passion (*kāma*), shame (*vrīḍā*), joy (*harṣa*), and fear (*bhaya*). One way to proceed may be to use the new classification as the overarching structure and to employ the 4P within that structure.

Consider the following figure that links the six motivations with the aims in life as mentioned in section III.A:

![Figure 14: From *dharmadāna* to *harṣadāna*](image)

(2) **The marketing for customers motivated by duty**

If customers are motivated by duty, old-Indian concepts may be helpful for devising

- marketing strategies for charities or
- self-marketing strategies for you-tubers, influencers, B promis, politicians, and the like
Indeed, the marketing for prospective pātras is one particular field of application.

(3) **The marketing for customers motivated by worldly reward**

For customers motivated by worldly reward, Indian text provide rather modern perspectives as is clear from chapters V, XIII, and XIV.D. In particular, the problems of mistrust and asymmetric information have been very clearly seen by arthaśāstra authors (see the latter sections of chapter XIX).

(4) **The marketing for customers motivated by passion**

Considering <55>, the relevant marketing question should be of how to apply the 4P to the craving of men for “women, racing, hunting, or playing dice”. One may speculate about the common denominator of these passion goods/activities. Presumably, they are about enjoyment and fun, rather than about addiction.

(5) **The marketing for customers motivated by shame**

Is it possible to shame people into giving away their money? It is not difficult to find modern-day examples. Most marketing textbooks are too well behaved for describing (or recommending) this kind of communication policy.

(6) **The marketing for customers motivated by joy**

Customers are motivated by joy if they buy/give “after seeing or hearing pleasant things”. It seems that this particular type of marketing deals with spontaneous giving that street artists endeavour to elicit.
The marketing for customers motivated by fear

The marketing tools expedient for extortion or blackmail have not been covered extensively.

XVI. Arthadāna and dānagrahaṇa for the king

The king takes in reciprocal exchange relationships (this chapter), but also by threat (the next chapter). With respect to reciprocity, the king may be a receiver in the sense of being praised by a poet or being taught by a philosopher-guru, but also from enjoying a competition between pañdits, or, of course, as a tax collector.

A. Praising the king

The king is involved in various dānagrahaṇa relationships. Beginning with praise, kings and poets often form a mutually beneficial relationship:

<150> khyātā narādhipatayaḥ kavisamśrayena |
    rājāśrayena ca gatāḥ kavayah prasiddhim ||
    rājño samo 'sti na kaveḥ paramopakārī |
    rājñe na cāsti kavinā sadṛśaḥ sahaḥ ||482

482 Kāvyamīmāṃsā by Rājasekhara, cited from Angot (2017, p. 22) who notes the intimate alliance between politics and poetry.
Due to their association with poets, the kings are well-known, and by resting on kings, the poets become accomplished. As an eminent supporter, the poet has none who is like the king, and there is no companion like the poet for the king.

B. Teaching the king

With respect to teaching, consider BĀU 4.1\textsuperscript{483} where we learn about Yājñavalkya visiting king Janaka, the king of Videha. Yājñavalkya manages to amaze the king with his wisdom. Several times, the king exclaims: “I’ll give you a thousand cows together with the bulls and elephants!” Perhaps out of modesty, Yājñavalkya declines this easy opportunity for wealth: “My father believed that one should never accept a gift before giving instruction. Let’s hear what else they have told you.” The wise Yājñavalkya disproves again and again assertions such as “Brahman is breath” or “Brahman is sight”.

It seems that Yājñavalkya’s initial modesty pays off immensely. Finally, Janaka is so impressed by the teaching that he exclaims:

<151> namas te ‘stu | ime videhā ayam aham asmi\textsuperscript{484} 

Homage to you! These people of Videha and I myself–here we are at your service.\textsuperscript{485}

\textsuperscript{483} Olivelle (1998, pp. 102–109)
\textsuperscript{484} BĀU 4.2.4
\textsuperscript{485} Olivelle (1998)
C. Engaging in a competition in front of the king

A philosophical debate was another method to gain income. We read in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad\(^{486}\): “Janaka, the king of Videha, once set out to perform a sacrifice at which he intended to give lavish gifts to the officiating priests. Brahmins from the Kuru and Pañcāla regions had flocked there for the occasion, and Janaka of Videha wanted to find out which of those Brahmins was the most learned in the Vedas. So he corralled a thousand cows; to the horn of each cow were tied ten pieces of gold. He then addressed those Brahmins: “Distinguish Brahmins! Let the most learned man among you drive away those cows.”\(^{487}\)

Yājñavalkya is bold enough to have the cows driven away by his son. Consequently, he is challenged by eight Brahmins and manages to silence each of them.\(^{488}\)

D. Taxes as payment for services rendered by the king

(1) The contract theory of state

One might distinguish four Old Indian theories of state. First, the “idealistic viewpoint” projects a rather idealistic picture of the king and his characteristics. For example, GDh 11.2–6 demands: “[The king] should be correct in his actions

\(^{486}\) Olivelle (1998, 74-77).
\(^{487}\) BĀU 3.1.1-2, Olivelle (1998)
\(^{488}\) BĀU 3.1.2-3.9.26, Olivelle (1998)
and speech and trained in the triple Veda and logic. Let him be upright, keep his senses under control, surround himself with men of quality, and adopt sound policies. He should be impartial towards his subjects and work for their welfare.”\textsuperscript{489} This idealistic approach can also be found in many other places.\textsuperscript{490} Thus, some sort of “benevolent dictator”\textsuperscript{491} is supposed to reign the old Indian state.

Second, the “seven-member theory” is central to the \textit{Arthaśāstra}’s practical manner of political thought:

\begin{quote}
svāmyamātyajanapadadurgakośadaṇḍamitrāṇi prakṛtayā\textsuperscript{492}
\end{quote}

Lord, minister, countryside, fort, treasury, army, and ally are the constituent elements.\textsuperscript{493}

Sharma (2005b, p. 31) calls this list a “complete definition of the state” and Sharma (2005, p. 33) remarks that the usual translation of \textit{amātyas} as “minister” is misleading: “In the \textit{Arthaśāstra} the \textit{amātyas} constitute a regular cadre of service from which all high officers such as the chief priest, ministers, collectors, treasurers, officers engaged in civil and criminal administration, officers in charge of harem, envoys and the superintendents of various departments are to

\textsuperscript{489} Olivelle (2000).
\textsuperscript{490} For example VaDh 19.1
\textsuperscript{491} For this fictitious character from economic theory, see Buchanan (1975, 1987).
\textsuperscript{492} KAŚ 6.1.1
\textsuperscript{493} Olivelle (2013)
be recruited”. Summarizing, Sharma (2005b, p. 34) remarks that “the amātyas stand for the governmental machinery”.

Third, the “protection-through-punishment theory of state” is due to Manu:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{\textit{yadi na praṇayed rājā daṇḍaṁ daṇḍyeśv atandritaḥ |}} \\
&\text{śūle matsyān ivāpakṣyan durbalān balavattarāḥ ||}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{svāmyaṁ ca na syāt kasmiścit pravartetādharottaram ||}
&\text{sarvo daṇḍajito loko durlabho hi śucir naraḥ |}
&\text{daṇḍasya hi bhayāt sarvam jagad bhogāya kalpate ||}^{495}
\end{align*}
\]

If the king fails to administer Punishment tirelessly on those who ought to be punished, the stronger will grill the weak like fish on a spit; […] no one would have any right of ownership; and everything would be topsy-turvy.\(^{496}\) The whole world is subdued through Punishment, for an honest man is hard to find;\(^{497}\) clearly, it is the fear of Punishment that makes the whole creation accede to being used.\(^{498}\)

\(^{494}\) Sharma (2005b, p. 33). See, for example, KAŚ 1.9-10, 1.16, 2.6-36, or 3.1.1. Kauṭilya often uses the term \textit{amātyasampad} which is translated as “exemplary qualities of a minister” by Olivelle (2013), in particular in KAŚ 1.9.1, 1.16.2, or 2.9.1. Referring to KAŚ 3.1.1 on “justices of ministerial rank”, Olivelle (2013, p. 582) supports Sharma’s assessment by noting that “a large number of officials carried this rank”.

\(^{495}\) MDh 7.20-22

\(^{496}\) According to old Indian commentators of Manu, “the lower castes would usurp the roles and privileges of upper castes”, see Olivelle (2005, p. 294).

\(^{497}\) The difficulty of finding an honest man is discussed in section XIX.C.

\(^{498}\) Olivelle (2005)
Fourth, and closely related to the third theory of state, comes the “contract theory of state”. Consider the *Arthaśāstra*:

<154>  mātsyanyāyābhibhūtāḥ prajā manuṃ vaivasvataṁ rājānāṁ cakrire | dhanyaṣaḍbhāgaṁ panyadaśabhāgaṁ hiranyam cāsyā bhāgadeyam prakalpayāmāsuh | tena bhṛtā rājānāḥ prajānāṁ yogakṣemāvahāḥ |

Oppressed by the law of the fish, people made Manu, the son of Vi̯vasvat, king. They allocated to him as his share one-sixth of the grain and one-tenth of the merchandise, as also money. Subsisting on that, kings provide security to the subjects.

There is no evidence that *Kauṭilya* himself supported the contract theory of state. The above passage is ideological. Its purpose is to propitiate the people with their tax-collecting ruler who may often seem oppressive.

As an aside, *Yajñavalkya* has the king collect both taxes and merit (which may be negative):

<155>  brāhmaṇeṣu kṣamī snigdheṣv ajihmaḥ krodhano ’riśu | syād rājā bhṛtyavargeṣu prajābhyaś ca yathā pītā || punyāt śaḍbhāgam ādatte nyāyena paripālayan | sarvadānādhikaṃ yasmān nyāyena paripālanam ||

---

499 Sharma (2005b, pp. 63–76) summarizes old Indian ideas and sources (that comprise the *Aitareya Āranyaka* and Buddhist texts) of the contract theory of state.

500 KAŚ 1.13.5-7

501 As Olivelle (2005, p. 481) explains, “[i]n several accounts of the origin of the human race, Manu is presented both as the first man and as the first king.”

502 Olivelle (2013)

The king should act with forbearance toward Brähmans, without guile toward loved ones, with anger toward enemies, and like a father toward his various dependents and his subjects. He takes a sixth portion of the merits by providing protection justly, because providing protection justly is greater than all gifts. He should protect his subjects when they are being harassed by rogues, thieves, evildoers, extremely violent men, and the like, and especially by scribes. Whatever evil his subjects commit when they are not being protected, half of that falls on the king, because he collects taxes.

The king had to offer protection of his realm in different dimensions. For example, Manu devotes one out of 12 chapters to the four classes or castes (varṇa) and in particular to the problems resulting from any mixing (MDh 10). The following subsections concentrate on the king who administers just punishment and provides protection against theft.

(2)  Just punishment

Viṣṇu 5 lists the punishments to be administered by the king in some detail, for “crimes deserving capital punishments”, for “offences against upper classes by lower classes”, for “verbal abuse and assault”, for “sexual crimes”, and so on.

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504 YSm 2.330-333
505 Olivelle (2019)
506 Olivelle (2009)
A king’s responsibility for punishment is clear from many texts. For example, *Manu* demands:

<156>  \( yathārhattaḥ \) *sampraṇayen naresv anyāya-vartīṣu*\(^{507}\)

The king should administer appropriate Punishment on men who behave improperly\(^{508}\)

One good reason for punishment is given by the above *Manu* citation <153>. The Indian texts now start to worry about the king’s incentives to administer justice in the correct manner. We will take up the incentive problem in detail in section XIX.F below.

(3) Protection and insurance against theft

According to *Kauṭilya*, the the king should compensate the victim for items stolen by a thief if the latter cannot be apprehended:

<157>  \( paracakrāṭavīhṛtaṃ \) […] *praty āṇīya rājā yathāsvaṃ prayacchet | corahṛtam avidyamānaṃ svadravyebhyaḥ prayacchet, praty ānetum āśakto vā*\(^{509}\)

Things robbed by an enemy king or a tribal chief […] the king should recover and restore to their respective owners. Anything stolen by thieves that cannot be found—or that he is powerless to recover—the king should restore from his own property. What has been seized as a

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\(^{507}\) MDh 7.16  
\(^{508}\) Olivelle (2005)  
\(^{509}\) KAŚ 3.16.25-26
result of individual plunder, he should recover and restore or pay com-
pensation.\(^{510}\)

In another \textit{Arthaśāstra} passage, the compensation is not to be payed by the king himself, but by his functionaries:

\[
\text{\textless 158\textgreater } \text{grāmeśv antaḥ sārhikā jñātasārā vaseyuh | muṣitaṃ pravāsitaṃ}
\]
\[
caiṣāṃ anirgataṃ rātrau grāmasvāmī dadyāt | grāmāntaresu vā
\]
\[
muṣitaṃ pravāsitaṃ vivīdhyakṣo dadyāt | avivītnāṃ corarajjukaḥ}
\]

\(^{511}\)

Traders in a caravan may lodge within village perimeters after declaring the value of their goods. From among these, anything stolen or killed—unless it has gone out at night—should be compensated by the village headman. What is stolen or killed between villages, on the other hand, should be compensated by the Superintendent of Pasture Lands; in areas beyond the pasture lands, by the officer in charge of catching thieves.\(^{512}\)

In the Indian context, this kind of rules is not restricted to the \textit{Arthaśāstra}.\(^{513}\) Interestingly, the old Egyptian narrative “The voyage of Unamūn” that dates from the second half of the second millennium BCE tells about a similar rule.\(^{514}\) In contrast, compensation for stolen items is not wide-spread in modern legal sys-

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\(^{510}\) Olivelle (2013)

\(^{511}\) KAŚ 4.13.7-10

\(^{512}\) Olivelle (2013)

\(^{513}\) Kane (1973, pp. 166–168) reports the numerous other texts with similar provisions.

\(^{514}\) See Erman (1927).
tems. Nonetheless, this rule reminds us of the central obligations of governments, i.e., to ensure inner and outer security. This is surely in line with the contract theory of state. From an efficiency perspective, it is unclear whether such compensation rules should be in effect. On the one hand, potential victims may take insufficient precautions if they know that the cost of theft are borne by the government (or a king). Indeed, the compensation acts as an insurance against theft. In economic theory, these reductions in precautionary measures come under the heading of moral hazard. On the other hand, (modern) governments may also need (monetary and political) incentives to prevent theft (by stricter laws against theft, by increasing the police force, by controlling borders, etc.).

**XVII. Bhayadāna: extortion and taxation**

One might give in order to prevent negative sanctions. This is the topic of extortion and taxation. In terms of the Brahmanical theory of giving, the Gift Based On Fear (bhayadāna) is one of the six bases of gifting (adhiṣṭhāna).

**A. The Shapley value in the presence of negative sanctions**

Extortion rests on threats, uttered by a player 1, for example by a robber. The Shapley value (section XI.I) can be applied to this situation. Even with a gun pointing to the head of player 2 (the victim), withdrawal symmetry still holds. It is important to note that withdrawing is analyzed within the given game. The

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515 See, for example, Salanié (2005).
516 See section VI.G.
517 See subsection XI.I(3) on pp. 149.
question of whether a player can quit the game or opt out is a totally different one. In market games, withdrawal just means “not buying” or “not selling”. In games with negative sanctions, withdrawal means not to give in to the threat. This does not mean that the robber and his gun mysteriously disappear.

The corresponding coalition function might obey \( v(1, 2) = 0 \). If player 2 hands over the amount of money \( D \) to player 1, the robber’s gain is the victim’s loss. One then finds \( Sh_1 = D \) and \( Sh_2 = -D \). The efficiency axiom is fulfilled.

One might be tempted to put \( v(2) = 0 \) because the victim (player 2) does not lose any money if the robber withdraws. However, what the victim can achieve still depends on what the robber is doing (withdrawal is not quitting). If player 2 does not hand over the money peacefully, the robber may resort to violence causing injury to the victim. Let \( i \) stand for the pain of being injured. Thus, one finds \( v(2) = -i < 0 \). Similarly, if player 2 runs away, the robber may injure the victim. Then, he will be in fear of prosecution for injury. Let \( f \) stand for this fear so that one obtains \( v(1) = -f < 0 \).

In the present case, withdrawal symmetry means

\[
-D - (-i) = Sh_2 - v(2) = Sh_1 - v(1) = D - (-f)
\]

This equality can be used to calculate \( D \), the amount of money handed over to the robber. It is given by

\[
D = \frac{i - f}{2}
\]

The smaller the robber’s fear of prosecution and the larger the victim’s fear of injury, the higher the robber’s loot.
B. Begging for alms

As explained in subsection XV.B(1), the ācārya’s grahaṇa includes his students’ begging for alms. According to Āpastamba, fear might be a reason for giving to begging students:

<159> strīṇāṃ praty ācakṣāṇānāṃ samāhito brahmacārīṣṭam dattaṃ hutam pražām paśūn brahmavarcasam annādyam vrñkte | tasmād u ha vai brahmacārīsaṅgham carantaṃ na praty ācakṣītāpi haiśv evaṃvidha evaṃvratam syād iti hi brāhmaṇam ||

For a Brāhmaṇa declares: “When women refuse a steadfast student, he robs them of their sacrifices, gifts, oblations, offspring, cattle, sacred learning, and food supply. One should never refuse a group of students come to beg, therefore, for among them there may be one who is like that and who keeps that vow.” 519

C. Generous renumeration of officials

As seen from <34>, officials were often renumerated quite generously. It seems that the fear of revolt or dishonest behaviour of officials gives the king sufficient reason to remunerate generously. Economists are reminded of the efficiency-wage hypothesis put forward by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). They argue that paying workers above the market rate has the advantage of disciplining them according to the following mechanism: If a very well-paid worker is caught shirking, he will be fired and not find an equally well-paid job elsewhere. Similarly, Kauṭilya’s officiating priests etc. will be loyal to the king because they cannot

518 ĀDhS 1.3.26
519 Olivelle (2000)
hope to get a higher remuneration in the same kingdom (after a revolt) or in another (after being fired).

D. Taxes and fines

(1) Collection of taxes as a king’s duty

The Gift Based On Fear (bhayadāna) is one of the six bases of gifting (adhīṣṭhāna). It is not quite clear whether the authors on dharmaśāstra would count taxes among as an example of bhayadāna. Perhaps not, because raising taxes belongs to a king’s duties as is clear from the Mahābhārata:

<160> tān sarvān dhārmiko rājā baliṃ viṣṭiṃ ca kārayet

the virtuous king makes them all [pay] taxes and perform obligatory labour

However, we have to imagine that the king could use his power to enforce his tax rules. Indeed, taxing is the first part of Trautmann’s “noble exchange” (section XIII.B).

(2) Diverse taxes

The king’s arsenal of taxes is quite impressive. In particular, one finds revenue sources such as

<161> śulkaṃ daṇḍah pautavam nāgariko lakṣaṇādhyakṣo mudrādhyakṣaḥ

[…] sītā bhāgo baliḥ karo vaṇik

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520 MBh 12.77.7
521 KAŚ 2.6.2-3
duties, fines, standardization of weights and measures, city manager, director of the mint, director of passports […] agriculture, share, tribute, tax, trader

or revenue categories such as

\[ \text{mūlyaṃ bhāgo vyājī parighaḥ} \]

price, share, surcharge, monopoly tax

The Kauṭilyan market tax has been described in subsection XIV.B(2), pp. 184. *Manu* describes the tax philosophy and concrete tax rates:

\[ \text{krayavikrayam adhvānam bhaktam ca saparivyayam} | \]
\[ \text{yogakṣemaṃ ca sampreksya vanijo dāpayet karān} || \]
\[ \text{yathā phalena yujyeta rājā kartā ca karmaṇāṃ} | \]
\[ \text{tathāveksya nrpo rāṣṭre kalpayet satataṃ karān} || \]
\[ \text{yathālpālam adanty ādyam vāryokvatsaḍpadāḥ} | \]
\[ \text{tathālpālo grahīta vyo rāṣṭraṃ ṛājñābdikāh karāḥ} || \]
\[ \text{paṇcāśadbhāga ādeyo ṛājñā paśuḥiranyayoḥ} | \]
\[ \text{dhānyānāṃ aṣṭamo bhāgaḥ śaṣṭho dvādaśa eva vā} || \]
\[ \text{ādadītātha ṣaḍbhāgaṃ drumāṃsambhisparipām} \]

The king should levy taxes on traders after taking into consideration the price of purchase and sale, the distance of transport, maintenance and other expenses, and the cost of security. The king should always assess taxes in his realm after careful consideration so that both he and those

\[ \text{Olivelle (2013)} \]
\[ \text{KAŚ 2.6.10} \]
\[ \text{Olivelle (2013)} \]
\[ \text{MDh 7.127-131ab} \]
who do the work get their fair reward. As leeches, calves, and bees eat their food a little at a time, so a king should gather annual taxes from his realm a little at a time. Of livestock and gold, the king shall take a one-fiftieth share; and of grains, an eighth share, or a sixth or twelfth. He shall also take a sixth share of trees, meat, honey, ghee, …

Of the above taxes, many are in-kind. But monetary taxes are also usual. A special kind of tax is the reduction in the price payable by the royal household as witnessed in the charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa:

<164> chimpakakolikadakārāṃ yathānurūpakarmmaṇah janapadād ājyakule [']rdhādānam

For the royal household, takings from dyers, weavers, and travelling salesmen, each according to the nature of their work [are set] at half the prices prevalent throughout the countryside.

(3) Taking at the time of death

The charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa restricts the confiscating power of the king’s officials:

<165> āputrakam na grāhyam

The sonless man’s property is not to be taken.

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526 Olivelle (2005)
527 VCh 71
528 Wiese and Das (2019)
529 VCh 1
530 Wiese and Das (2019)
This *sthiti* is similar to *aputtradhanam nāsti*\(^{531}\) which is also to be understood as a no-escheat rule. Compare *dravyam aputrasya* in KAŚ 3.5.9. There, “his uterine brothers or those living with him, as also [...] his unmarried daughters”\(^{532}\) are rightful heirs according to *Kauṭilya*. Finally, by KAŚ 3.5.28, “[t]he king should take a property that has no heir, excluding what is required for the maintenance of the wife and for funeral expenses”.\(^{533}\)

Kane (1973) narrates the discussions surrounding the question of who should be entitled to the property of an *aputra*: possibly his widow (pp. 702-713) or even his daughters (pp. 713-719). ViDh 17.4-14 mentions this order of inheritance for a man without son: wife, daughter, father, mother, brother, brother’s son, *bandhu* members, *sakulya* members, fellow student, and, finally, the king.\(^{534}\) Interestingly, the king is not the final recipient if the dead one is a Brahmin; the property would instead go to other Brahmins (ViDh 17.14). Thus, \(<165>\) may stipulate that the guild obtains privileges that normally hold for Brahmins.

(4) **Obligatory labour**

Apart from taxes, the king could order obligatory labour (see subsection (1)) which may have been quite suppressive. Indeed, conscription (*viṣṭi*) is mentioned in many *dharma* texts, for example

\(<166>\)  śilpino māsi māsy ekaikam karma kuryuḥ |
       etenātmopajīvino vyākhyātāḥ |

\(^{531}\) BhoB: 237, line 33, emendated from *aputtradhanam nāsti*

\(^{532}\) Olivelle (2013)

\(^{533}\) Olivelle (2013)

\(^{534}\) After Olivelle (2009). A similar provision is noted by BrSm 1.26.119:

\`{\textit{ye }}{\textit{putrāḥ kṣatratvēcchūdrāḥ patniḥbhrātrśivarjītāḥ }} |
\`{\textit{teśām dhanaharo rājā sarvasyādhipatir hi saḥ }} ||
Every month each artisan shall work one day for the king. This applies also to people who live by manual labor and to those who operate boats and carriages. The king should give them food when they work for him. Every month traders should give the king a piece of merchandise below its market value.

(5) **Restrictions on taxation and obligatory labour**

It has been noticed by authors on *dharma* and *artha* that kings are well-advised not to overtax their subjects. Consider, for example, *Manu*:

\[ yathā phalena yuyeta rājā kartā ca karmaṇāṃ | \]
\[ tathāvekṣyā nrpo rāṣṭre kalpayet satataṃ karān || \]
\[ yathālpālpam adanty ādyaṃ vāryokvatsaṣadhāṃ | \]
\[ tathālpālpo grahitavyo rāṣṭrād rājñābdikāḥ karāḥ || \]

The king should always assess taxes in his realm after careful consideration so that both he and those who do the work get their fair reward. As leeches, calves, and bees eat their food a little at a time, so a king should gather annual taxes from his realm a little at a time.

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535 GDh 10.31-35
536 Olivelle (2000)
537 Kane (1973, pp. 185–186) provides an overview.
538 MDh 7.128-129
539 Olivelle (2005)
This is sound advice, even for a king who endeavours to maximize his tax income. In economics, the so-called Laffer curve shows how a government’s tax income is an increasing function of the tax rate initially, but a decreasing function of that tax rate above a specific level. Furthermore, the king might have reason to be afraid of overtaxed and hence illoyal subjects (see subsection (9) below).

The charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa restricts the confiscating power of the king’s officials:

<168> gośakaṭaṃ na grāhyam sāmantāmātyadūtānām. anyeśāṃ
cābhypūgame śayanīyāsanasiddhānnām na dāpayet sarvvaśreṇīnāṃ
ekā।

A bullock cart is not to be confiscated by vassals, king’s legates, or royal envoys. And, should others show up, no single guild need give beds, seats or cooked food.\(^{541}\)

Presumably, a bullock cart is vital for the livelihood of farmers and artisans. Compare NSmV 18.11–12 where “tools by which artisans make their livings are not to be taken by the king even when he confiscates a man’s entire property”.\(^{542}\) The “others” are probably minor officers, below the ranks of vassals, legates, or envoys (= sāmantas, amātyas, dūtas).

\(^{540}\) VCh 10-12
\(^{541}\) Wiese and Das (2019)
\(^{542}\) Lariviere (2003)
Similarly, we have *rājapuruṣāṇām āvāsakī jemakaś* ca [...] *nāsti* (“none from the king’s bailiffs should dwell or eat [in private houses due to their official function]”) from the Anjaneri plates.

Understandably, powerful groups tried to curb the king’s *viṣṭi*. For example, the charter of *Viṣṇuṣeṇa* stipulates:

<169>  

\[ \text{lohakārarathakāranāpitakumbhakāraprabhṛtīnāṃ vārikena viṣṭīḥ} \]

\[ karaṇīyā \]

For blacksmiths, carpenters, barbers, potters, and others, obligatory labour may [only] be determined by the [respective] *vārika*.

In the context of the charter, a *vārika* is a guild’s headman. This *sthiti* disallows the king to order obligatory labour directly. Other inscriptions ask for full dispensation, as seen in *muktibrahmakaraviṣṭīḥ* (someone “dispensed from religious taxes and from unpaid labor”).

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543 MW: root *jim* (“to eat”).
544 BhoB: p. 237, lines 33–34. Translation by Vats and Diskalkar (1939-1940)
545 According to Sircar (1984, p. 11) these plates are due to “king Bhogaśakti, who ruled over the Konkana region and parts of Maharashtra including the Nasik District during the early years of the 8th century A.D.” They have been transliterated and translated by Vats and Diskalkar (1939-1940).
546 *ḥ* (before *k*) stands for the *jihvāmūliya*.
547 VCh 72
548 Wiese and Das (2019)
549 See Edward Hall (1858–1860, pp. 539, 541) for the text and the translation.
The charter of king Viṣṇuṣeṇa and several rājadharma texts give preferential treatment to incoming goods over outgoing goods. The Arthaśāstra’s superintendent of customs had to collect outgoing and incoming duties (KAŚ 2.21–22). However, the superintendent of commodities “should facilitate the import of commodities from other lands by granting favors” (KAŚ 2.16.11). Similarly, a rule favouring paradeśapanya (“[incoming] goods from other countries”) over svadeśapanya (“goods from [the king’s] own country”) is found in ViDh 3.29–30. The duty on incoming goods is half the duty on locally produced ones.

The charter of king Viṣṇuṣeṇa is even more extreme:

<170> varṣaparyyuṣitā vanijah prāveśyaṃ śulkātiyātrikaṃ na dāpanīyāḥ, nairggamikaṃ deyaṃ | 552

Merchants, who have resided [abroad] for a year, are not to be charged an incoming border-crossing fee, [only] an outgoing [border-crossing fee] should be paid. 553

Note that border-crossing transport of goods in premodern times is not to be confused with modern-day imports or exports. An exporter (in the modern sense) is institutionally located in a home country and obtains gold, foreign currency, or claims (receivables) in exchange for the goods he exports. A country may benefit from exports if it values gold, foreign currency and/or claims higher than the exported goods. In Old and Medieval India, the trading goods brought

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550 This section freely borrows from Wiese and Das (2019).
551 Olivelle (2013)
552 VCh 52
553 Wiese and Das (2019)
out of the country by merchants were lost until (and if) the merchants returned. It is therefore understandable that *Kauṭilya* and *Viṣṇuṣeṇa* were concerned about goods flowing out of the country.

In Europe, similar policies were pursued in order to safeguard and increase the supply of goods in city or state. This approach is called “policy of provision” and discussed in detail by. For example, “[i]n 1234 imports into Ravenna were free of duty, while tolls were imposed on exports.” In Europe, the policy of provision gave way to the mercantilist “protection” policy that favoured imports over exports.

(7) **Presumptive taxation**

Remember the contract theory of state and citation <154> according to which the king can collect as *bhāga* “one-sixth of the grain and one-tenth of the merchandise, as also money”. According to Trautmann (2012, pp. 142–143), the term *bhāga* implies that “the king is a co-sharer with the people of the kingdom in various wealth-making enterprises […] The focus is not on ownership of a resource but of a share of what is produced.” An example of a suchlike tax is the market tax described by Kauṭilya.

However, co-sharing surely knows exceptions. In particular, presumptive taxes were also known. Presumptive taxes are not based on actual income but rather on the potential to create income. In particular, most taxes mentioned in the

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554 Heckscher (1994, p. 87).
555 Heckscher (1994, pp. 112–172)
556 This section freely borrows from Wiese and Das (2019).
557 See subsection XIV.B(2).
558 Thuronyi (2004) discusses administrative and other merits of presumptive (or potential-income) taxation.
charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa are “presumptive”. This clearly holds for ChV 48–51 where fees are to be paid for fields and workshops but not for sales or profits generated from these production facilities. The outgoing duties (subsection 0) may be considered presumptive, too. The outgoing merchants may hope to find good prices abroad, but the actual revenue is not relevant for the duty to be paid.

(8) Other tax collectors

In most texts, the king seems to be the benefactor of tax collection. In contrast, epigraphic records point to town councils or merchant groups as tax collectors. For example, the fees mentioned in the Anjaneri plates of king Bhogaśakti are to be collected by the “town council”.

(9) The king’s fear of illoyal subjects

While the subjects may fear the king’s wrath and therefore pay the taxes he demands, a reduction in the king’s demand may stem from the king being afraid of illoyal subjects. In fact, whenever specific taxes or tax rates are reported, they will in general stem from some generalized bargaining procedure, sometimes presumably explicit as in the charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa that is called an anugrahas-thitipātra (“charter of statutes for showing favours”). Implicit bargaining can be guessed from passages like this one:

<171> 19 avakṣepena [...] satāṃ asatāṃ pragrahaṇa ca |
      abhūtānāṃ ca hiṃsānāṃ adharmyānāṃ pravartanaiḥ
20 ucitānāṃ caritrānāṃ dharmiṣṭhānāṃ nivartanaiḥ |
      adharmasya prasaṅgena dharmasyāvagrahaṇa ca

559 Vats and Diskalkar (1939-1940, p. 238)
560 Wiese and Das (2019, p. 44)
26 rājñaḥ pramādālasyābhyyāṁ yogakṣemavadhena vā |
prakṛtīnāṁ kṣayo lobho vairagyaṁ copajāyate

27 kṣīṇāḥ prakṛtayo lobham lubdhā yānti virāgatāṁ |
viraktā yāntyamitraṇā vā bhartāraṇā ghnanti vā svayam561

19 […] by casting away good people and embracing evil people, by initiating unprecedented and unrighteous acts of violence; by discontinuing customary and righteous practices, by addiction to what is unrighteous, and by severing himself from what is righteous; […]

26 through the negligence and lazyness of the king or the destruction of enterprise and security, there arise the impoverishment, greed, and disloyalty of subjects.

27 When impoverished, subjects become greedy; when they are greedy, they become disloyal; and when they are disloyal, they either go over to the enemy or kill their lord themselves. 562

(10) **Household theory of giving**

This subsection discusses how tax cuts might provide incentives for donating, together with a quote from Kauṭilya. Assume an individual who has at his disposal some income $W$ that he can spend on donations $D$ and other, privately consumed goods, $C$. Thus, we have

$$[26] \quad D + C = W$$

561 KAŚ 7.5.19–27
562 Olivelle (2013)
Assume, now, that the individual has to pay an income tax at a rate of $tx$, so that his budget line is now described by the equation

$$D + C = (1 - tx)W = W - tx \cdot W$$

In many modern countries, donations are tax-deductible. This means, that only the non-donations part of the income is to be taxed, i.e., we have

$$D + C = (1 - tx)W + txD = W - tx \cdot C$$

or

$$(1 - tx)D + C = (1 - tx)W$$

Comparing equations [27] and [29], shows that a tax-deduction on donations amounts to reducing the “price” for donations from 1 to $1 - tx < 1$. From that perspective, an increase in donations following the introduction of tax-deductions amounts to saying that donations are ordinary in that a price decrease is followed by an increase in demand. Indeed, this prediction gets empirical support.\(^{563}\)

Relatedly, Kauṭilya advises not to burden a whole range of ritually relevant articles with customs duty:

<172> vaivāhikam anvāyanam aupāyanikam yajñakṛtyaprasavanaimitākam
divejyācaulopanayanagodānavratadīkṣanādiśu kriyāviśeṣēsu bhāṇḍam
cucchulkaṃ gacchet | anyathāvādinaḥ steyandaṇḍaḥ\(^{564}\)


\(^{564}\) KAŚ 2.21.18-19
The following should pass without customs duty: articles for use in a marriage; wedding gifts accompanying a bride; articles meant for gifts; what is received on the occasion of a sacrifice, a religious ceremony, or a birth; and articles for use in special rituals such as divine worship, tonsure, Vedic initiation, first shave, and consecration for a religious observance. A person who makes a false statement incurs the fine for theft.\footnote{Olivelle (2013)}

In the list above, note *aupāyanika* (“articles meant for gifts”).

**XVIII. Yajña**

Sacrificing means “giving to gods”. The Indian rituals provided food for sociological thought (Hubert and Mauss) and provoked modern disapproval (Bloomfield).

**A. Actors and stages of sacrifices**

According to Malamoud (1976), the actors involved in a sacrifice are\footnote{Malamoud (1976, pp. 156–159)}

- the *yajamāna* or *svāmin*, i.e., the patron who has the sacrifice performed on his behalf, who pays for it, and who enjoys the merit,
- the *devatā*, i.e., the god to whom the sacrifice is addressed, and
- the *ṛtvij*, i.e., the officiating priest(s).

The same author lists four basic elements:\footnote{Malamoud (1976, pp. 161–162)}
➢ the śraddhā (“belief”, “confidence”, see section VI.E) that the yajamāna entertains with respect to the efficacy of the ritual and with respect to the officiating priest,\textsuperscript{568}

➢ the dīkṣā, i.e., the consecration of the yajamāna,\textsuperscript{569}

➢ the yajña, i.e., the sacrifice in the narrow sense, and, finally,

➢ the dakṣīṇā.

![Diagram of sacrificial exchanges]

\textit{Figure 15: The simple sacrificial exchanges}

Thus, the officiating priest can expect the fee-gift dakṣīṇā for his services of dīkṣā and yajña. It may be helpful to provide a few patterns. In the upper part of Figure 15, a worshipper praises god and hopes to obtain riches or offspring. A reciprocal relationship is also present between the officiating priest and the king.

\textsuperscript{568} In Malamoud (1976, p. 161)’s words: “La confiance dans l’opération veut la confiance dans l’opérateur.”

\textsuperscript{569} See the detailed study by Gonda (1985).
as indicated by the lower part of this figure. The three parties to a sacrifice mentioned by Malamoud are indicated in Figure 16. The yajamāna as the central figure at the intersection of two exchange relationships is seen in Figure 17.

Hubert and Mauss (1964) build their applauded treatise of the sacrifice on Hindu texts and the bible. Their definition of the sacrificial system encompasses

\textsuperscript{570} See the monograph by Strenski (2003).
the “sacrifier”, i.e., “the subject to whom the benefits of sacrifice thus accrue, or who undergoes its effects”\textsuperscript{571} (above: the \textit{yajamāna})\textsuperscript{572},

the “objects of sacrifice”, i.e., “those kinds of things for whose sake the sacrifice takes place” (above: related to the merit enjoyed by the \textit{yajamāna})\textsuperscript{573}

“consecration” of sacrificer or of objects of sacrifice, i.e., passing “from the common into the religious domain”\textsuperscript{574} (above, \textit{dīkṣā})

the “victim”, i.e., “any oblation, even of vegetable matter, whenever the offering or part of it is destroyed”\textsuperscript{575}, and, to a lesser degree,

the “sacrificer”, i.e., “[a]n intermediary, or at the very least a guide” who is “[m]ore familiar with the world of the gods, in which he is partly involved through a previous consecration […] and] can approach it more closely and with less fear than the layman, who is perhaps sullied by unknown blemishes”\textsuperscript{576} (above, \textit{ṛtvij}),

specific places and instruments\textsuperscript{577}

Summarizing, the two Durkheimian sociologists define:

\textsuperscript{571} See Hubert and Mauss (1964, p. 10).
\textsuperscript{572} See Hubert and Mauss (1964, pp. 107-108: fn. 10).
\textsuperscript{573} See Hubert and Mauss (1964, pp. 10–11).
\textsuperscript{574} See Hubert and Mauss (1964, pp. 9–10).
\textsuperscript{575} See Hubert and Mauss (1964, pp. 11–12) who do not subscribe to the usage where “the word sacrifice [designates] only sacrifices where blood is shed”.
\textsuperscript{576} See Hubert and Mauss (1964, pp. 22–25).
\textsuperscript{577} See Hubert and Mauss (1964, pp. 25–28).
Sacrifice is a religious act which, through the consecration of a victim, modifies the condition of the moral person who accomplishes it or that of certain objects with which he is concerned.\footnote{578}

\section*{B. Purpose of sacrifices according to Bloomfield}

According to Bloomfield (1908, p. 65), “the earliest Hindu poetry [i.e., the \Rgveda, HW] is not epic, nor lyric in the ordinary sense, not idyllic, nor didactic, but [...] almost throughout dominated by a single idea, namely, the praise of the gods in connection with the sacrifice. A few pages earlier, Bloomfield (1908, pp. 60–61) has this to say on the sacrifices’ purpose:\footnote{579}

As regards its immediate purpose, or its economic aspect, it is thoroughly utilitarian and practical. Its purpose is

(a) to secure happiness and success, health and long life for man, notably the rich man, while living upon the earth;

(b) to secure to a very talented and thrifty class of priest-poets abundant rewards in return for their services in procuring for men this happiness, success, and so on;

(c) to satisfy the divine powers, visible and invisible, beneficent and noxious, gods and demons, that is, to establish livable relations between gods and men; and, finally,

(d) to secure after death the right to share the paradise of the gods in the company of the pious fathers that have gone there before.

\footnote{578}{Hubert and Mauss (1964, p. 13)}
\footnote{579}{The markers (a) etc. are added by the current author.}
C. Hospitality

Dealing with Vedic ari, in “Der Fremdling im Ṛgveda”, Thieme (1938) claims “stranger” as the original underlying meaning of both enemy and, in the Ṛgveda, guest. According to Thieme, “the figure of God Aryaman […] is the personified and deified hospitality. He is the god who rewards the host, protects the guest, punishes those who act disgracefully (against guests) and watches over truth.”

D. Reciprocity

Bloomfield (1908, pp. 184–185) remarks:

Men can subsist and prosper only if the gods return in kind. The gods, on the whole, are good; they do not beat down the requests of him that comes with prayer and cup of soma. Reciprocity, frank unconditional reciprocity, thus becomes an accepted motive: „Give thou to me, I give to thee,“ is the formula. The sacrificing king, or rich householder, is thereby placed between the upper and the nether mill-stone: he must satisfy both gods and priests, each of whom show a surprising habit of becoming more and more exacting as time goes by. In this way the high poetic quality of Vedic religion is crowded and choked by many conceptions mean from the start, or bent by these circumstances into a mean shape. The gods themselves, notwithstanding their luminous origin, are brought down to the plane of human weakness. Open to adula-

580 Thieme (1938, p. 82). Note, however, Oberlies (1998, pp. 342-343: fn. 44) who argues that “function”, not “personification” provides the suitable perspective.
tion, they become vain; eager for advantage, they become shifty; reflecti-

ing human desires, they become sordid, and in some cases even indecent.

In the first place, Vedic poets engage in a sort of scramble for the gods.

The gods cannot be in one and the same place at the same time, and

cannot grant all the conflicting wishes of their numerous suppliants.

As in dharmadāna, śraddhā is also relevant for sacrificers. Bloomfield (1908,

pp. 186–199) deplores the deterioration of that term:

There is scarcely any idea which has suffered so much from the utilita-

rian aspects of Vedic religion as the Vedic idea of faith. ... The word

starts well in the Rig-Veda. It means first of all belief in the existence

and godhead of the gods. ... So there is no doubt that faith means the

belief in the existence of the gods, and their interference in the life of

man. It would be doing injustice to those early believers to say that

they did not develop the idea beyond this stage of mere primary utility.

... Next, faith is wisdom; faith is the sister of wisdom: ... Unfortu-

nately, the Vedic conception of faith, at least the prominent or

average conception sinks to a much lower plane. In the main and in the

end, faith expresses itself in works, and the Brahmans who are anything

but mealy-mouthed have seen to it that they shall be benefited by these

works. In other words, he who gives baksheesh (dakshinā) to the Brahma-

ns, he has faith (śraddhā). ... The frank system of barter of the

sacrificer's soma and ghee for the god's good gift and protection, with

considerably more than one-eighth of one per cent. brokerage for the

priest that—that surely, is not the religious feeling in the souls of the

composers of the Rig-Veda hymns. I have taken pains to show how
constantly present is this external side of their religion: may the religion that is free from all external considerations, the religion from which is absent every form of safe-guarding self, throw the first stone.

E. Dakṣiṇā

(1) Singing bards

The Vedic hymns were addressed to gods like Agni:

<177>  
\[ \text{evā no agne amṛteṣu pūrvyav dhīṣ pīpāya brhāddiveṣu mānuṣā |} \\
\[ \text{dūhānā dhenūr vrjāneṣu kārāve tmānā śatināṃ pururūpam iṣāni |} \]

In this way, o foremost Agni, (hymnic) vision swells for us among the immortals dwelling in lofty heaven through the human (lifespans)—(a vision like) a cow giving milk to the bard in the (ritual) enclosures, (bringing) by herself multiform (prizes) in hundreds at her impulse.\(^{582}\)

Patel (1929, pp. 3–4) has this interpretation: Family clans earned their living with hymns. This transpires from the “cow giving milk to the bard”. If the lord commissioning the sacrifices was satisfied with the bards’ performance, the latter could expect a dakṣiṇā.\(^{583}\) See also Jamison and Brereton (2014, p. 1571) on the hymn praising the dakṣiṇā: “[A] dakṣiṇā, once given, brings untold benefits to the giver, both material and spiritual, far exceeding the value of the original gift.”

\(^{581}\) RgV 2.2.9
\(^{582}\) Jamison and Brereton (2014)
\(^{583}\) This hybrid form of payment is the subject matter of subsection XVIII.E(4).
(2) **A close cousin**

Importantly *dakṣinā* had a close cousin in Vedic sacrifice, *vāja*. The latter may mean “reward of a contest” according to MW. The contest in question is the one by competing poets or priests for being commissioned with praise and/or ritual. Having stressed the role of Indra as the warrior god,\(^{584}\) Oguibénine (1998, pp. 105–119) points out that *vāja*, more that *dakṣinā*, has war-like undertones:

> [W]on by the officiant poets and coming from and through the patrons of the sacrifice, the dakṣinā and the vāja are given to the officiants as a reward which crowns their para-warrior efforts and ensures the solidarity of the two groups involved in the sacrificial ritual. […] *vāja* tends to be associated with the outside rich in war references, whereas *dakṣinā* does not step out of its zone of origine and is associated with war only in a relative way by virtue of the competition between the officiant poets.\(^{585}\)

(3) **Formes and etymology**

Sanskṛt *dakṣa* means “suitable, fit” etc. whence *dakṣinā* may carry the meaning “able to calve and give milk, a good milch-cow”. And then, since a cow seems to have been the primary fee or present given to the officiating priest in Vedic times, *dakṣinā* became to carry the meaning of fee or present.\(^{586}\) A second meaning transpires from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa:

> ghnánti vā etádyajñām | yádenām tanvāte yannvéva rājānam ab-hiṣuṇvánti tattām ghnanti yát paśúm sañjñapáyanti vviśásati tattām

\(^{584}\) Oguibénine (1998, pp. 59–70)  
\(^{585}\) Oguibénine (1998, pp. 111-112, 118)  
\(^{586}\) See MW.
Now, in performing that sacrifice, they slay it; and in pressing out the king (Soma), they slay him; and in quieting and immolating the victim, they slay it. The havirya they slay with the mortar and pestle, and with the two mill-stones. When slain, that sacrifice was no longer vigorous. By means of dakṣiṇās (gifts to the priests) the gods again invigorated it: hence the name dakṣiṇā, because thereby they invigorated (dakṣay) that (sacrifice). Whatever, therefore, fails in this sacrifice when slain, that he now again invigorates by means of gifts to the priests; whereupon the sacrifice becomes successful: for this reason he makes gifts to the priests.\(^{588}\)

It seems that **dakṣiṇā** comes under three different forms: First, in Vedic times, singers presented hymns to the Vedic goods and obtained a **dakṣiṇā** from the king or other noble persons. Second, a priest performed a sacrifice for noble or not so noble people and, again, expected a **dakṣiṇā** in return. This is a complex case because the **yajamāna** gave in a twofold manner, for the sacrifice itself and for the **dakṣiṇā**. Very similarly, a classical **mahādāna** was typically accompanied by lavish gifts to officiating priests (see section VII.B). In that respect, a

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\(^{587}\) ŚB 2.2.2.1-2 and, identically, ŚB 4.3.4.1-2

\(^{588}\) Eggeling (1882-1890)
mahādāna is closer to a Vedic sacrifice than to a dharmadāna. Third, the graduating student is to present a gift to his ācarya.

It is not quite clear on how the roles of poets and priests were differentiated. Jamison and Brereton (2014, pp. 9–10) write:

Who is the poet, and why is he composing poetry? The poets participate in an elaborate patronage system. They are hirelings, but of a very superior sort. As craftsmen of the word, their contribution to the success of the sacrifice that establishes and maintains the mutually beneficial relationship between men and gods is critical, and they serve the patrons, often royal patrons (whatever ‘royal’ meant at this period), who arrange for and underwrite the sacrifice. The poet provides the praise poetry that the patron needs to put the gods in his debt, and he speaks on behalf of his patron, in making specific requests of the gods for goods and services. The poet’s reward comes as a second-hand or indirect benefit of the success of his verbal labors: the patron should receive from the gods what he asked for, and he provides some portion of that bounty to the poet in recompense. This payment from his patron is sometimes celebrated by the poet at the end of his hymn, in a genre known as the dānastuti, literally ‘praise of the gift,’ in which the largess of the patron—cows, horses, gold, women, is catalogued and glorified. Or, if it is less than expected or desired, scorned. The tone of the dānastuti is often teasing and jokey, and the language colloquial.

But the making of poetry is not simply a business proposition. Poets take great pride in their work and often reflect on their part in the poetic tradition and also on their ability to use the tools of the tradition in innovative and creative ways.
The reader is also invited to the 12th c. Upāsakajñālāṅkāra (§96) where the relationship between the gift to teachers is related to the southern direction.

(4) **A hybrid form of payment**

It seems that it has always been clear to Indologists that a dakṣinā is a hybrid form of payment (see Table 6), between a fee or wage on the one hand and a gift on the other hand.\(^589\) I translate dakṣinā as “fee-gift”. One the one hand, a dakṣinā is a fee to be given to particular person who has performed a particular service.\(^590\) It is similar to a vetana (wage, see §28) a hired man can expect in return for his services. See also Kauṭilya’s treatment of partnerships of officiating priests and, in particular, the context of working slaves, employees, and partnerships of agriculturists and traders.\(^591\)

On the other hand, a dakṣinā shares a gift’s property of not fixing a particular amount agreed upon ex ante. Thus, a dakṣinā or a dāna are given śaktitaḥ (according to the donor’s means).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>payment obligation to a specific receiver</th>
<th>payment to any worthy receiver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\(^589\) However, the framing of this insight is somewhat unusual. While Heesterman (1959, p. 242) considers the dakṣinā a gift rather than a salary, Mylius (1979) contradicts in words, but not so much in substance. See also Max Weber (1921, p. 61) for whom the brahmin “nahm nur ‘Geschenke’ (dakshina), nicht ‘Gehalt’. Das Geben der Geschenke bei Inanspruchnahme der Dienste freilich war rituelle Pflicht.”

\(^590\) According to Malamoud (1976, p. 158), “[l]es ṛtvij sont, pour le temps de la cérémonie, au service du yajamāna (ou plutôt au service de la cérémonie elle-même)”.

\(^591\) See subsection V.A(5).
fixed amount | vetana
---|---
amount payable | dakṣiṇā payable to | dāna
śaktitah | Vedic priest or guru

Table 6: A dakṣiṇā as a hybrid form of giving

F. Hubert and Mauss on the function of sacrifices

Hubert and Mauss (1964, pp. 101–103) stress the social function of sacrifices:

The unbeliever sees in these rites only vain and costly illusions, and is astounded that all mankind has so eagerly dissipated its strength for phantom gods. But there are perhaps true realities to which it is possible to attach the institution in its entirety. Religious ideas, because they are believed, exist; they exist objectively, as social facts. The sacred things in relation to which sacrifice functions, are social things. And this is enough to explain sacrifice. […] personal renunciation of their property by individuals and groups nourishes social forces […] individuals find their own advantage […] they invest with the authority of society their vows, their oaths, their marriages. They surround, as if with a protective sanctity, the fields they have ploughed and the houses they have built.

For an even more concrete example of what social function a sacrifice may fulfil see the Varuṇa rule expounded in section XIX.F.
G. Bloomfield’s view of the dakṣīṇā

The importance of the dakṣīṇā is stressed again and again in Vedic texts (see section IV.C). Irreverently, Bloomfield (1908, p. 69) translates dakṣīṇā by “baksheesh”:

<182> úd u śrīyā uṣāso rōcamānā āsthur apām nōrmāyo rūṣaṁtaḥ |
krṇōti viśvā supāthā sugāṇyābhūd u vāsvī dākṣīṇā maghōṇī ||\(^{592}\)

The shining Dawns have arisen for splendor, glistening like the waves of the waters. She makes all pathways, all passages are easy to travel. She has appeared—the good priestly gift, the bounteous one.\(^{593}\)

Up the shining strands of Dawn have risen,
Like unto glittering waves of water!
All paths prepareth she that they be easily traversed;
Liberal goddess, kind, she hath become baksheesh.\(^{594}\)

It is not difficult to find verses that highlight the importance of dakṣīṇā:

<183> uccāṁtīr adyā citayamta bhojān rādhodēyāyośāso maghōnīḥ |
acitrē aṁtāḥ paṇāyah sasāṁtvābudhyamānās tāmaso vिमadhye ||\(^{595}\)

Dawning today, the bounteous Dawns brighten the benefactors for the giving of largesse.
In (a place) without brightness let the niggards sleep, unawakening in the middle of darkness.\(^{596}\)

\(^{592}\) RgV 6.64.1
\(^{593}\) Jamison and Brereton (2014)
\(^{594}\) Bloomfield (1908, p. 69)
\(^{595}\) RgV 4.51.3
\(^{596}\) Jamison and Brereton (2014)
or:

<184>  tēbhyo dyumnam brhad yāśa uṣo maghonyā vaha |
yē no rādhamsy āśvyā gavyā bhājamta surāyaḥ sūjāte āśvasūnte ||

To them bring lofty brilliance and glory, o bounteous Dawn,  
to the patrons who apportion to us benefits consisting of horses and  
cows - o well-born lady, liberal with horses.  

or:

<185>  devām-devaṃ rādhase codāyamtyasmadryāk sūnṛtā īrāyaṃtī |
vyuucchāntī nah sanāye dhiyo dhā yūyāṃ pāta svastibhiḥ sādā nah ||

Impelling every god to largesse, rousing liberalities in our direction,  
dawning widely, impart insights to us for our gain. - Do you protect us  
always with your blessings.

Bloomfield (1908, p. 71) interprets in this manner: “That is to say, make our po-
etry so clever that it shall not fail to stimulate the liberality of the patron of the  
sacrifice!” One may well side with Bloomfield (1908, p. 72) against Bergaigne  
who, in Bloomfield’s words, “opines that Dawn is called dakshinā because she  
is the gift of heaven bestowed upon pious men as a recompense for their piety.”  
Bloomfield comments: “This is all too roundabout, and unnecessary, and un-
Vedic.”

____________________

597 RgV 5.79.7
598 Jamison and Brereton (2014)
599 RgV 7.79.5
600 Jamison and Brereton (2014)
Bloomfield (1908, p. 81) even uses these words: “To treat sacrificial themes in the high poetic way seems to most of us hollow mockery. But we must not forget that …”

Malamoud (1976, pp. 167–168) criticizes Bloomfield’s view. “Pour les uns, qui étudient la *dakṣinā* en la considérant du point de vue du ṛtvij, la dakṣinā est avant tout une institution qui permet qux brâhmanes de consommer. … Bloomfield … n’as pas assez de sarcasmes ou plutôt d’ironique admiration pour ces clercs qui réclâment avec astuce et insolence leur ‘bakchich’. … Cette analyse, avec le jugement moral qu’elle implique, ne nous apprend pas grand-chose. … L’interprétation de Bloomfield … est décevante parce que’elle tourne court: ayant découvert, sans grande peine, que c’est l’interêt des brâhmanes que de tenir des discours à la gloire de la *dakṣinā*, ils dédaignent d’étudier les termes et l’organisation de ces discours.”

One may add that these authors also disregard the functions and brahmins have carried out. This aspect is discussed below in chapter XXI.

**XIX. This worldly social effects of gifting**

This chapter is on non-reciprocal giving for the purpose of benefitting from third human parties. In particular, one may give to another person in order to showcase one’s liberality and/or power. Section G is an outlier because a judicial wager can hardly be called a gift.
A. Anonymous giving in a very simple model

(1) Giving to unproductive receivers

In a society with several givers and several receivers, the numbers need to “add up”. In this section, we assume a society consisting of agents, some of which end up as givers, while others become receivers. A main assumption here is homogeneity, i.e., all agents are equally capable of assuming either role. Let \( n \) be the number of people in the society. There exist \( g \) givers and \( r \) receivers so that \( g + r = n \) holds. Givers have an initial income of 1 that they can consume for themselves or that can be donated. The amount given by an individual giver is denoted by \( D \) (where there is no need to use an index because all givers donate the same amount by assumption). We assume these utility functions for givers (indicated by \( G \)) and receivers (with index \( R \)):

\[
U^G(D, g) = 1 - D
\]

and

\[
U^R(D, g) = \frac{g}{r} D
\]

Observe that the amount obtained by all the receivers together has to obey

\[
r \left( \frac{g}{r} D \right) = gD
\]

Hence, giving and receiving “add up”.

For very small gifts \( D \), the givers obtain a higher utility than receivers. Inversely, agents prefer to be receivers if \( D \) is relatively large. An equilibrium is a situation where neither agent has an incentive to switch roles, i.e., where
This equilibrium condition\textsuperscript{601} amounts to

\[ \frac{g}{r} D = U_R(D, g) = U_G(D, g) = 1 - D \]

Thus, in the case of many receivers, the individual gifts need to be rather large.

At $D^N$, the payoffs for both groups are $\frac{g}{n}$. Thus, both groups prefer a society where there are no receivers, but only givers: $g^{\text{opt}} = n$.\textsuperscript{602} From that perspective, giving seems an unlikely event.

\section*{(2) Adding productive receivers}

In order to model equilibrium giving in a homogenous model, one may envision that receivers provide benefits to givers. Here, one does not necessarily consider exchange in the sense of chapter XI.

Instead, we assume that the receivers provide a public good, i.e., a service that is not subject to rivalry in consumption. For examples, the receivers might be people who study, teach, and transmit important texts. In the Indian context, one may think of Vedic texts, dharmashastra, and other. This work benefits all the people in the society, givers and receivers alike. Note that the benefit is not exclusively to the giver so that we may be justified in calling this exchange non-reciprocal.

\textsuperscript{601} Think of a model where agents choose between the two strategies adopting the role of giver or receiver.

\textsuperscript{602} This is the Pareto-optimal number of givers.
Study and teaching come at a cost $c$ to those pursuing these activities. Hence, the following adaptations of the above utility functions (in equations [30] and [31]) may be proposed:

\[ U_G(D, g) = 1 - D + \ln(r) \]

and

\[ U_R(D, g) = \frac{g}{r} D + \ln(r) - c \]

The equilibrium condition $U_G(D, g) = U_R(D, g)$ yields

\[ D^N = \frac{r}{n} (1 + c) \]

Therefore, if learning and teaching knowledge is very difficult ($c$ is large), the givers have to provide a generous gift to make up for these difficulties.

At $D^N$, the payoff for each member of the society is

\[ U_G(D^*, g) = U_R(D^*, g) = -c + \frac{g}{n} (1 + c) + \ln(n - g) \]

The Pareto-optimal number of givers can be found to be

\[ g^{\text{opt}} = n - \frac{n}{1+c} = \frac{n}{1+\frac{1}{c}} < n \]

---

603 Note that the natural logarithm is a monotonically increasing function defined for any positive real number. Of course, one may choose any other monotonically increasing function. The adventurous reader may try $\ln(1 + r)$ together with $n > 1 + c$ or even the square root $\sqrt{r}$ together with $n \leq 4(1 + c)^2$.

604 Form the derivative of $U_G(D^*, g)$ with respect to the number of givers $g$ and obtain $\frac{1+c}{n} - \frac{1}{n-g}$. Setting equal to zero and solving for $g$ yields $g^{\text{opt}}$. 

In contrast to the case of unproductive receivers, $g^* = n$ is not optimal. Some portion of the society consists of receivers that study the *Vedas* etc. Note that we have assumed homogeneous agents, all being equally capable of “earning money in the real world” and of “study the Veda”.

The giver- receiver ratio is constant in this model:\footnote{With other specifications, this need not be the case.}

$$
\frac{g^{\text{opt}}}{n} = \frac{1}{1+c} \text{ and } \frac{r^{\text{opt}}}{n} = \frac{1}{1+c}
$$

The more difficult learning and teaching are, the higher the number of givers and the smaller the number of receivers.

**B. A simple probabilistic model of beneficium reciprocity**

The Roman philosopher Seneca (1\textsuperscript{st} c. CE) has written the treatise “De Beneficiis” in which he advances the idea of giving for “companionship” (see \textless 115\textgreater ).\footnote{See the monograph by Griffin (2013).} If I give to a friend today, I do not expect him to reciprocate unless I fall on hard times and unless he is able to reciprocate. Notwithstanding Seneca’s insistence on being virtuous for the sake of virtue (\textless 114\textgreater ), one may argue that this idea falls under the heading of *arthadāna*. In contrast to most *danagrahaṇa* considered so far, we have an incomplete-contract setting here. There is no contract, no enforceable manner of getting something in return.

A very simple model of the advantage of fellowship in the sense of Seneca (*societas*) might run like this. A person G gives some amount $D \leq 1$ to a friend R...
in period 1. In period 2, if G does not meet a calamity, there is no expectation that R gives him something in return.

Let a calamity strike G with probability \( \pi \). Let \( \tau \) be the probability that R is a trustworthy friend who is prepared to help out G in period 2 if capable to do so. Let \( W \) be the wealth that R has available in period 2. Then, G’s utility function may be specified as follows:

\[
U^G(D, \pi, W, \tau) = 1 - D + (1 - \pi) \cdot 0 + \pi(1 - \tau) \cdot \sqrt{0} + \pi \tau \cdot \sqrt{D}W
\]

Note \( \sqrt{D} \leq 1 \) and hence \( \sqrt{D}W \leq 1 \). The partial derivative of \( U^G \) with respect to \( D \) equals \( -1 + \pi \tau \cdot \frac{W}{2\sqrt{D}} \). The optimal “gift” is therefore

\[
D^* = \frac{\pi^2 \tau^2}{4} W^2
\]

In this model, giving out of companionship is generous if the chances for a calamity striking the giver are large, if the receiver is likely to be trustworthy, and if the receiver stands a good chance of being wealthy in the second period.

In a full-fledged economic model, one may try to endogenize \( \tau \) by extending the model by additional periods where the ungrateful receiver is punished by not being deemed a trustworthy companion worthy of help if needed.

C. Common knowledge and rituals

Trautmann (1981, p. 279) is surely right in stressing that dānadharma is of a soteriological nature. This does not exclude thisworldly effects of giving that may, or may not, be in the back of some donors’ minds. The theoretical background is provided by the concepts of common knowledge and of principal-agent theory.
Chwe (2001) advances the interesting idea that rituals serve the purpose of producing “common knowledge”. Common knowledge of an event is said to be present between actors A and B if A and B knows the event, B knows that A knows it, A knows that B knows that A knows it etc. ad infinitum. In particular, common knowledge between two people might be produced if they are looking at each other while observing or hearing some event.

In the presence of many actors, common knowledge can be defined in a similar manner. In that case, common knowledge might come about if all the agents are observing an event while sitting in an “inward facing circle” so that each person can see or at least assume that every one else observes the same event. Also, common knowledge can be helped by repetitions (of mantra, say), by songs, or audience participation.

Chwe explains how common knowledge may help people to solve “coordination problems”. Consider two different courses of action. It may be the case that people benefit from agreeing on the same course of action. An example is provided by technical standards in telecommunication. While people may disagree on the best standard, they may nevertheless prefer a commonly accepted standard over a variety of “standards”.

The coordination problem of submitting to a social or political authority is discussed in some detail by Chwe (2001, pp. 19–25). Consider a king who has a mahādāna and parvatadāna performed on his behalf. Mahādāna is reflected

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610 See subsection VII.B.
in the most complicated pattern dealt with in this book. It can be analyzed as exhibiting charitable giving in order to earn merit (as immediately above) and also a reciprocal relationship:

One effect or one motivation of having a *mahādāna* performed may be to produce the common knowledge of the king’s power. Then, not only do people see how resourceful he is, but they also see that others see and possibly interpret the event in this manner. And, they see that others observe others notice this event, etc.\(^{611}\) The contrast to dharmic gifts that are best kept secret (see \(<63>\) and \(<206>\)) is evident.

\[^{611}\text{Compare Heim (2004, p. 116): “The king displays and centralizes his own power and glory worshipping the brahmans and lavishing upon them prestigious gifts.” and also Heim (2004, p. 108): “The ceremonialism of dāna also tends to make a gift a public affair rather than a private matter.” The main point added by the current author is to stress that “public” needs to be understood in terms of common knowledge.}\]
D. Outwitting and principal-agent theory

(1) The tiger and the traveller

The following two sections describe how giving might alleviate mistrust. The topic of mistrust itself and how it is examined in microeconomics is expounded this section. A well-known fable from the Hitopadeśa collection concerns a tiger and a traveller: A tiger that finds himself on one side of a lake sees a traveller passing by on the opposite side. The tiger attempts to catch and eat the traveller by offering a golden bracelet to him. Since the traveller is suspicious of the tiger's intentions, the tiger argues that he would not (he claims to have profoundly changed his former evil behaviour) and could not (he claims to be old and weak) do any harm to the traveller. Finally, the traveller is convinced, gets into the murky waters where he gets stuck. Immediately, the tiger takes advantage of the traveller's misfortune and kills him as planned.

One may of course speculate why the traveller is so “stupid”. Did “greed cloud the mind” or did he act on some probability assessment about the lion telling the truth? Indeed, the tiger claims to have studied the Vedas to lend credibility to his peaceful intentions. However, it seems obvious that the fable writer does not think of this example under the heading of “better safe than sorry”. Instead he argues that the tiger’s preferences being as they are the traveller should have known his fate in advance. Before being killed, the traveller has time for some wise insights to share with the readers (see Kale and Kale, 1967, p. 8):

\[ na \ dharmaśāstraṃ \ paṭhatīti \ kāraṇaṃ \]
\[ na \ cāpi \ vedādhyayanaṃ \ durātmanah \]

---

612 This section liberally borrows from Wiese (2016b).
svabhāva evātra tathātiricyate
yathā prakṛtyā madhurāṃ gavāṃ payah ⁶¹３

It is not because he has read treatises on religious duty or because he has studied the Vedas that he behaves like this—it is the wicked creature’s own nature that prevails here, just as the cow’s milk is naturally sweet.⁶¹⁴

Pious appearances are also used by the cat in an animal tale from the Panchatantra. The cat is chosen as a judge in a dispute between a partridge and a hare. Although wary of the danger, the two contestants finally approach the cat who kills them without much ado.⁶¹⁵

(2) Hitopadeśa/Pañcatantra theory on deception

The Pañcatantra’s “central message” is that “craft and deception constitute the major art of government”. But: “Deception, of course, is a double-edged sword; it is important to use it against others, but just as importantly one must guard against its use by others against oneself. So, in a sense, even the losers provide counter-examples”.⁶¹⁶ However, guarding against deception is difficult because people are not to be trusted:

<187> suhṛd ayam iti durjane ’sti kāśā ? |
bahu kṛtam asya mayeti luptam etat ||

⁶¹３ HU 1.17
⁶¹⁴ Törzsök (2007)
⁶¹⁵ Olivelle (2006, pp. 392–399)
svajana iti purāṇa eśa śabdo |
dhanalavamātranibandhano hi lokaḥ ||617

‘He is my friend!’—is that any reason to trust a scoundrel?
‘I have done him a great many favors!’—that counts for nothing!
‘This man is my very own relative!’—that’s an old folk tale!
People are driven by money alone, no matter how small.618

Even more seriously, there is no way to judge another person’s intentions:

<188> poto dustaravārīrāśitarāṇe dīpo ‘ndhakārāgame |

[[...]]

ittham tad bhuvi nāsti yasya Vidhīnā nopāyacintā kṛtā |
manye durjanacittavṛttiharaṇe Dhātāpi bhagnodyamaḥ ||619

If you have to cross an impassable ocean, you have a boat;
when darkness comes, you have a lamp;
[[...]]
Thus there is no problem in the world for which
the Creator has not carefully invented some solution.
But when it comes to countering a wicked person’s way of thinking,
it seems to me that even the Creator has failed in his efforts.620

Thus, the problems of mistrust and asymmetric information have been very clearly understood by these arthaśāstra authors.
(3) **Principal-agent problems**

Old Indian texts exhibit an amazingly clever perspective on human agency.\(^{621}\) Within economics, outwitting is treated under the heading of principal-agent theory.\(^{622}\) In recent times, economists have given due credit to *Kauṭilya*, the *Arthasastra*’s author, as a very early principal-agent theorist.\(^{623}\) Roughly speaking, principal-agent theory deals with the problems that arise from “asymmetric information”, with one person A (the “agent”) being better informed than another person P (the “principal”). It may seem obvious that A (in possession of some relevant information not available to P) stands to benefit from this superior knowledge. Relatedly, a person A who cheats another person P will typically profit from that action.

A big chunk of principal-agent theory is concerned with “hidden action” problems.\(^{624}\) Consider the example of a firm (the principal) that has employed a worker (the agent) who may diligently work in the principal’s interest or pursue his own interests instead. If and insofar the principal cannot observe the effort exerted by the agent, the principal’s problem is how to supervise or remunerate the worker so that the interests of the latter are aligned with those of the former. We term this the “outwitting problem” of principal-agent theory. The agent tries

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\(^{621}\) This has already been noted by Zimmer (1969, p. 89) who observes, in the context of Indian fables, that Indian political thought was characterized by “cold-blooded cynical realism and sophistication”.

\(^{622}\) Textbook presentations of principal-agent theory are Salanić (2005) and Rasmusen (2009).

\(^{623}\) See Brockhoff (2014) and Sihag (2007). In a series of papers, Sihag has highlighted Kauṭilya’s achievements in other parts of economics, too. A summary of his efforts is Sihag (2014).

\(^{624}\) A second branch of principal-agent theory (called adverse selection) deals with a principal who wants the agent to reveal information held by the agent.
to outwit the principal: he aspires a high reward without effort. The principal tries not to be outwitted: he wants to make the agent work hard for as little remuneration as possible.

*Kauṭilya* is a foremost expert on outwitting. With respect to the topic of peace making through hostages, he writes: “The taking of a kinsman or a chief constitutes a hostage. In this event, the one who gives a traitorous minister or a traitorous offspring is the one who outwits. One who does the opposite is outwitted”\(^625\). It is from this translation by Olivelle that the current outwitting section has obtained its name.\(^626\) In order to prevent being cheated upon, *Kauṭilya* advises the king to investigate wrongdoings “through interrogation and torture”\(^627\) and suggests to find out about “the ministers’ integrity […] through secret tests”\(^628\).

Economic principal-agent theory is also about another aspect of asymmetric information. The person in command of superior knowledge may not always be able to benefit from this knowledge. Indeed, if he needs the uninformed side to agree to some mutually beneficial venture, asymmetric information may harm the informed side by preventing this venture. This is the “gains-from-trade problem” of principal-agent theory. I conjecture that there was no explicit (openly expressed) understanding of the gains-from-trade problem in Old India. Of course, this is difficult to prove; a text dealing with the gains-from-trade problem might just have escaped my attention.

\(^625\) KAŚ 7.17, Olivelle (2013)
\(^626\) The Sanskrit root for “outwit” is *ati-sam-dhā* found in KAŚ 7.17.12-13. Kangale (1969b) translates as “over-reach”.
\(^627\) KAŚ 4.9, Olivelle (2013)
\(^628\) KAŚ 1.10, Olivelle (2013)
E. Trustworthiness resulting from giving

Giving, or not taking, may serve to emit positive signals to third parties. Indeed, Ānanda provides the quote <87> according to which giving creates trust. And trust is a vital ingredient to business, and other, relationships. Taking up this idea, I sketch simple game-theory models that can shed some light on why a donor might indeed be trustworthy (oi. viśvasanīya). In section F, the fact of non-taking by a king will have similar trust effects.

Consider two agents, a “trading partner” TP and a “giver” G. The naming of G will make sense soon. In Figure 19, TP may choose to offer a deal to G. In that case, G may deal honestly so that both receive a “benefit” $B$, indexed with TP and G, respectively. However, if G outwits TP, the latter obtains a “stealing” or “scam” payoff of $S$ which is lost by the former. I assume $S > B_G$ so that G prefers to outwit TP. The latter, foreseeing this deception, will not offer a deal. This is the backward-induction outcome.\(^{629}\)

\[Figure 19: The outcome of no-deal in the presence of a dishonest G\]

\(^{629}\) The backward-induction procedure has been described in section XI.H.
In contrast, Figure 20 deals with an honest G. This agent is punished with some fine $F$ if he cheats. The punishment may refer to some “external” punishment (organized by the king) or some “internal” punishment like pangs of conscience or fear or bad karma. Assuming $S - F < B_G$, agent G will choose to deal honestly. Again looking ahead, TP will offer the deal and the mutually beneficial trade goes ahead.

![Figure 20: The outcome of no-deal in the presence of an honest G](image)

Of course, “a wicked person’s way of thinking” are difficult to detect. Assume, now, that G may practice gifting before TP makes an offer. One may surmise that a generous giver is more likely to be one who has śraddhā in the sense of “conviction about the certainty of rewards” (see subsection VI.E). Then, observing G to donate generously makes it more likely from TP’s point of view that the fine $F$ does indeed feature in G’s payoff.

The situation here is not the one encountered in the tiger-traveller-fable (subsection XIX.D(1)). There, the tiger’s arguments are just “cheap talk”. Both a mischievous and a benevolent tiger could claim their benevolence without any cost.

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630 <188>
Therefore, the tiger’s assertions are not credible even if the traveller was stupid enough to lend them credibility. In contrast, in the present case of a gift, giving comes at a cost to someone who has no “conviction about the certainty of rewards”. Of course, even a non-believer might donate in order to pretend to be astika and in order to feign a fine $F$ which he does not, in fact, fear. The point is that a virtuous person can signal “$S - F < B_G$” at a lower cost than can a deceiver. Thus, indeed, a “donor is trusted”.

F. Varuṇa rule

(1) Varuṇa as punisher of king

One of the king’s duty is just punishment (subsection XVI.D(2)). One may worry about the king’s incentives to do so. As the famous Latin saying goes: “quis custodiet custodes ipsos”, i.e., who supervises the supervisors? One answer given by Manu points to Varuṇa as chastiser of kings: Varuṇa

<189> rājñāṃ daṇḍadharo hi saḥ

holds the rod of punishment over kings

Varuṇa would be the god responsible for punishing because he is a god involved in contract keeping and truth-telling according to Thieme (1957). In classical Sanskrit, mitram is a neuter (!) noun meaning friend. Thieme (1957, p. 18)

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631 Game theorists have formalized this idea. See the beer-quiche game in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 446–451).
632 This section freely borrows from Wiese (2016b).
633 MDh 9.245. The same idea is expressed in KAŚ 4.13.43: śāstā hi varuṇo rājñāṃ mithyā vyācaratāṁ ṛṣu (translated as “Varuṇa is the one who disciplines kings when they act wrongly with respect to men” by Olivelle (2013))
634 Olivelle (2005)
clearly sides with Antoine Meillet who claims that, in Vedic times, the meaning of *mitram* was “contract” from which the meaning of friendship and then friend developed. Thieme cites the *Ṛgveda* to support Meillet’s and his own claim:

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<190>  mitrō jānān yātayati bruvaṇō ... |635
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Contract, when named, makes peoples array (arrange) themselves [with regard to each other] (=‘causes them to make mutual arrangements’).636

He adds that “[a]lso other gods may receive this qualification: God Fire (Agni), the fire being invoked as a witness at the conclusion of certain contracts [...] or God Varuna, that is the personified Oath [...] or, as I should prefer, the personified True Speech.”637

*Mitra* and *Varuna* are often mentioned together:

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<191>  vraténa stho dhruvākṣemā dhármaṇā yātayájjanā|638
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You two (Mitra and Varuna, i.e., Contract and True-Speech) are of firm peace through vow (= you secure peace by seeing to it that vows are kept), you cause people to make mutual agreements through firmness (= you make contractual agreements desirable as establishing firm relations).639

They produce very beneficial results:

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635 RgV 3.59.1a
636 Thieme (1957, p. 39)
637 Thieme (1957, pp. 40–41)
638 RgV 5.72.2ab
639 Thieme (1957, p. 41)
<192> ádhārayataṃ prthivīṁ utā dyāṁ mitrarājānā varuṇā māhobhiḥ |
vardhāyatam oṣadhīḥ pīvatam gā́ vá vṛṣṭiṃ srjataṁ jīradānu ||

You two, king Contract and king True-Speech, made firm earth and heaven by your greatness. Cause plants to grow, cause cows to swell [with milk], send down rain, you of live wetness!

Thieme (1957, p. 43) comments: “The original motivation for their creating prosperity is, of course, that Contract and True-Speech secure peace.” Differently put, prosperity can flourish because the principal-agent problems are overcome.

Of course, there must be some sanctions if somebody does not keep a contract:
<193> tā́ bhūripāśā́v ánṛtasya sēṭū duratyētū ripāve máṛtyāya |

These two (Contract and True-Speech) have many slings (in which to catch a cunning transgressor), they are fetters of untruth, difficult for the deceitful mortal to circumvent.

Thus, Varuṇa as chastiser of king has Vedic credentials.

(2) Two-level punishments

We then have a two-level structure where Varuṇa can punish the king who in turn can punish his subjects. At this juncture, one might worry about Varuṇa’s

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640 RgV 5.62.3
641 Thieme (1957, p. 43)
642 RgV 7.65.3ab
643 Thieme (1957, p. 52)
incentives to chastise the king appropriately. Can we run into a regressus ad infinitum? Presumably not, because the god Varuṇa does not encounter any incentive problems, himself.

In this setting, the role of Varuna consists of fining the misbehaving king. One might argue (with Manu) that the king will fulfill his rājadharma if he is afraid of the chastiser Varuna. However, for the “Varuna the chastiser” argument to go through, it is not the king’s belief that is relevant. Rather, the subjects need to believe that the king is a believer. Thus, we need second-order beliefs which are more difficult to uphold than first-order ones.

If the belief argument is too facile, we need to supply additional arguments of how Varuṇa’s punishment might work. Does it imply that the king, the most powerful agent himself, would somehow need to punish himself? Against this idea, Kane has already opined that “these prescriptions [...] were counsels of perfection and must have been futile. No king would ordinarily fine himself”. He then refers to medieval texts where the king is understood as a “subordinate chief”. Then, it is not Varuṇa himself who is doing the punishing, but the overlord, instead. This is a good explanation, as far as it goes. However, it just pushes up the problem one level. After all, how would, then, an unjust overlord be brought to justice?

644 See Geanakoplos (1994).
So far, we have looked at “Varuṇa as chastiser of kings” from the perspective of two-level punishment. We now explain the Varuṇa rule and analyze it from the point of view of principal-agent theory.

Some Indian dharma texts mention the punishment of confiscating property. It is significant that the quotations about Varuṇa as the chastiser of kings occur in the context of casting property or fines into water or giving them to Brahmins. Manu stipulates

<194> itare kṛtavantas tu pāpāny etāny akāmataḥ  
sarvasvahāram arhanti kāmatas tu pravāsanam  ||
nādadīta nrpaḥ sādhur mahāpātakino dhanam  |
ādādānas tu tal lobhāt tena doṣena lipyate  ||
apsu praveṣya taṃ daṇḍam varuṇāyopapādayet  |
śrutavṛttopapanne vā brāhmaṇe pratipādayet  ||
īśo daṇḍasya varuṇo rājīṇām daṇḍadharo hi sah  |
īśaḥ sarvasya jagato brāhmaṇo vedapāragah  ||
yatra varjayate rājā pāpakṛdbhyo dhanāgamam  |
tatra kālena jāyante mānavā dīrghajīvinaḥ  ||
nispadyante ca sasyāni yathoptāni viśām prthak  |
bālāś ca na pramīyante vikṛtaṃ ca na jāyate rājīṇāṃ daṇḍadharo hi sah  ||

646 MDh 9.242–247
When others [i.e., not Brahmins, HW] commit these sins [causing loss of caste, HW], however, they deserve to have all their property confiscated, if they did them thoughtlessly, or to be executed\textsuperscript{647}, if they did them wilfully.

A good king must never take the property of someone guilty of a grievous sin causing loss of caste; if he takes it out of greed, he becomes tainted with the same sin.

He should offer that fine to Varuṇa by casting it into water, or present it to a Brahmin endowed with learning and virtue.

Varuṇa is the lord of punishment, for he holds the rod of punishment over kings; and a Brahmin who has mastered the Veda is the lord of the entire world.

When a king refrains from taking the fines of evildoers, in that land are born in due course men with long lives; the farmers’ crops ripen, each as it was sown; children do not die; and no deformed child is born. holds the rod of punishment over kings\textsuperscript{648}

Similar rules are known from the Arthaśāstra and from the Yājñavalkya Smṛti.\textsuperscript{649} Superficially, these passages are clear and do not present any translational difficulties. In Manu, the king is strongly advised not to keep any confiscated property for himself or his treasury. Instead, he should throw it into the water or give it to the Brahmins. Manu expounds the negative consequences of

\textsuperscript{647} Bühler 1886: 384 translates as “banished”. Olivelle 2005: 332 can point to some commentaries supporting his understanding (MDhC, vol II, pp. 1237-1238). This controversy is unimportant here.

\textsuperscript{648} Olivelle (2005)

\textsuperscript{649} KAŚ 4.13.42–43, YSm 2.310
the king’s confiscating for himself and the positive consequences of not doing so. We call the prescription to give the fine “to Varuna by casting it into water” the “Varuna clause”.\textsuperscript{650} One may ask why it is Varuna who is mentioned in relation to throwing confiscated property into water. Simply, because in post-vedic times, Varuna is the God of Water.\textsuperscript{651}

Why should Manu demand that the king does not keep the confiscated property taken from the offenders? Is it not pure waste to throw the property into the water? Of course, one might point to the alternative of giving the property to Brahmins. After all, Brahmins do often benefit from unclaimed property. If a treasure-trove is found, VDh 3.56–61 lets the Brahmins obtain 5/12, 1/4, 1/2, or all of it, depending on the social class of the finder. In support of the Brahmin alternative, Balbir Sihag (in a personal communication) points out that silver coins could be picked up by anyone (possibly undeserving) and that houses or cows cannot be thrown into water for other obvious reasons.

One may, then, as suggested by Balbir Sihag, see the Varuna clause as another clever device by Brahmins to gain influence and wealth. That is certainly a valid point. However, to our mind, there is more behind the Varuna clause.

\textbf{(4) The king’s costly message}

We have discussed above that the king who does not have an overlord is in a difficult position. He certainly likes to be reckoned a just king and enjoy the loyalty

\textsuperscript{650} Strictly speaking, “casting into water” and confiscation are contradictory terms. Lat. \textit{fiscus} means treasury and confiscation hence “adjoining the treasury”. From this perspective, one might say that Manu 9.242–247 forbids confiscation. However, we will understand confiscation as asset forfeiture or asset seizure, irrespective of how the property taken is dealt with.

\textsuperscript{651} See Hopkins (1915, pp. 116–122) and Lüders (1951).
of his ministers and subjects. The king’s fear of illoyal subjects is covered in subsection XVII.D(9).

Now, in his position relative to his subjects, the king is the agent who knows best whether he acts justly. How can he, even if well-intended, convince the subjects? Just saying: “I am a just king” will generally not suffice. In game-theory parlance, this would just be “cheap talk” and hence not credible. Then, the Varuna clause may help the king to “prove” that he is a good king, a king who would not take property as a fine in order to enrich himself or in order to fill his depleted treasury. The best way to do this would be a ritual, with Brahmins performing the rites and many onlookers. Then, in line with Chwe (2001) the common knowledge (section C) of the king’s righteousness might be produced.

We now return to Kane’s assertion that “[n]o king would ordinarily fine himself”. From the perspective of the gains-from-trade problem one might reply: Maybe, he would not, but he would like to be able to. Varuṇa, the chastiser of kings, may be of some help. But, if that is not enough, the king has to incur some cost, for example by offering the confiscated property “to Varuṇa by casting it into water”.

It seems unlikely that some Old Indian thinkers might explain the Varuṇa clause in a similar matter as one might do nowadays. In any case, a society’s “understanding” of a problem or a solution to that problem need not always be present in an explicit manner. Hayek has stressed that useful institutions (such as markets or specific judicial rules) are often not invented or not even fully understood by us humans. Instead, they spontaneously develop and are kept if they

652 Hayek (1973, pp. 8–34)
prove useful. In this sense, institutions may embody “intelligent” solutions. We think that the “Varuna rule” specified in the Manusmṛti is a suitable illustration of such implicit understanding.

G. Juridical aside: judicial wages

(1) Introduction

This section is about an Old Indian judicial institution called paṇa (“wager”). Within a court proceeding, a judicial wager is a certain sum of money that a party to a conflict offers to pay if he ends up losing his case. Under certain circumstances, high wagers may indicate truthfulness.

Consider a defendant in Ancient India who is accused of a misdeed. If defendant and accuser are not able sort out this disagreement between themselves, they resort to the king for a judgement. The usual procedure is this: The king considers the evidence presented to him and decides in favour of the defendant or of the accuser. Apart from the “objective” evidence, the parties to a legal conflict may try to underline the trueness of their respective assertions by other means. In particular, and with special relevance for Old Indian law, they may resort to ordeals. Ordeals are a manner of saying: “I am speaking the truth; this will be revealed by God.”

Apparently, a second manner to insist on one’s truthfulness is the “judicial wager” called paṇa in the Old Indian law literature. Basically, a

\[^{653}\] According to Manu 8.114, a defendant is to “carry fire, stay submerged in water, or touch separately the heads of his sons and wife. When the blazing fire does not burn a man, the water does not push him up to the surface, and no misfortune quickly strikes him, he should be judged innocent by reason of his oath.” For economic analyses of ordeals, see Leeson (2012) and Wiese (2016a).
judicial wager amounts to proclaiming: “I am speaking the truth; if found otherwise by the king, I will pay the appropriate fine, and, on top, make a payment of size $w$."

**The institution**

Lariviere (1981b) presents the scarce textual evidence. Here let is suffice to present a Yājñavalkya verse: from a famous law text (Yājñavalkya 2.18) together with Lariviere’s (1981b, p. 135) translation

<195> sapaṇaś ced vivādaḥ syāt tatra hīnaṃ tu dāpayet |
     daṇḍam ca svapaṇaṃ caiva dhanine dhanam eva ca ||$^{654}$

If the dispute should be with a wager, then he should make the defeated party pay the fine and his own wager as well, but only the contested amount to its owner.$^{655}$

There is no need to repeat Lariviere’s inconclusive findings in detail. They can be summarised (for our purposes) in the following manner:

- The wager may have been placed by one or by both parties.
- The recipient might have been the king (the court), the opponent, or even both.
- The size of the wager seems not to have been fixed and was probably up to each party.

$^{654}$ YSm 2.18

$^{655}$ Lariviere (1981b, p. 135)
The findings from a game-theoretical model

Wiese (2018) analyzes judicial wagers in game-theoretic terms. It is assumed that the wagers placed by the opponents were decided by themselves individually and that the king or a third party was the recipient, as seems to be the case for Yājñavalkya. The third party may have been Brahmins?

Furthermore, the king is assumed to decide cases on the basis of both (a) the evidence available to him and (b) the wagers offered by the agents. With respect to (b), the king might think that an accuser who files a correct complaint or an innocent defendant tend to decide on a higher wager than dishonest accusers or defendants. In the model, the king uses weights (or probabilities) that determine the importance of evidence or wagers in his decision.

Methodologically, strategic games are used. The players are the two parties, the defendant and the accuser. The strategies are the wagers placed by the parties. The analysis of dominant strategies and Nash equilibria yields these findings:

- If the king disregards the wagers for his decision, the players will choose zero wagers.656
- If the king disregards the evidence or if the quality of evidence is very poor, the parties’ wager decisions are independent of whether the defendant is guilty or not.
- Wagers are a positive function of the probability of wager-based judgments.
- Wagers tend to be higher for the innocent defendant (the honest accuser) than for the dishonest accuser (the guilty defendant).

656 This result contradicts Lariviere (1981b, p. 143) who thinks that the wager “seems … not to be a factor at all in deciding the case … .”
A party with a small amount of money to spend on wagers will be deemed guilty more often.

(4) Conclusion

Judicial wagers have serious drawbacks. First, a cash-stripped party may just not be able to place high wagers. Second, if the king obtains the wagers, the parties may suspect that the king has financial reasons when using the wagers as a basis for his judgement. Doing so and/or the suspicion that he might do so, will certainly undermine any confidence in the justice system. Also, the king may then be torn between two motives. On the one hand, he takes high wagers as an indication for truthful behavior and tends to rule in favor of the high-wager agent. On the other hand, ruling against the agent with high wagers is financially profitable for him. For these mixed motives, one may conjecture that a third party like the Brahmins, rather than the king himself, was the recipient. However, the textual evidence collected by Lariviere (1981b) does not provide any support. These drawbacks may be the reason why, in India, judicial wagers seem to have gone out of fashion many centuries before ordeals did.657

XX. Dharmadāna (and Buddhist) perspectives

This chapter is the etic counterpart of chapter VI. Here, I venture to put microeconomic “explanations” on dānadharma concepts like śraddhā, śakti, and puṇya. Buddhist perspectives are added whenever appropriate. Thus, I present

several attempts at “theory formation”, the final stage from Freiberger’s comparative process.

A. Applying the Shapley value

Dharmic giving is indicated by Figure 21 and is an instance of the lower right pattern of Figure 11 (p. 174):

![Figure 21: Dharmic giving](image)

The central problem of altruistic giving is to provide reasons for giving to the prospective giver. A Christian motive (or only idea), namely “fac locus Christo cum filiis tuis” (section X.B) has been provided by Augustinus and other Church Fathers. Somewhat similar is the merit or fruit that is promised to generous donors in the dharmadāna literature.

First, I will apply cooperative game theory to a gift from a player G (the giver) to another player R (the receiver). Arguably, the coalition function $\nu$ is given by

$$[41] \quad \nu(G) = 0$$

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$658$ See section XI.I.
\[ v(R) = 0 \text{ and} \]
\[ v(G, R) = Ph - c \]

This coalition function captures a situation where a giver alone or a receiver alone obtain a payoff of zero. If they “get together”, the giver transfers some gift \( D \) to the receiver. This gift does not show up in the two-man coalitional worth, because the gain \( (D) \) for the receiver equals the loss \( (-D) \) for the giver. Let \( Ph > c \) denote the merit or fruit (\textit{phala}) accruing to the giver and let \( c > 0 \) stand for the cost of becoming a worthy recipient.

The Shapley values for this coalition function are by

\[ Sh_G = \frac{Ph-c}{2} \text{ and} \]
\[ Sh_R = \frac{Ph-c}{2}, \]

i.e., the players equally share the gain of \( Ph - c \). To the Indian theoreticians on \textit{dharmadāna}, the giver obtains merit \( m \) by giving up \( D \). Thus, one can postulate

\[ Sh_G = \frac{Ph-c}{2} = Ph - D \text{ and hence} \]
\[ D^* = \frac{Ph+c}{2}, \]

The same \( D^* \) is obtainable from the receiver’s Shapley value by

\[ Sh_R = \frac{Ph-c}{2} = D - c \]
The Shapley gift $D^*$ makes intuitive sense. The larger the earnable fruit and the larger the cost of becoming a pātra, the larger the gift. The texts on dāna, however, take a different perspective. They argue the other way around and consider the earnable merit a function of the gift, more precisely of śraddhā and śakti.

Note that the Shapley value assumes cooperation, i.e., the formation of the coalition {G, R}. Thus, the above formulae would also hold for $m < c$. However, in that case it would be inefficient if gift giving occurs.

B. The difficulty of giving in equilibrium

The most simple theory of giving can be shown in the following model. We have two agents, agent G (“giver”, oi. dātṛ) and agent R (“receiver”, oi. pratigrahītṛ). Agent G chooses whether to give a present (dāna) $D$ to agent R. Since a gift may mean something different to the giver G than to the receiver R, it is useful to distinguish $D_G$ from $D_R$. It is always assumed that $D_G$ is desirable or costly to the donor and $D_R$ is desirable to the receiver. Thus, both $D_G$ and $D_R$ are positive. If no donation occurs, each agent obtains the payoffs zero (0). If $D_G$ is not a numerical value, it stands for something that the giver prefers over 0. The preference relation is not modelled expressively, but is clear from the context or from the numerical values we assume.

![Figure 22: The simplest giving model in non-cooperative game theory](image-url)
Consider Figure 22. The giver G has two actions available to him, he may give or not give (“not” is indicated by $\neg$). If he gives, $D_G$ is lost to him while the receiver obtains $D_R$, i.e., the first entry in the payoff vector is the receiver’s payoff, while the second entry indicates the donor’s payoff. It is clear that the (rational) agent G will not give $D_G$ to the receiver R in the form of $D_R$ in this exceedingly simple model.

The chances for making giving possible increase if $D_G$ is small. Therefore, we should not be surprise to find textual evidence that belittles the donor’s sacrifice from giving:

<196>  
\begin{verbatim}
yad dadati yad aśnāti tad eva dhanino dhanam |
anye mrītasya kṛūḍanti dārair api dhanair api ||
\end{verbatim}

An owner’s wealth is what he gives and what he eats, for others fool around with the wife and wealth of a dead man.\textsuperscript{660}

<197>  
\begin{verbatim}
kim dhanena karisyanti dehino bhaṅgurāśrayāḥ |
yadartham dhanam icchanti tac charīram aśvāśvatam ||
\end{verbatim}

For what will embodied beings, who reside in such fragile containers, do with wealth? The bodies for whose sake they desire wealth are not eternal.\textsuperscript{662}

While these quotations stress the finiteness of the donor’s current life, another one points to the ineffectiveness of wealth to secure the donor’s satisfaction:

\textsuperscript{659} DK 0.10\textsuperscript{660} Brick (2015)\textsuperscript{661} DK 0.13\textsuperscript{662} Brick (2015)
Why isn’t a morsel—even half a morsel—given to those who ask for it? For when will anyone’s wealth ever conform to his desires? 

From the Buddhist literature, compare <80>. Using the economic term of a discount factor, one may translate these citations by saying that the donor does not give up $D_G$, but only $\delta D_G$ with $\delta > 0$ and $\delta < 1$. However, replacing $D_G$ by $\delta D_G$ in Figure 22 above, is not sufficient to ensure giving.

Giving may pay for thisworldly motivations as shown in section XIX.E (reputation) and XIX.B (Seneca’s beneficium reciprocity). Here, we consider otherworldly fruit (such as getting rid of sin or earning merit).

**C. A first attack on śraddhā and śakti**

Remember

Whether small or large, the size of a gift does not bring about its benefits, but rather the spirit of generosity and the means available to the donor associated with a gift—indeed, only these two things cause prosperity or ruin. 

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663 DK 0.17
664 Brick (2015)
665 DK 1.3
666 After Brick (2015), who translates śakti as capability here. We follow Brick’s translation of DK 1.38.
One might interpret this verse in the following manner: the absolute size of the gift is not important but its relative size, the gift in relation to the giver’s wealth, i.e., $\frac{D_G}{W_G}$. This is also evident from

<200> anyāyādhiṣṭaṃ dattvā sakalāṃ prābhūtiṃ api |
śraddhāvarjatam apāṭrāya na kāṃcid bhūtim āpnyāt ||
pradāya sākaṃpuṣṭiṃ vā śraddhāśaktisamudayatām |
mahate pāṭrabhūtāya sarvābhuyadayam āpnyāt$^{667}$ ||$^{668}$

A person who gives something unlawfully acquired—although it be the entire earth—without a spirit of generosity to an unworthy recipient obtains no prosperity. In contrast, someone who gives just a handful of vegetables, offered with a spirit of generosity and in accordance with his means, to a great and worthy recipient obtains all success.$^{669}$

Consider Figure 23 where the 45°-line represents the giving of sarvasvam (everything the donor owns). He gives with generosity if the ratio $\frac{D_G}{W_G}$ is close to 1, but without generosity if the gift is small in relation to the donor’s wealth.

$^{667}$ āpnyāta in Brick (2015, p. 264) is clearly a typo.
$^{668}$ DK 1.37-38
$^{669}$ Brick (2015)
Śakti does not only refer to the inequality $D_G \leq W_G$. Indeed, within that area, the dharmadāna authors distinguish between gifts that are deya and those that are adeya:

\begin{quotation}
\begin{verse}
svakuṭumbāvirodhena deyaṃ dārasutād ṛte
nānvaye sati sarvasvam yac cānyasmai pratiśrutam
\end{verse}
\end{quotation}

So long as it does not hurt his family, a man can give away any of his property except for his wife and his sons, [but] not the entirety of his wealth if he has descendants, nor anything he has promised to another.  

This idea is reflected in Figure 24.

---

670 DK 2.5  
671 After Brick (2015)
While this relative thinking is clearly prominent, the absolute value of the gift is stressed in some verses. In particular, DK 1.27-31 distinguishes between High Gifts (see <65>), Middle Gifts, and Low Gifts. Another piece of evidence is the request to give something that is rare (*durlabha*).\(^\text{672}\) Having acknowledged this relative aspect, the following sections disregard the donor’s wealth in order to focus on other aspects of *dānadharma*.

### D. Giving with transference of sin (*pāpa*)

Brick (2015, pp. 25–32) claims that the Brahmanical theory of the gift had the sin-transference theory as its *pūrvapakṣa*. According to that theory, “when a person gives a gift, he also gives his sin; and when a person receives a gift, he also receives the donor’s sin. In this way, a donor benefits by ridding himself of sin, although strictly speaking merit is not created nor sin destroyed. However, he

\(^{\text{672}}\) DK 1.16, Brick (2015)
benefits only at the expense of the recipient, who must take on his sin and, therefore, suffer both socially and soteriologically.” It seems that Old Indian text are not easily found that attest to this theory. Brick refers to the work done by modern ethnologists.

Roughly speaking, the donor’s loss ($D_G$) and gain (getting rid of his sin $P$) corresponds to the recipient’s gain ($D_R$) and loss (taking on the donor’s sin).

Consider Figure 25. By $\tau P$ is meant the sin that gets transferred to the receiver, together with the gift $D_R$ itself. One can think of $\tau$ as a positive number smaller than 1, i.e., the receiver may be in a position to absorb the sin at relatively small cost to himself. The giver chooses to give if

$$D_G < P$$

holds. That is, the donor would value the sin he got rid off more than the gift he bestows on the receiver. However, the receiver is happy to accept the gift only if

$$D_R > \tau P$$

---

673 Brick (2015, p. 26)  
or, equivalently,

\[ \tau < \frac{D_R}{P} \]

hold. According to the latter inequality \( \tau \) has to be sufficiently small, i.e., the sin absorption technology of the receiver sufficiently effective.

Putting both inequalities together, giving is welcomed by both donor and donee if

\[ D_G < P < \frac{D_R}{\tau} \]

holds. Thus, the sin-transference theory of the gift makes giving possible.

## E. Fruits (phala) and faith (śraddhā)

Otherworldly fruits are stressed in the dānadharma texts much more than this-worldly\(^{675}\) ones. Otherworldly fruits come under the headings of “fruit” (oi. phala)\(^{676}\), “heaven” (oi. svarga)\(^{677}\), “wealth” (oi. dhana)\(^{678}\), or the like. For example,

<202> \( \text{yo 'rcitaṃ pratigrḥṇāti yo 'rcayitvā prayacchati | tāv ubhau vasataḥ svarge viparīte viparyayaḥ ||} \)

\(^{675}\) Irritatingly, Brekke (1998, p. 288) writes that “householders’ donations […] are motivated by a desire for merit which is, strictly speaking, a thisworldly currency.”

\(^{676}\) DK 1.18, Brick (2015). Note \(<64>\) where investment gifts (rather than consumption gifts) “bear fruit all the time”. There, “fruit” is obviously used in a thisworldly sense sense.

\(^{677}\) DK 2.35, Brick (2015)

\(^{678}\) DK 1.59–60, Brick (2015)
Both he who receives something respectfully offered and he who respectfully gives it dwell in heaven, but in the opposite case, the opposite happens. If a man gives gifts to virtuous people out of respect, he obtains wealth after death and reaches heaven along with his sons and grandsons.

Similarly, the receivers may “purify” the givers (the example immediately below) or the givers may be “saved” (the example after next):

Brahmins who are learned, strictly observe religious vows, practice austerities, are truthful and self-restrained, engage in meditation, and have conquered their sensory organs purify people just by coming into their field of vision, how much more so by entering their company! People who give to them and feed them reach the ultimate state.

\[\text{dānam hi bahumānād yo guṇavadbhyah prayacchati} | \]
\[sa tu pretya dhanam labdhvā putrapautraiḥ sahāśnute} ||^{679}\]

\[\text{vidyāvantaś ca yi viprāḥ suvratāś ca tapasvinaḥ} | \]
\[\text{satyasamasyamasamyuktāḥ dhyānayuktā jitendriyāḥ} || \]
\[\text{punanti darśanaṃ prātāḥ kim punar saṅgatīṃ gatāḥ} | \]
\[\text{teṣāṃ dattvā ca bhuktvā ca prāpnuyuḥ pramāṃ gatim} ||^{681}\]

\[^{679} \text{DK 1.58-9} \]
\[^{680} \text{Brick (2015)} \]
\[^{681} \text{DK 3.9-10} \]
\[^{682} \text{Brick (2015)} \]
ye kṣāntadāntāḥ śrutapūrṇakarṇā jitendriyāḥ prāṇivadhe nivṛttāh
| pratigrahe saṃkucitāḥgrastās te brāhmaṇās tārayituṃ samarthāḥ
||

Brahmins of this type are capable of saving others: Those who are forbearing and disciplined and whose ears are filled with scripture; who have conquered their sensory organs and refrain from killing living beings; and who are householders that close their hands when offered gifts.

Significantly, the fruit obtained by the donor (which is called dāna below) does not come at any (material) cost to the receiver:

mṛtavatsā yathā gaur vai ṛṣṇālubdhā tu duhyate |
aparasparadānāni lokayātrā na dharmavat ||
adṛṣṭam aśnute dānam bhuktvā caiva na drśyate |
punar āgamanam nāsti tasya dānam anantakam ||

Non-reciprocal gifts are like milking a cow whose calf has died and which is consumed with thirst. [As] a worldly matter, they do not pertain to the Law. A [dharmic] giver obtains an unseen gift and is not seen enjoying that gift, since he does not return to this world and his gift is endless.

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683 Brick (2015: 77, note 1) points to the “widely attested variant” pratigrahe saṃkucitāgrahastās with translation “who close their fingers when offered gifts”.
684 DK 3.6
685 Brick (2015)
686 DK 0.22-3
687 Compare the extensive discussion in section XIII.A.
In my view, this passage expresses non-reciprocity typical for dharmadāna: The donor does not expect a counter-present from the receiver in return for his gift. Instead, the donor expects an adṛṣṭam dāṇaṃ that we translate as fruit and indicate by Ph.

It is easy to find promises of infinite rewards Ph, for example

\[
\text{abhigamya tu yad dānaṃ yac ca dānam ayācitam |} \\
\text{vidyate sāgarasyāntas tasyānto naiva vidyate ||} \\
\text{pracchannāni dānāni jñānaṃ ca nirahāṃkṛtam |} \\
\text{tapāṃsi ca suguptāni teśāṃ phalam anantakam} ||^{688}
\]

If someone approaches a recipient and gives him a gift or gives a gift that has not been asked for, the merit from his gift will never end, though the ocean will. The reward of these things is endless: gifts that are kept secret, knowledge without egotism, and austerities that are well-guarded.\(^{689}\)

Since a fruit can only be a motivating force if the donor has faith in it, śraddhā in the meaning of “conviction about the certainty of rewards” is relevant in this subsection.\(^{690}\) One might translate it by a probability (a degree of conviction) \(\sigma\). The expected fruit would then be expressed by \(\sigma \text{Ph}\). Donors with a high degree of conviction would then value \(\sigma \text{Ph}\) more than donors with a low one.

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\(^{688}\) DK 1.73-74

\(^{689}\) Brick (2015)

\(^{690}\) See subsection VI.E.
F. Trusted fruits versus discounted gifts

Now, taking the parameters from sections XX.B and E together, one obtains Figure 26 where the giver gives away the discounted gift $D_G$, but obtains the expected fruit $\sigma Ph$. Donating is worthwhile if the expected fruit (indicated by a large numerical value) $\sigma Ph$ is larger than the discounted gift $\delta D_G$, i.e., if

\[ \sigma Ph > \delta D_G \]

or

\[ \frac{Ph}{D_G} > \frac{\delta}{\sigma} \]

holds.\(^{691}\) If numerical values are not easily available, the above inequality [53] can be understood as follows: the donor prefers relinquishing $D_G$ (which he discounts because it is not permanent) if he receives $Ph$ with probability $\sigma$ in return over not-giving $D_G$ together with not-obtaining $Ph$.

\[ Figure \ 26: \ Giving \ with \ earning \ fruit \]

\(^{691}\) There is no need to worry about the case $Ph = D_G$ which has a zero probability in a sense that could be made precise.
Equations [53] and [54] make clear that a large probability (a large degree of conviction) $\sigma$ makes giving attractive for the donor. The ratio $\frac{P_h}{D_G}$ (in equation [54]) could be called the “fruit-gift ratio”, i.e., the output-input relation that informs about the gift $D_G$ used to produce the fruit $P_h$. In order to make giving attractive, this ratio has to be larger than the “fruit-gift threshold” $\frac{\delta}{\sigma}$. Consider Figure 27. It is a graphical translation of equation [54]. Whenever the gift-fruit ratio is smaller than the gift-fruit threshold, giving pays. Then a spirit of generosity prevails.

![Figure 27: The two senses of giving](image)

Revisiting Köhler (1973) and Brick’s remarks on śraddhā, a large degree $\sigma$ of conviction in the effectiveness of giving (the cause) leads to a high willingness to give, i.e., to generosity (the effect). But, of course, the discount factor is also instrumental in bringing about a “spirit of generosity”. Thus, in terms of our

692 See section VI.E.
model, the following equation neatly summarizes the fruit-based Brahmanical theory of the gift:

\[ \text{śraddhā (spirit of generosity) is a negative function of } \frac{\delta}{\sigma} \]

For a given discount factor, the above equation tells that a spirit of generosity is brought about by a sufficiently large conviction in the effectiveness of giving. In particular, if \( \sigma \) increases, the line gets less steep and the donor is prepared to give larger gifts for a smaller merit than before.

Whether, however, a large-enough willingness to give \( \frac{\delta}{\sigma} \) effectively leads to giving is a matter that we take up in the next subsection.

### G. Economic and moral feasibility (śakti, adeya)

In subsection F, śraddhā is interpreted as willingness to give, depending on the parameters of the dāna situation, i.e., depending on the gift \( D_G \), the fruit \( Ph \), and the degree of conviction \( \sigma \). Remember:

<207> nālpatvaṃ vā bahutvaṃ vā dānasyābhhyadayāvaham | śraddhā śaktiś ca dānānāṃ vrddhiṣayakare hi te ||

Whether small or large, the size of a gift does not bring about its benefits, but rather the spirit of generosity and the means available to the donor associated with a gift—indeed, only these two things cause prosperity or ruin.\(^{694}\)

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\(^{693}\) DK 1.3

\(^{694}\) After Brick (2015), who translates śakti as capability here. We follow Brick’s translation of DK 1.38.
where śakti is explained as follows:

<208> svakuṭumbāvirodhena deyaṃ dārasutād ṛte |
       nānvaye sati sarvasvaṃ yac cānyasmā pratiśrutam ||

So long as it does not hurt his family, a man can give away any of his property except for his wife and his sons, [but] not the entirety of his wealth if he has descendants, nor anything he has promised to another.

Thus, the ability to donate (śakti) is the second important ingredient. Consider Figure 28. Even if śraddhā is effective, a gift may be ruled out because it puts too much hardship on the family.

Figure 28: śraddhā is checked by śakti

\[ \text{Figure 28: śraddhā is checked by śakti} \]

\[ D^\text{G}_\text{adeya} \]

\[ D^\text{G}_\text{deya} \]

\[ P_h \]

\[ \text{śraddhā} \]

\[ \text{ineffective} \]

\[ \text{effective} \]

\[ \text{slope } \frac{s}{\sigma} \]

\[ D^\text{sakti} \]

\[ \text{but} \]

\[ \text{and} \]

\[ 695 \]

\[ \text{DK 2.5} \]

\[ 696 \]

\[ \text{After Brick (2015)} \]

\[ 697 \]

\[ \text{See section VI.F.} \]

\[ 695 \]

\[ 696 \]

\[ 697 \]
H. Gift-fruit technology

Gift and fruit are intimately related.\textsuperscript{698} Inter alia, this relationship depends on the quality of the Brahmin receiver:

<209> \textit{samam abrāhmane dānaṃ dviguṇaṃ brāhmaṇabruve |}
\textit{prādhīte śatasāhasraṃ anantaṃ vedapārage} \textsuperscript{699}

A gift to a non-Brahmin yields an equal reward; a gift to one who is a Brahmin in name only yields twice that; a gift to one who is learned yields one-hundred-thousand-times that; and a gift to one who has mastered the Vedas is infinite.\textsuperscript{700}

Also,

<210> \textit{duṣphalaṃ nisphalaṃ hīnaṃ tulyaṃ vipulam akṣayam |}
\textit{ṣaḍ vipākayug uddiṣṭaṃ ...} \textsuperscript{701}

It is taught that a gift can yield six kinds of effects: negative effects, no effects, reduced effects, proportionate effects, increased effects, and imperishable effects. \textellipsis \textsuperscript{702}

One may be tempted to capture these quotations by a gift-fruit technology or a merit technology factor $\mu$ where

\[ [1] \quad Ph = \mu D_G \]

\textsuperscript{698} Similarly, hospitality must not be extended towards unworthy persons as is clear from <20>.
\textsuperscript{699} DK 3.58
\textsuperscript{700} Brick (2015)
\textsuperscript{701} DK 1.18
\textsuperscript{702} Brick (2015)
holds and

- *samam abrāhmaṇe dānaṃ* (in <209>) or *tulyam* (in <210>) are captured by \( \mu = 1 \),
- *dviguṇaṃ brāhmaṇabruve* (in <209>) is captured by \( \mu = 2 \),
- *dusphalam* (in <210>) is captured by \( \mu < 0 \),
- *nisphalam* (in <210>) is captured by \( \mu = 0 \),
- *hīnaṃ* (in <210>) is captured by \( 0 < \mu < 1 \),
- *vipulam* (in <210>) is captured by \( \mu > 1 \) or
- *akṣayam* (in <210>) is captured by \( \mu = \infty \).

While these translations may be suggestive, they are problematic. They presuppose that \( Ph \) and \( D_G \) are measured in the same units, such as “happiness”, Euro, meter, or so. How one might come an understanding with respect to that unit is unclear and not a topic addressed in any Old Indian texts. Relatedly, the reasons for particular values of \( \mu \), i.e., the reasons for particular gift-fruit technologies are diverse. A gift is

- *dusphala* on account of unworthy recipients,\(^{703}\)
- *nisphala* or *aphala*\(^{704}\) by the missing spirit of generosity (śraddhā)\(^{705}\),
- *hīna* or *ūnatāṃ vraja*\(^{706}\) by causing harm to others (parabādhākara)\(^{707}\),
- *tulya* by a wicked mind (*cittena kaluṣeṇa*)\(^{708}\) or by that flaw in the donor’s intention (*samkalpadosēṇa*)\(^{709}\), respectively.

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\(^{703}\) DK 1.19
\(^{704}\) DK 1.20a
\(^{705}\) DK 1.20b with translation by Brick (2015)
\(^{706}\) DK 1.20d
\(^{707}\) DK 1.20c, translation by Brick (2015)
\(^{708}\) DK 1.21b, translation by Brick (2015).
\(^{709}\) DK 1.21c, translation by Brick (2015).
• *vipula* with all six proper components (*yuktāṅgaiḥ sakalaiḥ ṣaḍbhīḥ*)\(^{710}\), and, finally,

• *akṣayam* if the gift is given out of compassion (*anukrośavaśād*)\(^{711}\).

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 29: Rewards depend on the quality of the Brahmin*

In a Buddhist story, the causal direction from the receiver’s worthiness to merit is reversed. Filliozat ?? Filliozat (1991)

Brekke (1998, pp. 290, 313) points to a giver’s alternative between a gift as a sacrifice (where the quality of the recipient is of paramount importance) and a charitable gift (where intentions reign supreme). It is the current author’s view that Brekke’s implication that giving “becomes meritorious *a priori*” is not a good summary of the *dānadharma* authors’ intentions.

Holding the virtuousness of the receiver constant, one may consider giving as the optimization problem where \(P_h(D_G) - D_G\) is to be maximized subject to \(D_G\) being feasible, i.e., *deya*.

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\(^{710}\) **DK** 1.22a, translation by Brick (2015).

\(^{711}\) **DK** 1.22c, translation by Brick (2015).
I. Proactive giving

Proactive giving rather than giving in response to begging is especially meritorious as is clear from <69> for marriages and <149> in the context of the yugas. Consider also the following verse:

<211> abhigamya tu yad dānam yac ca dānam ayācitam | 
vidyate sāgarasyāntas tasyānto naiva vidyate ||\(^{712}\)

If someone approaches a recipient and gives him a gift or gives a gift that has not been asked for, the merit from his gift will never end, though the ocean will.\(^{713}\)

Consider Figure 30. There I enlarge the model and assume that the receiver might beg in order to obtain \(D_R\), with three changes in comparison to the simple gift models:

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\(^{712}\) DK 1.73

\(^{713}\) Brick (2015)
The process of begging may be shameful which is expressed by \( sh > 0 \). Thus, the receiver’s payoff is \( D_R - sh \) if he is given \( D_R \) after begging, but \( D_R \) if he obtains the present without begging.

Giving without begging is more meritorious which is expressed by \( Ph^+ > Ph \).

If the potential receiver does not beg, the potential donor will consider giving to him only if the potential receiver catches his attention. We assume that this occurs with some probability \( \beta > 0 \).

The main information contained in Figure 30 is also present in the simpler Figure 31. Here, the probability of catching the potential donor’s attention shows up in the payoffs.

Applying backward induction,\(^{714}\) one finds:

- After begging, giving occurs in case of \( Ph > D_G \).
- After not begging, giving occurs in case of \( Ph^+ > D_G \).

\(^{714}\) See section XI.H.
Let us distinguish three cases:

- In case of \( Ph^+ > Ph > D_G \) giving is always attractive to the donor. The potential receiver prefers to beg if \( D_R - sh > \beta D_R \) holds, i.e., in case of \( \beta < \frac{D_R - sh}{D_R} \).

- In the intermediate case of \( Ph^+ > D_G > Ph \), giving is not attractive after begging. The potential receiver abstains from begging. Giving occurs with probability \( \beta \).

- In the case of low merit \( D_G > Ph^+ > Ph \), giving is never attractive. There will be neither begging nor giving.

These outcomes are depicted in Figure 32. On the abscissa, we have the giver’s assessment of the gift’s value \( D_G \) which can be low (smaller than \( Ph \)), in the medium range (between \( Ph \) and \( Ph^+ \)), or large (above \( Ph^+ \)). On the ordinate, we have the attention probability \( \beta \) which may be smaller or larger than \( \frac{D_R - sh}{D_R} \).

Thus, we obtain

- the (kaliyuga) receiver-initiative outcome,
the (kṛtayuga) donor-initiative outcome, or the
resignation outcome (neither begging nor giving)

J. Rescission of gifts (dattāpradānikam)

As well as with economic transactions, the problem of rescission may arise for
gifts.715 In general, gifts promised are to be delivered:

\[ \text{yac ca vācā pratiśrutya karmanā nopapāditam} \]
\[ \text{tad dhanam ṇṇasaṃyuktam iha loke paratra ca} \]

[…] pratiśrutāpradānena dattasya haraṇena ca |
\[ \text{janmaprabhṛti yat puṇyaḥ tat puṇyaṃ vipraṇaśyati} \]716

Wealth that has been promised in words, but not delivered in action en-
tails debt in both this world and the next. […] By not giving what has
been promised or snatching away what has been given, whatever merit
a person has accumulated since birth perishes.717

However, some gifts are adeya (“not to be given”), while others are adatta (“il-
legitimate”).718 See the discussion in subsection VI.K(2). Hence, a tension may
arise between promise keeping on the one hand and adeya/adatta giving on the
other hand. This conflict is sometimes resolved by violating the promise:

\[ \text{pratiśrutyāpy adharmasamāyuktāya na dadyāt} \]719

715 See subsection V.B(2) and consult Kane (1973, pp. 471–475).
716 DK 1.49, 51
717 Brick (2015)
718 See subsection VI.K(1)
719 DK 1.55
Even if one promises it, one should not give a gift to an unrighteous person.\textsuperscript{720}

**K. Merit transfer**

In Buddhist contexts, Figure 21 from the chapter on \textit{dharmadāna} undergoes a further complication in that the merit earned by gifting is transferred to a third party. See the upper part of Figure 33.

![Diagram of merit transfer](image)

\textit{Figure 33: Merit transfer}

As is clear from <91> and <92>, this “giving of good fortune” (\textit{pattidāna}) is particularly meritful. Apparently, by some merit-transfer technology, the merit obtained and forwarded by the original giver, is not diminished even for him.

One might entertain the idea that the upper part of the figure closely corresponds to the lower one. And the lower part of Figure 33 resembles Figure 21. In which

\textsuperscript{720} Brick (2015)
manner then is the donation process motivated in the case of merit transfer? It seems that the giver takes the merit into account in the *dharmadāna* case whereas he knows about the merit, but gives it to a third party. This would then mean that the donor is not aware of <91>. He thinks he passes on the merit to somebody else, but still keeps his merit unknowingly. A microeconomic analysis of this situation is difficult.

**L. Gifting without cost to the giver**

In the previous section, the giving of merit occurs without cost to the giver himself. A similar phenomenon is observed in <74> in the context of knowledge. If a Brahmin gifts knowledge, he nevertheless keeps it for himself. In modern economic terms, the gift of knowledge is characterized by non-rivalry in consumption. This means, that a good consumed by one does not diminish the consumption possibilities of other agents. Then, indeed, ownership can be produced for the receiver without giving up ownership on the donor’s side.

Finally, see the Buddhist quotation <91> where the *pattidāna* (“giving of good fortune“) is compared to a lamp which is used to light other lamps and still not exhausted.

All these cases are like Figure 26 in the special case of \( \delta = 0 \). A discount factor of zero amounts to zero cost of giving to the giver. Alternatively, one may refer to section B in the special case of \( D_G = 0 \).
Part Five:

Restrospection

The final two chapters of the book “warp up” in two ways. First, I revisit Bloomberg’s decidedly negative attitude towards *dakṣīṇā*. Second, I am now in a position to tackle diverse issues like *kanyadāna*, the relationship between sacrifices and dharmic giving, and the concept of a “perfect gift”.
XXI. Functional theory of gifting

In this chapter, I deal with the question of whether the negative judgement of gift and *dakṣinā* receiving (especially by Bloomberg) is appropriate. Against that judgement, one might highlight the functions served by these institutions.

A. Selfserving Vedic priests and Brahmanical theories of the *dakṣinā* and *dāna*

The *daksīṇā* collected by Vedic priests and the *dharmadāna* obtained by Brahmans have aroused suspicion in all times, up the modern one. Consider the quotations:

- "Habgier der brāhmaṇa" (greed of the brahmins), die “trefflich für sich zu sorgen verstanden” (knew splendidly how to take care of themselves)\(^{721}\)
- “This poetry does not serve beauty as this religion does not serve the purpose to purify and uplift the souls. Instead, both serve the class interest, the personal interest, the remuneration.”\(^{722}\)

Similarly, one can see the possibility to collect *dāna* as yet another of the brahmins’ privilege as Brick (2015, pp. 41–42) seems to do: “Two fundamental motivations seem to explain both the prominence of the discussions of proper recipients within the *dānanibandha*\(^{723}\) and the bulk of their contents. The first of these is a desire to establish orthodox, Vedic Brahmans as the ideal recipients

\(^{721}\) Weber (1868, 54)

\(^{722}\) Oldenberg (1923, p. 20)

\(^{723}\) A *nibhanda* is an antology, a *dānanibandha* an antology on the subject of (dharmic) giving.
and in many cases as the sole legitimate recipients of gifts. The second is the theoretical principle that the merit of a gift is directly proportional to the virtuousness of its recipient (with “virtuousness”, of course, here defined from a Brahmanical perspective). As is likely obvious to readers, the achievement of both of these desires would have been very much in the interests of the Brahmins who composed most of the dānanibandhas, including the Dānakāṇḍa … .” Thus, according to the dharma texts, Brahmins as writers of these texts point to themselves as receivers of dāna. Thus, “one can easily interpret this stress on the Brahmin-ness and Vedic knowledge of proper recipients as intended to reserve for the authors’ own social group the entitlement to receive gifts.”

**B. Definition or requirements**

Reconsider <60>:

<214> yogas tapo damo dānaṁ satyaṁ śaucam śrutaṁ ghṛṇā | vidyā vijñānam āstikyam etad brāhmaṇalakṣaṇam ||

Discipline, austerity, self-control, liberality, truthfulness, purity, vedic learning, compassion, erudition, intelligence, and religious faith—these are the characteristics of a Brahmin.

Two possible understandings of this quotation come to mind: (i) as “definitions of a proper Brahmin” with “unambiruously high opinions of themselves and of their place in society”. Thus, Brahmins have somehow managed to enjoy

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724 Brick (2015, p. 42)  
725 VaDh 6.23  
726 Olivelle (1998)  
727 Brick (2015, p. 41)  
728 Brick (2015, p. 40)
payoff power in the control-of-events sense in the form of material wealth (the *dāna*) and in the form of high rank.

While this understanding is certainly not wrong, “discipline, vedic learning” may also point to (ii) requirements the Brahmins have to fulfil. Consider

<215> śīlaṃ saṃvasatā jñeyam śaucam saṃvyavahārataḥ |
prajñā saṃkathanāj jñeyā tribhiḥ pātraṃ parīkṣyate ||

One can know a person’s virtue by living with him, his purity by interacting with him, and his wisdom by talking with him. A recipient should be tested in these three things. 730

One should bear in mind that the ability to perform sacrifices as well as the Vedic learning required many years of study. 731 The understanding (ii) stresses the requirements Brahmins as *pātras* have to fulfil rather than (i) the definitional aspect where Brahmins engage in self-exhaltation. As Brick (2015, p. 44) states with respect to the Brahmins’ virtuousness, “it serves the purpose of policing the Brahmin community by encouraging its members to aspire to the high standards of an ideal Brahmin lest they be deemed unfit to receive patronage.” Of course, the specific manner in which testing a recipient occurs (see <62>) should violate the dignity of neither giver nor receiver.

729 DK 3.1
730 Brick (2015)
C. Functional theory of the gift

To the current author, the often-encountered stress placed on the Brahmins’ greed etc. is overdone. Of course, the material interests are important for Brahmins. But, similarly, the “rest” of the society, Vedic or classical, also pursued their interests. The *yajamānas* sought this- and otherworldly benefits. And society at large may well have profited from the Brahmins’ activities.

One should, I argue, recognize that giving has been instrumental in allowing Indian religion/science etc. to be transmitted from generation to generation. After all, human traditions usually depend on presenting some elite group with the possibility to pursue scientific and religious work. Here comes the very first verse in *Yājñavalkya*’s treatment of *dāna*:

<216> 
```
tapas taptvāsrjad brāhma brāhmanān vedaguptaye |
trpyartham pitṛdevañām dharmarakṣāṇāya ca ||
```

Brahma, after performing ascetic toil, created Brahmans to protect the Veda, to bring satisfaction to ancestors and gods, and to safeguard dharma.\(^{733}\)

It seems that the Brahmins understood the importance of giving in the context of its transmittal function. But a functional theory does not rely on humans understanding the function as we have argued before in subsection XIX.F(4). Giving may just embody an “intelligent” solution to the transmittal problem.

\(^{732}\) YSm 1.197
\(^{733}\) Olivelle (2019)
XXII. Conclusion

Finally, it is time to wrap up. I will proceed in five steps. First, the special case of *kanyadāna* that touches rather diverse aspects is addressed. Second, giving in the Old Indian culture was varied, but sacrifices and dharmic giving are characterized by interesting commonalities and differences. Third, I consider the question how exactly the process from sacrificing to gifting can be understood as a secularization process. Fourth, a comparison of a “perfect gift” with a *dharma-dāna* is insightful. Finally, revisiting Freiberger’s twofold classifications seems in order.

A. A wide variety of gifts: *Kanyādāna*

Trautmann (1981, chapter 4) covers the transaction of marriage. He points out that the transaction is not between two freely contracting individuals, but rather between groups, the bride’s relatives and the groom’s relatives. Such group decisions are not unknown to economics (collective decision making) or marketing (family decisions). The transferred object is “dominion over the woman”.

Manu identifies eight different types of marriages, see <69>. Trautmann thinks that the first four marriages belong to *kanyādāna* type, i.e., they are gifts of some sort. However, both the third marriage (where the father “accepts a bull and a cow, or two pairs of them”) and the fifth one (where “a girl is given after the payment of money to the girl’s relatives and to the girl herself”) seem to involve the “sale and purchase”. Trautmann (1981, p. 290) and the

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734 Trautmann (1981, p. 277)
735 Trautmann (1981, p. 277)
Mahābhārata’s anuśāsana argue that in the third marriage (i) the price is reduced to a minimum and the transaction does not therefore come under the heading of “sale and purchase”, and (ii), the price is given dharmataḥ. In contrast, argues Trautmann (1981, p. 290), the fifth marriage prescribes that the wealth is given svacchandyāt (“out of his own free will”)\textsuperscript{736}. This last argument is somewhat surprising because the amount of dāna is typically left to the donor.\textsuperscript{737} It is easier to understand Trautmann (1981, pp. 277, 291)’s characterization of the last three types of marriages by “mutual choice, forcible seizure, and theft”.

Referring back to Trautmann’s exchange taxonomy\textsuperscript{738}, we may classify as “sacred” marriages by way of gifting (the first four kinds), while marriage by sale and purchase (the fifth king of marriage) would be called “profane”. Mutual choice (i.e., “abduction of a consenting maiden”\textsuperscript{739} according to the sixth marriage) or forcible seizure of a girl (marriage no. 7) would be termed as “noble”, as the proper way proceeded by kṣatriyas. The remaining case of theft lies outside Trautmann’s taxonomy.

Normally, “divorce and permanent return to the father’s house is ruled out”.\textsuperscript{740} However, according to Kauṭilya, rescission might also be possible for sexually defective brides (or grooms).\textsuperscript{741} It seems that this form of rescission is modeled more closely on rescission for merchandise (section V.B(2)) than on rescission of gifts (section XX.J).

\textsuperscript{736} Trautmann (1981, p. 290) translates as “at one’s own desire”.
\textsuperscript{737} See subsection XVIII.E(4).
\textsuperscript{738} See section XIII.B.
\textsuperscript{739} Trautmann (1981, p. 291)
\textsuperscript{740} Trautmann (1981, p. 291)
\textsuperscript{741} See, for example, KAŚ 3.15.12.
The patrilocal character of marriage (a bride joins her husband’s family, not the other way around) makes the framing of marriage in terms of *kanyadāna* look natural. However, a priori it is not clear who should pay whom for making a marriage possible. In a culture, where marriage is the norm, the direction and size of payments (if any) should be a matter of relative scarcity and the involved person’s “quality” (measured in whatever dimension one might have in mind).

**B. Comparing sacrificing and gifting**

The close connection between offering to gods and gifting has often been observed, for example in <44>. Sometimes, offering and gifting are seen on an equal plane as expressed by <1>. However, some dissimilarities need to be mentioned:

- (worldly or otherworldly) purpose:
  
  Sacrifices for worldly purposes seem to be of a lower type than *dharma-dāna* and on a par with the special kind of gifting called *kāmyadāna* (see <46>).

- reciprocity:
  
  While humans expect the gods to reciprocate, reciprocation is irreconcilable with dharmic gifts. Thus, the third of the “three obligations” mentioned by Marcel Mauss\(^{742}\) clearly does not apply.

Similarities include

\(^{742}\) Mauss (2012, pp. 82–86, 142–153) or Mauss and Maurer (2016, pp. 73–75, 121–130)
impurity:
None of the gifts covered in this book come under the heading of pure altruism (section XII.B). Indeed, one might doubt whether pure altruism is psychologically possible at all.

believes:
Sacrifices to gods for some worldly purpose and giving to Brahmins in order to obtain merit both require belief, śraddhā.

constraints:
Sacrifices and giving are subject to constraints. In some circumstances, all of a sacrificer’s wealth (sarvavedasadakṣinā in <9>) or all of a donor’s wealth (sarvasva in <53>) might be donated. But the general rule seems to be that sacrificing and giving are to be done “according to one’s means” (saktitaḥ in <9> and <11> for sacrifices, in <51> and <53> for dharmic gifts, in <69> for a marriage according to the Demonic Law).743

regular (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) sacrifices and gifts, respectively. But prāyaścitta only for sacrifices? #

- Max Müller: Die Todtenbestattung bei den Brahmanen, ZDMG IX, p. lxiii

Finally, one may apply Trautmann’s terms of sacred and noble gifts (see section 0) in the manner of Table 7 below.

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743 Compare the Buddhist six quarters in <96>. They do not, however, directly refer to gifting (see UJA 4.71, Agostini (2015), where the five ways in which a pupil should “minister to his teachers” are listed).
Table 7: Applying Trautmann’s modes of exchange

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vedic</th>
<th>classical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sacred gifts</td>
<td>A pātra obtains dāna, the giver obtains other-worldly merit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noble gifts</td>
<td>A Vedic priest performs a sacrifice for a yajamāna who pays a dakṣiṇā in return.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. A secularization process?

(1) Definition

It is the thesis of this section that the substitution of yajña/dakṣiṇā by dāna can be considered a secularization process. Thus, referring to Freiberger’s scope of comparison, I perform a genealogical comparison on the background of a modern concept. Here, a definition of secularity is surely needed. The current author should refer to a suitable existing definition or even copy a convincing definition from the literature. The only excuse of not doing so is his ignorance of suitable definitions. With this caveat in place, I propose the following definition:

744 The very concept of secularization seems to be elusive. Although the title of Turner (2010)’s collection suggests that contrasting definitions of “secularization” might be found therein, they are indeed difficult to identify. This remark may be unfair and is grounded on nothing more than the reading of the 20 contributions’ titles. See also Martin (2005) who attempts a “Rivised General Theory” of secularization while the same author questions the scientific usefulness
Secularization is about the decline of beliefs, practices, and institutions that concern

a. otherworldly beings (“gods”),
b. worshipping or honouring them,
c. catering to those beings’ needs,\(^{745}\)
d. privileging c over b.

e. a considerable amount of material consumption during “religious” ceremonies (such as sacrifices or maha\(\text{d}a\text{n}a)\)s) and of material investment for housing these ceremonies (such as temples),

f. the material wellbeing of (officiating) priests and the respect owed to them,\(^{746}\)

g. life after death (in “heaven”),\(^{747}\)

h. future lives to come (brought about by “rebirth”), and/or

i. interference of otherworldly beings on this earth, in particular in response to sacrifices, prayers, and the like\(^{748}\)

j. privileging i over g or h.

Most of these aspects are self-explaining. With respect to aspect b, consider Heim (2004, p. 117): “The principles of the Vedic sacrifice rested on reciprocity

\footnote{Compare <174>(c).}

\footnote{Compare <174>(b).}

\footnote{Compare <174>(d).}

\footnote{Compare <174>(a) and (c).}
[...] between the Vedic gods and humans [...]. But the \textit{mahādāna} [...] did not appeal to reciprocity or bargaining with the gods, but rather entailed worship or honoring them. [G]ifts and \textit{pūjās} [...] were made out of respect and honor, rather than because [the god] needed or desired them.” Aspect i stands for the unrealistic (“religious”) expectation of obtaining offspring, victory, etc. from certain kinds of behaviours or beliefs. Remember that Cartesian Deism categorically denies these expectations.\textsuperscript{749} If the obtainable fruit is shifted to the otherworld (according to g and h), no direct contradiction to what science or experience might teach people over the long run ensues. In that sense, this shift (j) should be considered a secular one.

(2) \textbf{From giving to gods to giving to humans}

The Vedic (and later) sacrifices (offered to gods) are substituted by classical dharmic gifts or great gifts offered to worthy Brahmins—or so one might argue. This shift can be interpreted as a secular one in line with a, b, and c in <217>. Most evidently, sacrificing means “giving to gods” while donating means “giving to humans”.

(3) \textbf{Reduced material consumption}

Concerning c in <217>, while empirical material is not available, it seems plausible that sacrificing\textsuperscript{750} (with the involvement of fire) is consuming more material than \textit{mahādāna} giving. For dharmic giving, this seems evident.

\textsuperscript{749} See Gay (1968).
\textsuperscript{750} See section XVIII.A and in particular the “victim” within Hubert and Mauss (1964)’s definition of the sacrificial system.
Following Krick (1975, p. 31), Oberlies (1998, p. 274) thinks that the slaughter of animals could occur only in the context of sacrifices. Thus, the sacrifice need not entail huge economic sacrifices. In particular, the non-edible parts used to be sacrificed, the edible ones are partly sacrificed and partly eaten. However, sacrificing ghee into the fire, surely implies the destruction of that precious substance.

(4) **Worshipping is more secular than seeing to a god’s need**

Arguably, worshipping is a more “enlightened” activity than the belief that the gods need to be looked after by humans (d in §217).

(5) **From thisworldly to otherworldly fruit**

Roughly speaking, the patron of a sacrifice hopes for thisworldly fruit while the giver of a dharmic gift believes to obtain an otherworldly fruit. As argued above in subsection (1), this shift in §217 should be considered a secular one.

Compare the left with the right column in Table 8. Referring to my definition of secularization §217, aspect a of this definition (concerning otherworldly beings) is involved. In contrast, the rows refer to j in §217.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gift to Gods (Sacrifice)</th>
<th>Gift to Humans (No Sacrifice)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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Preparation the final remark on this subject, reconsider <3>. The shift from sacrificing (typical for the Dvāpara age) to gift-giving (typical for the later Kali age) fits nicely with a process of increasing secularization.

D. The perfect gift

Building on Mauss’ celebrated essay, Carrier (1990) develops a theory of the “perfect gift”:

We live in societies that strongly distinguish (this contrast is now criticized by jurists themselves) real rights and personal rights, persons and things. This separation is fundamental; it constitutes the condition itself for part of our system of property, alienation and exchange. … our civilizations, dating back to the Semitic, Greek, and Roman civilizations, strongly distinguish between obligation and nonvoluntary prestation, on the one hand, and the gift (don) on the other. But are these distinctions not rather recent in the law of the great civilizations? Did they, too, not pass
through an earlier phase, during which they were less characterized by such a cold and calculating mentality?\footnote{Mauss (2012, p. 174) or Mauss and Maurer (2016, p. 146)}

From the Old Indian point of view, there is no contradiction between pursuing \textit{artha} on the one hand and performing \textit{dānadharma} on the other hand. Whether, indeed, some parts of humankind went through a phase without “a cold and calculating mentality” is a topic not taken up here.

Carrier (1990) discusses the “the ideology of the perfect gift in American society”. In that paper, he cites Noonan, Jr. (1984, p. 695)’s characterization:

A gift … is meant as an expression of personal affection, of some degree of love. It is given in a context created by \textbf{personal relations} [bold here and below by HW] to convey a \textbf{personal feeling}. The more it reflects the donee’s interests and the donor’s tastes the better. The more completely it is a gift the more completely it declares an \textbf{identification of the giver with the recipient} … The size of what is given is irrelevant. … The donor … does not give by way of compensation or by way of purchase. \textbf{No equivalence} exists between what the donee has done and what is given. \textbf{No obligation} is imposed which the donee must fulfill. The donee’s \textbf{thanks} are but the ghost of a reciprocal bond. That the gift should operate coercively is indeed repugnant and painful to the donor, destructive of the liberality that is intended. Freely given, the gift leaves the donee free. When the love that gift conveys is total, donor and donee are one, so the donee has no one to whom to respond. Every gift tries to approximate this ideal case.
In some sense, both a *dharmadāna* and a perfect gift are ideal cases. Neither of them is given out of pure altruism (section XII.B). *A dharmadāna* is given in order to earn merit. A perfect gift is made in order to “to convey a personal feeling”. Still, a *dharmadāna* and a perfect gift do not coincide:

- While a *dharmadāna* is to be given with a friendly face (see <52>), a **personal relation** or even **identification** between donor and receiver are not involved.
- A *dharmadāna* has to be given according to the donor’s means (see <53>) and may be just a handful of vegetables\(^754\). Nevertheless, the **size** of what is given clearly matters which can be seen from the three types of gifts (see <65>). Another piece of evidence is the request to give something that is rare (*durlabha*).\(^755\)
- The virtuous receiver (**pātra**) is central to the Brahmanical *dānadharma* (see <55>). Thus, **equivalence** between what the receiver’s learnedness, virtue, etc. and what is given clearly exists.
- Relatedly, while the gift does not impose a specific **obligation** to be fulfilled by the *pātra*, the clear expectation exists that the latter keeps on with his learned and good ways. Indeed, gift giving “serves the purpose of policing the Brahmin community by encouraging its members to aspire to the high standards of an ideal Brahmin lest they be deemed unfit to receive patronage.”\(^756\)

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\(^754\) *śākamuṣṭi* in DK 1.38, Brick (2015)
\(^755\) DK 1.16, Brick (2015). This request is given in the form of the last two of the six components (*dānānām aṅgāni*), the right place (*deśa*) and the right time (*kāla*). 
\(^756\) Brick (2015, p. 44)
In case of the perfect gift thankfulness is rather unimportant. For dharmadānas, thankfulness is unthinkable. This is contrasted by Seneca’s theory of benefits (chapter IX).

Carrier (1990, p. 19) proposes to structure gift giving along two dimensions:

- “objects as anonymous commodities” versus “objects as personal tokens” (Carrier (1990, p. 24) cites Mauss’ dictum that “objects are never completely separated from the men who exchange them”).
- “people as free and independent individuals” versus “people enmeshed in relations of mutual obligation”.

In the table below, these two dimensions are used to build a two-times-two matrix. In this perspective, a perfect gift is diametrically opposed to a dharmadāna. And the latter is similar to impersonal market transaction!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>objects as anonymous commodities</th>
<th>objects as personal tokens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>people as free and independent individuals</td>
<td>impersonal market transaction/dharmadāna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people enmeshed in relations of mutual obligation</td>
<td>beneficium (Seneca)</td>
<td>perfect gift</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 9: The Carrier definition of a perfect gift*
E. Revisiting Freiberger’s classifications

The current author was made aware of Freiberger’s classifications (see subsection II.C(2)) only after the book’s structure was more or less completed. Interestingly, the classification did not influence the major decisions on how to structure the book and on which comparisons to carry out etc. One may opine that this attests to the uselessness of Freiberger’s work. However, neither that author nor the current one would subscribe to this negative view. As Freiberger (2018, p. 2) himself argues,

[T]he elements discussed here [in his article, HW] are largely familiar to practicing comparativists, even if the terms may be partly new. My primary goal is to provide analytical categories, that is, a vocabulary that enables us to speak about the methodical components of comparison that most comparativists more or less intuitively exert in their scholarly practice.

It seems to me that the two-fold classifications “fits”. In this sense, the classifications have passed the “test” mentioned in the introduction (p. 15). More importantly, I find (and the readers might also have found) helpful and disciplining the sharpened awareness for

- the two modes of comparison,
- the different scopes to work with,
- the several tertia comparationis (in my complex study), and
- the emic-versus-etic distinction.
Part Six:

Indices
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<td>rājadharma</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shapley value</td>
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