

Microeconomic Analyses of Old Indian Texts

Decisions

Harald Wiese

University of Leipzig

- Chapter I:
Introduction: Old Indian literature and microeconomics

Part A. Decision theory

- Chapter II:
Preferences
- **Chapter III:
Decisions**
- Chapter IV:
Decision theory for the Bhagavad Gita
- Chapter V:
Monopoly theory and Kautilya's market tax

Chapter III: Decisions

- 1 Decision theory: the simple models
- 2 Simple models in the Hitopadeśa
- 3 Decision theory: lotteries
- 4 Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra
- 5 Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

Decision theory: the simple models

description

action	production of umbrellas	100
	production of sunshades	64

- a set of actions A
- a set of consequences C (profits)
- a consequence function $f : A \rightarrow C$
- a preference relation \succsim on C

Decision theory: the simple models

Theoretical prediction

An action a^* with

$$\underbrace{f(a^*)}_{\in C} \succsim \underbrace{f(a)}_{\in C} \text{ for all } a \in A.$$

Problem

In our example, the firm will produce ??

Decision theory: the simple models

States of the world

state of the world

bad weather

good w.

action	um- brellas	100	81
	sun- shades	64	121

- a set of states of the world W
- tuples (a, w) with $a \in A$ and $w \in W$ determine consequence: uncertain-consequence function

$$g : A \times W \rightarrow C$$

Decision theory: the simple models

analysis

Given a specific state of the world, which action is best?

state of the world

		bad weather	good w.
action	um- brellas	100 R	81
	sun- shades	64	121 R

Sometimes, one action is better than another one for all states of the world. We then say that *a* dominates *b*.

Decision theory: the simple models

dominance

Dominant action = best action for all states of the world (with R everywhere in the row)

state of the world

bad weather

good w.

action

um-
brellas

100 R

181 R

sun-
shades

64

121

	bad weather	good w.
um- brellas	100 R	181 R
sun- shades	64	121

Decision theory: the simple models

exercise on domination

		weather		
		bad	med.	good
action	green icecr.	10	20	30
	blue icecr.	25	25	20
	red icecr.	8	15	25

Decision theory: the simple models

maxmin

Maxmin action = best action for pessimist

state of the world

		bad weather	good w.
action	um- brellas	100	81 P
	sun- shades	64 P	121

Problem

For the icecream matrix, find the maxmin action!

Simple models in the Hitopadeśa

Investment and duty in short and long lives

Contradictory?

A wise man should think about knowledge and money as if he were immune to old age and death; but he should perform his duties as if Death had already seized him by the hair.

With respect to the first decision, we propose the actions

invest = save money/increase knowledge,
do not invest = spend money/do not labor for education

and the states of the world

short life,
long life.

Simple models in the Hitopadeśa

Investment decision

state of the world

short life

long life

action

invest

no use for
cap./knowl. P

long use of
cap./knowl. R

do not
invest

enjoyment.
money/leis. R

material pov./
spiritual pov. P **VB**

VB = very bad outcome of poverty (material and spiritual)

Simple models in the Hitopadeśa

dharmā decision

state of the world

		short life	long life
action	dharmā now	good karma R	good karma, little enjoym. P in youth
	dharmā later	bad karma P VB	good karma, some enjoym. R in youth

No contradiction!

A wise man should think about knowledge and money as if he were immune to old age and death; but he should perform his duties as if Death had already seized him by the hair.

Simple models in the Hitopadeśa

Contradictory advice on investment decision

The wealth of a rich man lie in what he gives away or enjoys; once he dies, others will play with his wife as well as his wealth.

Furthermore,

I think that your wealth is what you give away to distinguished people or what you consume day by day; the rest is what you keep for somebody else.

Simple models in the Hitopadeśa

Fate and human effort: quotation

One should not give up one's efforts, even when acknowledging the role of fate; without effort, one cannot obtain oil from sesame seeds.

And there is another verse on this:

Fortune gravitates towards eminent men who work hard; only cowards say it depends on fate.

Forget about fate and be a man—use your strength!

Then, if you don't succeed inspite of your efforts, what is there to blame?

Simple models in the Hitopadeśa

Fate and human effort: interpretation

		state of the world (fate)	
		favorable	unfavorable
action	lazy	10	2
	busy	50	10

A payoff of 10: Then, if you don't succeed inspite of your efforts, what is there to blame?

Matrix interpretation: "Just as a cart cannot move on one wheel, so fate itself cannot be fulfilled without human effort."

Simple models in the Hitopadeśa

Fate and human effort with cost of effort

		state of the world (fate)	
		favorable	unfavorable
action	lazy	10	2
	busy	$50 - c$	$10 - c$

Problem

For which cost intervals is "busy" dominant? Or "lazy"?

Decision theory: lotteries

state of the world

bad w., $\frac{1}{4}$

good w., $\frac{3}{4}$

action

um-
brellas

100

81

sun-
shades

64

121

$$L_{\text{umbrella}} = \left[100, 81; \frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4} \right]$$

$$E(L_{\text{umbrella}}) = \frac{1}{4} \cdot 100 + \frac{3}{4} \cdot 81 = 85.75$$

Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra

Fate and human effort revisited I

No talk about probabilities in the Hitopadeśa. Nevertheless:

		state of the world (fate)	
		favorable, p_{fav}	unfav., p_{unfav}
action	lazy	10	2
	busy	$50 - c$	$10 - c$

Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra

Fate and human effort revisited II

$$L_{\text{lazy}}^c = [10, 2; p_{\text{fav}}, p_{\text{unfav}}] \text{ and}$$
$$L_{\text{busy}}^c = [50 - c, 10 - c; p_{\text{fav}}, p_{\text{unfav}}]$$

with expected payoffs

$$E(L_{\text{lazy}}^c) = p_{\text{fav}} \cdot 10 + (1 - p_{\text{fav}}) \cdot 2 = 2 + 8p_{\text{fav}}$$
$$E(L_{\text{busy}}^c) = p_{\text{fav}} \cdot (50 - c) + (1 - p_{\text{fav}}) \cdot (10 - c)$$
$$= 10 + 40p_{\text{fav}} - c$$

$$E(L_{\text{busy}}^c) > E(L_{\text{lazy}}^c) \Leftrightarrow c < 8 + 32p_{\text{fav}}$$

Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra

Investment and duty in short and long lives revisited I

state of the world

		short life, p_{short}	long life, p_{long}
action	invest	no use for cap./knowl.	long use of cap./knowl. R
	do not invest	enjoyment of money/leis. R	material pov./ spiritual pov. VB

$$L_{\text{invest}} = [u(\text{no use}), u(\text{long use}); p_{\text{short}}, p_{\text{long}}] \text{ and}$$
$$L_{\text{not invest}} = [u(\text{enjoyment}), u(\text{poverty}); p_{\text{short}}, p_{\text{long}}].$$

Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra

Investment and duty in short and long lives revisited II

$$E(L_{\text{invest}}) > E(L_{\text{not invest}}),$$

$$p_{\text{short}} < \frac{u(\text{long use}) - u(\text{pov.})}{[u(\text{enjoyment.}) - u(\text{no use})] + [u(\text{long use}) - u(\text{pov.})]}$$

$$p_{\text{short}} < \frac{1}{\frac{[u(\text{enjoyment.}) - u(\text{no use})]}{[u(\text{long use}) - u(\text{pov.})]} + 1}$$

Thus, investment is best, if the following conditions hold:

- p_{short} is small or p_{long} is large,
- $u(\text{enjoyment.})$ or $u(\text{pov.})$ are small,
- $u(\text{no use})$ and $u(\text{long use})$ are large.

Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra

Dissension among allies I

The lion and the bull:

- the lion king
- two jackals who are counselors to the king
- the bull who has befriended the lion

From that time onwards, every day [the lion] and [the bull] spent their time together in mutual affection ... As time went by, the lion made fewer kills and food became scarce. As a result [the jackal counselors], became very hungry ...

One of the jackals manages to sow distrust between the two friends.

Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra

Dissension among allies II

- F (payoff for friendship)
- V (payoff for victory over friend)
- NF (payoff for loss of friendship and death of one animal or both animals, resulting from fighting)
- D (payoff for death)

$$F > V > NF > D$$

- If only one animal attacks, the other will be killed.
- If both animals attack, friendship destroyed and death for one or both.
- If no animal attacks, friendship saved.

Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra

Dissension among allies III

		Bull	
		attack p_B	not attack $1 - p_B$
Lion	attack p_L	NF_L, NF_B	V_L, D_B
	not attack $1 - p_L$	D_L, V_B	F_L, F_B

Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra

Dissension among allies IV

- The lion assumes that the bull will attack with a probability of p_B .
- Given this probability it is best for the lion to attack whenever

$$p_B N F_L + (1 - p_B) V_L > p_B D_L + (1 - p_B) F_L$$

or

$$p_B > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{N F_L - D_L}{F_L - V_L}}.$$

i.e., whenever

- the lion assumes that the bull will attack with a high probability.
- $N F_L$ and V_L are large, i.e., the lion does not fear the loss of friendship and enjoys victory over the bull.
- D_L and F_L are small, i.e., the lion is afraid of death and does not value friendship very highly.

Lotteries in the Hitopadeśa and the Pañcatantra

Dissension among allies V

Similarly, the bull will attack if he assumes a probability p_L for an attack by the lion and if

$$p_L > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{NF_B - D_B}{F_B - V_B}}$$

holds. In the story, it is the lion who attacks first. Maybe, the lion imputed a higher attack probability to the bull than the other way around. Also, the bull is not too worried about dying in battle:

To die in a war is for men the most glorious death of all.

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The loan lottery I

The birth-story of Brahma:

- a king who does not believe in the afterworld (*para-loka*) and holds other *Cārvāka* views
- the former Buddha = a Brahma deity (a god) intent on converting the king to virtuous attitudes and behavior:

"If convinced that good and bad deeds have happy and unhappy results in the next life, one avoids evil and strives for purity. But non-believers follow their whims.

The king's pernicious false view was an affliction that spelled ruin, bringing calamity on the world. As a result, the Great One, that divine seer, felt compassion for the king."

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The loan lottery II

The king is not convinced and comes up with a clever proposal:
“Well. great seer!

*If the next world is not a bogey man for children,
and if you think I should believe in it,
then give me five hundred nishkas
and I'll return you a thousand in another life!”*

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The loan lottery III

$$L_{\text{loan}} = \left[\begin{array}{cc} \underbrace{1000 - 500} & \underbrace{-500} & ; p_{\text{asti}}, p_{\text{nāsti}} \\ \text{loan is repaid} & \text{loan is not repaid} & \\ \text{in other world} & \text{in other world} & \\ \text{that exists} & \text{as o. w. does not exist} & \end{array} \right]$$
$$= [500, -500; p_{\text{asti}}, 1 - p_{\text{asti}}]$$

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The loan lottery IV

$$\begin{aligned} E(L_{\text{loan}}) &= p_{\text{asti}} \cdot 500 + (1 - p_{\text{asti}}) \cdot (-500) \\ &= - \underbrace{500}_{\substack{\text{loan given} \\ \text{in both cases}}} + p_{\text{asti}} \cdot \underbrace{1000}_{\substack{\text{repayment} \\ \text{if o. w. exists}}} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

if

$$p_{\text{asti}} > \frac{500}{1000} = \frac{1}{2}$$

This seems a good test of whether the god himself believes in the other world. If he assumes a probability larger than $\frac{1}{2}$, he should—so argues the king—accept the lottery.

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The loan lottery V

The god rejects the lottery:

*“Even in this world, wealth seekers
do not offer money to the wicked,
nor to the greedy, fools or indolents [träge].
For whatever goes there comes to ruin.*

*But if they see someone who is modest,
naturally calm and skilled in business,
they will give him a loan, even without witnesses.
For money entrusted to such a man brings reward.*

*The same procedure for giving a loan
should be used for the next world, king.
But it would be improper to entrust money to you;
for your conduct is corrupted by wicked views.*

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The loan lottery VI

*Who would harrass you for a thousand nishkas
when you lie in hell, senseless, sick with pain,
brought there by your own actions
caused by the evil of your false views?*

...

*In the next world, where nihilists [nāstika] live
a thick darkness and icy wind tortures
people by tearing through their very bones.
What prudent man would go there to get money?*

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The loan lottery VII

$$\begin{aligned} & L_{\text{loan, not paid back}} \\ = & \left[\begin{array}{cc} \underbrace{-500} & , \quad \underbrace{-500} & ; p_{\text{asti}}, p_{\text{nāsti}} \\ \text{loan is} & & \text{loan is} \\ \text{not (!) repaid} & & \text{not repaid} \\ \text{in other world} & & \text{in other world} \\ \text{that exists} & & \text{as o. w. does not exist} \end{array} \right] \\ = & [-500; 1] \end{aligned}$$

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The hell lottery I

Understandably, the king is convinced:

*"My mind almost runs wild with fear
at learning of the punishments in hell.
It practically burns with blazing thoughts
regarding my plight on meeting that fate.*

*Shortsightedly I trod the wrong path,
my mind destroyed by evil views.
Be then my path, recourse of the good!
By my resort and refuge, sage!*

*As you dispelled the darkness of my views
like the rising sun dispels night,
so tell me, seer, the path I should follow
to avoid a bad rebirth after this life."*

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The hell lottery II

The god is prepared to give this advice:

*Conquer vice, so difficult to vanquish!
Pass beyond greed, so difficult to overcome!
You will thus reach the gleaming gold-gated city
of the king of heavens, ablaze with fine gems [Juwel].*

*May your mind, which once praised evil views,
firmly cherish the creeds valued by good men.
Abandon immoral beliefs proclaimed
by those eager to pleasure fools.*

...

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The hell lottery III

*With glory as its banner,
pity as its retinue [Gefolge]
and tranquility as
its lofty flag, king,
if you travel in this chariot [the virtue chariot]
glittering with wisdom
to benefit others and yourself,
you will certainly not enter hell.*

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The hell lottery IV

$$L_{Cārvāka} = \left[\begin{array}{l} \underbrace{\text{pleasures in this life, but hell with endless horrors,}}_{\text{other world exists}} \\ \underbrace{\text{pleasures in this life}}_{\text{other world does not exist}} ; p_{asti}, p_{nāsti} \end{array} \right]$$
$$= [-100\,000, 10; p_{asti}, p_{nāsti}]$$

with expected payoff

$$\begin{aligned} E(L_{Cārvāka}) &= p_{asti} \cdot (-100\,000) + (1 - p_{asti}) \cdot 10 \\ &= 10 - 100\,010p_{asti} \end{aligned}$$

Lotteries against and in favor of God's existence

The hell lottery V

$$L_{\text{virtue}} = [\text{life of pity, tranquility, and wisdom, no hell}; 1]$$

$$E(L_{\text{virtue}}) = 2 \text{ (for example)}$$

$$E(L_{\text{virtue}}) > E(L_{\text{Cārvāka}})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow p_{\text{asti}} > \frac{8}{100010} \approx \frac{8}{10000} = 0.0008$$

Thus, the king may not (really) believe in the other world, but prefers to play it safe.

Incidentally, Blaise Pascal presented a similar argument for believing in God.