

# Overview “The union value”

- Introduction
- Partitions and rank orders
- Union formula and axiomatization
- Examples

Does it pay to unionize?

- Chances of a German citizen to become a EU commissioner versus those of an Irish citizen
- Productive players in a unanimity game profit when they dissociate themselves from other productive players.
- Left-glove owners may benefit from forming a cartel of left-gloves holders.

# Partitions and rank orders

subpartitions

$\mathcal{P}(i) \in 2^N =$  component that contains player  $i$

$\mathcal{P}(R) \subseteq 2^N =$  subpartition of  $\mathcal{P}$  fulfilling  $C \cap R \neq \emptyset \Leftrightarrow C \in \mathcal{P}(R)$  for all  $C \in \mathcal{P}$

## Problem

*Express  $\mathcal{P}(T)$  and  $\mathcal{P}(i) \cap T$  in your own words.*

# Partitions and rank orders

union of components

## Definition (union of components)

Let  $\mathcal{P} = \{C_1, \dots, C_k\}$  be a partition of  $N$ . We denote the union of  $R$ -components by

$$\bigcup \mathcal{P}(R) := \bigcup_{i \in R} \mathcal{P}(i).$$

Thus,  $\bigcup \mathcal{P}(R)$  is the set with partition  $\mathcal{P}(R)$ .

## Problem

Consider  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\}, \{5, 6, 7\}\}$  and find  $\mathcal{P}(\{2, 5\})$  and  $\bigcup \mathcal{P}(\{2, 5\})$ .

# Partitions and rank orders

rank orders consistent with partitions

Consider the partition  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\}\}$ .

- The rank order  $\rho = (3, 1, 2, 4)$  tears the component  $\{3, 4\}$  apart while
- the rank order  $\rho = (3, 4, 1, 2)$  does not.

## Problem

*Which of the following rank orders are consistent with the partition  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3, 4\}, \{5, 6, 7\}\}$ ?*

- $\rho = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)$
- $\rho = (2, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 3)$
- $\rho = (1, 5, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7)$
- $\rho = (1, 4, 3, 7, 5, 6, 2)$

# Partitions and rank orders

rank orders consistent with partitions

## Problem

*Which rank orders from  $RO_7$  are consistent with*

- $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7\}\}$  or
- $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{4\}, \{5\}, \{6\}, \{7\}\}$ ?

# Partitions and rank orders

how many consistent rank orders are there

How many rank orders are consistent with a partition

$$\mathcal{P} = \{S_1, \dots, S_k\}?$$

Note:

- We have  $k!$  possibilities to rank the components  $S_1$  through  $S_k$ .
- Within component  $S_j$ , there are  $|S_j|!$  possibilities to rank its players.

Thus, we find

$$\left| RO_n^{\mathcal{P}} \right| = k! \cdot |S_1|! \cdot \dots \cdot |S_k|!$$

# Union formula

definition

## Definition

The union, or Owen, formula is given by

$$Ow_i(v, \mathcal{P}) = \frac{1}{|RO_n^{\mathcal{P}}|} \sum_{\rho \in RO_n^{\mathcal{P}}} [v(K_i(\rho)) - v(K_i(\rho) \setminus \{i\})], i \in N.$$

Do you see that  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1, 2, \dots, n\}\}$  and  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \dots, \{n\}\}$  lead to the same Owen values?



# Union formula

calculating the Owen payoffs

## Example

$$N = \{1, 2, 3\}, v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}},$$

$\mathcal{P} = \{\{1, 2\}, \{3\}\}$  with consistent rank orders

$$(1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 3), (3, 1, 2) \text{ and } (3, 2, 1).$$

We obtain player 1's Owen payoff:

$$\begin{aligned} & Ow_1(u_{\{1,2\}}, \mathcal{P}) \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \left( \underbrace{0}_{(1,2,3)} + \underbrace{\text{---}}_{(1,3,2)} + \underbrace{0}_{(2,1,3)} + \underbrace{\text{---}}_{(2,3,1)} + \underbrace{1}_{(3,1,2)} + \underbrace{0}_{(3,2,1)} \right) = \frac{1}{4}, \end{aligned}$$

# Union value axiomatization I

The Owen value is a solution function  $\sigma$  on  $(N, \mathfrak{B}_N)$  that obeys

- the efficiency axiom,
- the symmetry axiom (payoff equality for  $\mathcal{P}$ -symmetric players),
- the null-player axiom, and
- the additivity axiom.

These axioms do not suffice to pin down the Owen value.

## Definition (component symmetry)

Consider a partition  $\mathcal{P} \in \mathfrak{P}_N$ . Two components  $C$  and  $C'$  from  $\mathcal{P}$  are called symmetric if

$$v\left(\bigcup \mathcal{P}(K) \cup C\right) = v\left(\bigcup \mathcal{P}(K) \cup C'\right)$$

holds for all  $K \subseteq N \setminus (C \cup C')$ .

## Definition (symmetry axiom for components)

A solution function (on  $\mathbb{V}^{\text{part}}$ )  $\sigma$  is said to obey symmetry between components if

$$\sigma_C(v, \mathcal{P}) = \sigma_{C'}(v, \mathcal{P})$$

holds for all symmetric components  $C$  and  $C'$  from  $\mathcal{P}$ .

## Theorem (Axiomatization of the Owen value)

*The Owen formula is the unique solution function that fulfills the symmetry axiom, the symmetry axiom for components, the efficiency axiom, the null-player axiom and the additivity axiom.*

# Union value axiomatization IV

Again: gloves game  $v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}$ , partition  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1, 2\}, \{3\}\}$

- Both components are needed to produce the worth of 1. Therefore, the symmetry axiom for components yields

$$Ow_1 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P}) + Ow_2 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P}) = Ow_3 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P}).$$

- Efficiency then leads to

$$\begin{aligned} Ow_3 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P}) &= 1 - (Ow_1 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P}) + Ow_2 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P})) \\ &= 1 - Ow_3 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P}) \end{aligned}$$

and hence to  $Ow_3 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P}) = \frac{1}{2}$ .

- The symmetry between players 1 and 2 produces  $Ow_1 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P}) = Ow_2 (v_{\{1,2\},\{3\}}, \mathcal{P}) = \frac{1}{4}$ .

# Examples

## unanimity games

- Disregard null components  $C \subseteq N \setminus T$ .
- Each component in  $\mathcal{P}(T)$  has the same probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}(T)|}$  to be the last component.
- Within each of these components, every  $i \in T$  player has the same probability  $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}(i) \cap T|}$  to complete  $T$ .

Thus, the Owen value yields the following payoffs for a unanimity game  $u_T$ ,  $T \neq \emptyset$ :

$$Ow_i(u_T, \mathcal{P}) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}(T)|} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}(i) \cap T|}, & i \in T \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Breaking off pays.

# Examples

## symmetric games

Symmetric players need not be  $\mathcal{P}$ -symmetric.

Consider  $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ ,  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1, 2\}, \{3\}\}$  and the coalition function  $v$  given by  $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$  and

$$v(S) = \begin{cases} 0, & |S| \leq 1 \\ \alpha, & |S| = 2 \\ 1, & |S| = 3 \end{cases}$$

rank order	marginal contribution for player 1
1-2-3	0
2-1-3	$\alpha$
3-1-2	$\alpha$
3-2-1	$1 - \alpha$
sum	$1 + \alpha$
Owen payoff	$\frac{1+\alpha}{4}$

# Examples

## asymmetric games

Since players 1 and 2 are  $\mathcal{P}$ -symmetric, we have

$Ow_2(v, \mathcal{P}) = Ow_1(v, \mathcal{P}) = \frac{1+\alpha}{4}$ . Efficiency yields

$$\begin{aligned} Ow_3(v, \mathcal{P}) &= 1 - Ow_1(v, \mathcal{P}) - Ow_2(v, \mathcal{P}) \\ &= 1 - 2 \cdot \frac{1+\alpha}{4} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2}\alpha. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we obtain  $Ow_3(v, \mathcal{P}) \neq Ow_1(v, \mathcal{P})$  unless  $\alpha = \frac{1}{3}$  happens to hold.



## Problem

*Find the Owen payoffs for the  $n$ -player apex game  $h_1$  and the partition  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1\}, \{2, \dots, n\}\}$ .*

If the unimportant players form several components, the apex player obtains a positive payoff. For example, if the players 2 to  $n$  form two components, the apex player obtains the marginal payoff 1 in one out of three cases – therefore, we have  $Ow_1(v, \mathcal{P}) = \frac{1}{3}$ .

## Problem

*Can you find a partition  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1\}, C_1, C_2\}$  such that a player  $j \in \{2, \dots, n\}$  obtains a higher payoff than  $\frac{1}{n-1}$ ?*

# The Shapley value is an average of Owen values

probability distribution I

## Definition (probability distribution)

Let  $M$  be a nonempty set. A probability distribution on  $M$  is a function

$$\text{prob} : 2^M \rightarrow [0, 1]$$

such that

- $\text{prob}(\emptyset) = 0$ ,
- $\text{prob}(A \cup B) = \text{prob}(A) + \text{prob}(B)$  for all  $A, B \in 2^M$  obeying  $A \cap B = \emptyset$  and
- $\text{prob}(M) = 1$ .

# The Shapley value is an average of Owen values

probability distribution II

## Problem

*Probability for the events*

- *“the number of pips (spots) is 2”,*
- *“the number of pips is odd”, and, applying the definition*
- *“the number of pips is 1, 2, 3 or 5”.*

# The Shapley value is an average of Owen values

symmetric probability distribution I

*prob* on  $M = \mathfrak{P}_N$

- not symmetric:

$$prob_1(\{\{1, 2\}, \{3\}\}) = \frac{1}{2} = prob_1(\{\{1\}, \{2, 3\}\})$$

- not symmetric:

$$prob_2(\{\{1, 2\}, \{3\}\}) = 1$$

- symmetric:

$$\begin{aligned} prob_1(\{\{1, 2\}, \{3\}\}) &= prob_1(\{\{1\}, \{2, 3\}\}) \\ &= prob_1(\{\{2\}, \{1, 3\}\}) = \frac{1}{3}, \end{aligned}$$

$$prob_2(\{\{1, 2, \dots, n\}\}) = 1, \text{ and}$$

$$prob_3(\{\{1\}, \{2\}, \dots, \{n\}\}) = 1$$

# The Shapley value is an average of Owen values

symmetric probability distribution II

- bijection  $\pi : N \rightarrow N$ . For example, for  $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ , a bijection  $\pi$  is defined by

$$\pi(1) = 3,$$

$$\pi(2) = 1, \text{ and}$$

$$\pi(3) = 2.$$

- For a partition  $\mathcal{P}$ ,  $\pi(\mathcal{P})$  is the partition  $\{\pi(C) : C \in \mathcal{P}\}$ .

## Problem

Let  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{1, 2\}, \{3\}\}$ . Find  $\pi(\mathcal{P})$  for the above bijection  $\pi$ !

# The Shapley value is an average of Owen values

symmetric probability distribution III

## Definition

Let  $prob$  be a probability distribution on  $\mathfrak{B}_N$ .  $prob$  is called symmetric if every bijection  $\pi : N \rightarrow N$  yields

$$prob(\mathcal{P}) = prob(\pi(\mathcal{P})).$$

Do you see:

- $\pi(\{1, 2, \dots, n\}) = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  for every bijection  $\pi$ .
- Every partition  $\pi$  keeps the atomic partition intact.

# The Shapley value is an average of Owen values

probabilistic Owen value

## Definition (probabilistic Owen value)

The probabilistic Owen value on  $\mathbb{V}^{\text{part}}$  is the solution function  $Ow$  given by

$$Ow_i(v, prob) = \sum_{\mathcal{P} \in \mathfrak{P}_N} prob(\mathcal{P}) Ow_i(v, \mathcal{P}), i \in N,$$

where  $prob \in Prob(\mathfrak{P}_N)$  is a probability distribution on the set of partitions of  $N$ .

## Theorem (Casajus in IGTR)

For any symmetric probability distribution  $prob$  on  $\mathfrak{P}_N$ , we have

$$Ow(v, prob) = Sh(v).$$

## Further exercises: Problem 1

Assume two men, Max (M) and Onno (O), who both love Ada (A). Their coalition function is given

$$v(K) = \begin{cases} 0, & |K| \leq 1 \\ 6, & K = \{M, A\} \\ 4, & K = \{O, A\} \\ 1, & K = \{M, O\} \\ 2, & K = \{M, O, A\} \end{cases}$$

- 1 Calculate the Owen payoffs for the partition  $\mathcal{P} = \{\{M, O\}, \{A\}\}$ !
- 2 Comment!