

UNIVERSITÄT LEIPZIG

**Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät  
Faculty of Economics and Management Science**

Working Paper, No. 91

Martina Padmanabhan

**Gender and Institutional Analysis  
A Feminist Approach to Economic and  
Social Norms**

August 2010

ISSN 1437-9384

# Gender and Institutional Analysis

## A Feminist Approach to Economic and Social Norms

*Martina Padmanabhan*

### **Abstract**

The paper examines different schools of New Institutionalism, in order to assess their capacity to incorporate a feminist analysis of gender. In reflecting on the assumptions of institutional traditions and the concept of gender, it identifies areas for fruitful merging and applies these to comparative, empirical case studies in Ghana, West-Africa. The paper is structured as follows: First, I delineate three schools of New Institutionalism, namely the *historical*, *rational choice* and *sociological*, to discuss their assumptions and analytical interests. Building on the insights from sociological institutionalism, I interrogate the classical school of institutional economics and its positions, scrutinised for the purpose of seeing whether it can accommodate gender analysis. I will show that both share the concept of social constructivism and the assumptions of institutional change. Second, the paper introduces aspects of feminist analysis and looks for linkages with institutional economics. Gender refers to the social construction of identity, assigning different roles, rights and opportunities to persons based on their sex. A closer look at feminist constructivism reveals the analytical similarities of classical institutional economics and feminist economics. Third, I suggest a merging of institutional and gender analysis for a fruitful consideration of productive roles and distribution patterns. Gender norms as asymmetric institutions are illustrated via a case study in Nigeria, based on van Straveren & Odebode (2007). Building on this review of literature and discussion, I further demonstrate the workings of the wider institutional context of family law, property rights and non-material sources of masculine status, based on my own fieldwork in West Africa. Delineating the gender specifications of the ethnic groups of the Kusasi and Dagomba in Ghana, I show how feminist institutional analysis can unravel the deeply embedded gendered economic structure and the reinforcing of potentially asymmetric institutions.

---

### **Acknowledgements**

Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at research colloquium (FoKo) Division of resource economics, Faculty of Horticulture and Agriculture of the Humboldt University, Berlin 08.05.2007 and at the Neue Institutionen Ökonomie (NIÖ) meeting in Leipzig, December 15.2007. We would like to thank the participants of the research colloquium FOKO at the Division of Resource Economics, Humboldt University of Berlin and at the annual meeting of the NIÖ group, especially Andrea Knierim for the fruitful comments and Stefan Geyler for editorial support and patience.

---

### **Contact**

*Leibniz Universität Hannover, Institute of Environmental Planning, Herrenhäuserstr. 2, 30149 Hannover  
padmanabhan@umwelt.uni-hannover.de*

## **1. Institutional analysis**

The New Institutional School consists of a number of different approaches. Historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalisms base their conceptualisations of change and stability on different assumptions for example concerning the actor and institutional change. Unlike the historical and rational choice institutionalism, the sociological school shares an understanding of social constructivism with the Classical Institutional Economics, which perhaps makes them both open to core concepts of feminist analysis.

### ***1.1. Historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalisms***

Hall and Taylor (1996) identify three analytical approaches under the umbrella of “New Institutionalisms”, distinguishing historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalisms and seeking to explain the roles that institutions play in determining social and political outcomes. Based on their work, I will delineate the conceptual landscape that institutionalisms occupy to arrive at an informed understanding of the central assumptions of the three approaches and their explanations concerning institutional change and stability.

Historical institutionalists define institutions as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structures of a system of political economy and pursue two lines of thought: the calculus and the cultural. The calculus approach perceives individuals as acting strategically, places strategic interaction at the centre of analysis and sees one important feature of institutions to be providing information about the possible behaviour of other actors. The cultural approach understands behaviour not as purely strategic, but as bounded by an individual’s worldview. It sees actors as satisfaction-rather than utilisation-maximisers. Institutions not only provide information important for building strategies, but also affect actor identities, self-images and preferences (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939). While the calculus approach understands the persistence of institutions as a result of their contributions towards solving collective action dilemmas, the cultural approach maintains that conventions as social institutions are not straightforward objects of individual choice. Rather, the conventional character of many institutions often clouds their influence and prevents direct scrutiny.

Historical institutionalists are interested in how institutions distribute power unevenly across social groups, how institutions shape access to decision-making unevenly and how some groups lose while others win (Steinmo 1993). The calculus concept of the freely-

contracting individual emphasises the degree to which outcomes makes everybody better off, whereas the cultural approach perceives social causation as “path-dependent”, viewing forces of change to be mediated by contextual features inherited from the past. For culturalists, the analytical aim focuses on understanding how these paths are produced, structure societal forces, generate certain identities and formulate interests that are costly to shift. From this perspective, institutions have unintended consequences and bear inefficiencies, rather than being ideally purposive and efficient. Institutional change comes along at critical junctures or as shocks due to conflict or economic crisis. Along this line, institutions are further changed by socio-economic development and the diffusion of ideas or beliefs.

Rational Choice Institutionalism draws from the new economics of organisations and is often subsumed under New Institutional Economics. Its focus is on property rights, rent-seeking and transaction costs (Williamson 1975) and how they can be reduced through appropriate institutions. Central to its analytical concerns are series of collective action dilemmas where collective outcomes are suboptimal compared to those of individuals. Yet, institutions do help to solve collective action problems, as instantiated by the stability in voting outcomes in legislature bodies despite assumed shifting majorities (Weingast and Marshall 1988). An important institutional mechanism is the monitoring principal, enforcing the compliance of agents through contracts. A strategic calculus drives behaviour and, in turn, affects expectations about the behaviour of other actors. A central contribution of this perspective is that institutions serve to reduce uncertainty about the corresponding behaviour of others. The value of institutions results from the gains won through co-operation, with the creation of institutions being explained as voluntary agreements made by relevant actors, where one institutional arrangement is chosen among others as being the most beneficial.

Sociological institutionalism has developed in organisational theory. Questioning the claim of the rational choice school that evolving institutional structures in modern societies do resemble each other because of inherent efficiency or rationality, Dobbin (1994) understands institutional forms and procedures as culturally specific practices. Social myths and ceremonies become assimilated into organisations as a result of a more general transmission of cultural practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Sociological institutionalists therefore seek explanations about why organisations take specific sets of institutional forms, procedures and symbols.

Three features distinguish sociological institutionalism from other new institutionalisms: Its understanding of institutions goes beyond formal rules, procedures and norms and

encompasses symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide frames of meaning. Thus, institutions and culture blend into each other, breaking down the distinction between institutional and cultural explanatory patterns, thus redefining culture itself as an institution. This cognitive turn goes beyond culture as attitudes and values, rather grasping it as a network of routines, symbols and behavioural blue-prints. Institutions thus provide cognitive scripts, categories and models necessary for action, help individuals to interpret the behaviour of others and specify what a particular person can imagine as a possible action in a certain situation. Embodying the ideas of social constructivism, institutions do affect the most basic preferences and the very identity of actors. In their classic text on “the social construction of reality”, Luckmann and Berger (1966) show how self-images of social actors are built through the institutions, images and signs of every-day-life. The interactive and mutually constitutive character of institutions in relation to individual action is central to sociological institutionalism. Action is tightly intertwined with interpretation, and practical reasoning concerning available institutional alternatives decides over courses of action to be taken.

Sociological institutionalists emphasise that what individuals see as “rational action” is itself socially constructed. From this perspective, though actors are purposive, the goals actors are striving for are much more broadly conceptualised than the maximisation of material well-being, but rather also include the definition and expression of their identities in socially appropriate ways. Institutional creation and change is explained as a result of the enhanced legitimacy achieved by organisations that come along with certain changes and their positive valuation by the wider cultural environment, though a particular change may be end up being dysfunctional. Here, the “logic of social appropriateness” may compete with a “logic of instrumentality” (March and Olsen 1989). The legitimacy or appropriateness of change itself derives from sources of cultural authority, ranging from the modern regulatory state (Skocpol 1992) to evolving professional communities pressing standards on their members (Abbott 1988) and interaction and discussion among actors in epistemological communities (Knorr Cetina 1981).

Institutional change from a sociological point of view takes place in an environment already saturated with institutions. New institutions often borrow from already existing templates. Not efficiency but the collective process of interpretation and social legitimacy play the crucial role in the process of institutional creation. Hall and Taylor (1996) criticise the extent to which, for all of its benefits, this approach misses the clash of power over

competing interests. They suggest paying more attention to processes of contention, beyond the processes of interpretation with their emphasis on meanings, scripts and symbols.

### ***1.2. Classical institutional economists, social constructivism and institutional change***

The foregoing comparison of the three institutionalisms with a historic, rational choice or sociological outlook can be strengthened and broadened through consideration of the Classical school of Institutional Economics. The classical tradition of institutional economics stresses the role of the collective and the effect that institutions have on forming the individual, thereby challenging the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics. In the following, I focus on charting the historical roots of Classical Institutional Economics based on Vatn (2005: 169ff).

Veblen (1899) and Commons (1931) are the most prominent thinkers of the Classical Institutional Economics. Working at the dawn of the twentieth century, Veblen can be regarded as the first economic anthropologist to study the customs of the American economy (Mayhew 1999). Focusing on evolutionary change as a characterising aspect of market economies, where humans are influenced by the institutional framework within which they live, he questioned the concept of marginal utility and rather thought that it is institutions that affect the preferences individuals hold.

Commons (1931) understood institutions as a means to support and protect interests and handle conflicts, in a world where economic exchanges are not harmonious but rather conflictual. He considered the important analytical relationship to be not between people and objects, but rather between people. For Commons, an institution expresses both controlled collective action and the liberation and expansion of possibilities for individual action. The smallest unit of analysis for institutional economists is the transaction: not in the sense of the exchange of commodities, but the alienation and acquisition between individuals of the rights and liberties created by society. Thus, institutions both constrain and enable.

Building on a general understanding of the economy as a larger process of provisioning, the contemporary Classical Institutional Economics have continued to contribute along this line of thought (Schmid 1987; Hodgson 1988, 1999; Bromley 1989, 1991). They regard the human as rationally multidimensional (Hodgson 1988), meaning that what is rational depends crucially on the institutional setting, with rationality being defined by meanings and expectations as given by each context. Furthermore, the importance of the institutional arrangements regarding preferences, value expressions and price formation influences the

evaluation of what is deemed efficient (Bromley 1989): efficiency being a reflection of the defined rights and the interests that are protected by the status quo institutions. Especially Hodgson (1988, 1999) works with the Veblenian theme of evolution as opposed to equilibrating forces. Hagedorn (2008) contributes by incorporating the dimension of sustainability into institutional analysis (Beckmann & Padmanabhan 2009)

The classical institutional economics perspective considers power a central explanatory factor in understanding institutional change. Bromley (1991), for example, proposes that we look at existing institutional structures and what potential they give to various parties to change the rules. When perceiving the state as a power structure, it can be used by actors to support different types of interests and values and, thus, support the construction of different types of societies. But power can take other forms, and it may be built into the basic structures of society – that is, its institutions – that, for example, regulate access to resources or provide rules defining the distribution of surpluses from production. Seen from this perspective, what was originally the exertion of brute force is transformed into a seemingly “natural state” by switching from physical power alone to systematic coercion through institutions.

### ***1.3. Economic institutions as social constructions***

In the economic analysis of institutions there are two different approaches to the relationship between the individual and society<sup>1</sup>. The school of New Institutional Economics takes the perspective of individuals as self-contained, with predefined capabilities and institutions being constraints within which individuals act and choose. New Institutional Economics is in this respect close to the neoclassical perspective and retains its individualistic foundations as rational choice institutionalism suggests. It employs some concepts, such as “working rules” developed by Commons (1931), as a foundation for principles of “bounded rationality” when transaction costs are high, but has no developed concept of culture. Because of this, Jennings (1993) concludes that it is largely incompatible with feminist theories. By contrast, the contemporary Classical Institutionalist School takes a social constructivist position (Vatn 2005: 25ff) in which institutions are viewed as choice sets that influence individuals with regard to their abilities, ideals and needs. The theory of social construction entertains a dialectical perspective whereby each human is a construct of society and society is itself a

---

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed discussion of the two major traditions of Classical/Old and New Institutional Economics on the grounds of central issues see Rutherford (1994).

construct of human interaction. Building on what has already been said on sociological institutionalism, this dialectical perspective will be laid out in more detail below.

As socially created, individuals carry norms, values and expectations. Institutions are “reciprocal typifications” (Berger & Luckmann 1967), the routinisation of which relieve actors from extraneous effort, as they define tasks and the relations entailed by them. Through institutionalisation, subjective forms become objective “social facts”. Organisational talent, the ability to coordinate, is seen as a core human trait important for survival, by means of which the group and the individual are jointly created. Within groups exist conflicts and differences in power, resulting in a stratification of society which is sustained by the use of coercive power, so that typifications are not necessarily accepted as mutual or reciprocal. The prevailing inequalities within a society are supported by institutional structures that make their source of power invisible. Power relations become invisible and turn into facts through being incorporated into the institutional structures of society, whereby they become part of “the natural order of things”. Not only the construction and reproduction of institutions, but also their interpretation influence behaviour.

Among the social constructivists, the cognitive and normative sub-traditions can be distinguished (Vatn 2005:29). The cognitive tradition (Berger & Luckmann 1967) focuses on the social construction of concepts and reciprocal expectations concerning roles, that is, how institutional frameworks shape our ends and the ways in which we pursue them. The emphasis rests on the mental aspects of social construction, implying that objects have to be transformed into mental constructs. Cognitive social constructivism builds on Herbert Blumer’s (1969) concept of symbolic interaction, proposing that things have relevance as meaningful phenomena from the ways in which they have been constructed symbolically. The cultural significance of things is central and stands in opposition to the Cartesian view that the world comes to us without any preconceptions.

The normative tradition emphasises that institutions carry messages about, and thereby define, (in)appropriate actions. Norms become guides to proper conduct through internalisation. Rational action is, thus, based on the normed behaviour that the relevant role and situation demand, not a result of calculation (March & Olson 1989). The normative role of some institutions is often more obvious than the regulating function of institutions for all interaction. Both traditions of social constructivism are concerned with how conventions and norms help individuals to sort out complex choice situations. Building on the foregoing

overview, I argue in the following section how Classical Institutionalism is conceptually able to accommodate feminist analysis.

#### ***1.4. Shared concepts of institutional economics and feminist analysis***

Feminist analysis of the economy is concerned with the conditions, processes and outcomes of economic acting under conditions of gender specification. Taking the social category of gender as a central variable, feminist economists ask how gendered discrepancies in income, wealth and wider means of provisioning can, on the one hand, be explained and, on the other hand, altered. Mayhew (1999) defines the interest of institutional economics as being to study the social organisations for the provisioning of society: the process of trying to assure culturally appropriate levels of food, housing, clothing and care. Provisioning processes are rooted in the history, culture and environment of a society, where humans interact with these through certain institutions; hence the economy is an instituted process (Polanyi 1957). This concept of economy goes beyond “pecuniary” activities of buying and selling, not synonymous with provisioning.

While the process of individual choice is central to New Institutional Economics (Coase 1960, Williamson 1975, North 1981) the Old and Classical schools perceive institutions as shared cultural norms that evolve in undirected adaptations to new circumstances and experiences. A central analytical concept is culture, the totality of time- and space- specific institutions changing over time. Mayhew (1999) observes an overlap between feminist and institutionalist views concerning four core concepts:

#### **1. Institutions are culturally specific and culturally shared**

Markets and related activities are not the product of individual “tastes and preferences”, but of cultural patterns whose histories can be unravelled. The Neoclassical School assumes that inherently individuals possess a kind of commercial rationality, and explains female participation in economies as a consequence of rational reactions to specific factor endowments or of unexplained tastes and preferences. Meanwhile, Classical Institutional Economics allows for the discovery of institutional patterns of female participation and entitlements in different times and places.

## **2. The modern integrated market system centres around production for sale**

The historical expansion of the market has altered the family and the role of women. Though commercial activities like buying and selling were peripheral to Western household in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, outside economic activity became more important and was understood as a male activity. Women were separated and excluded from that world. But cultural consumption norms in the Western world have been changing, and today women are encouraged to enter the workforce to maintain their social standing.

## **3. Instrumental valuing and institutional learning**

Historically speaking, there are few cultural constants across time and space in world society, but the process of innovation and valuation is universal to humans. The ability to use language so that learning can be carried across time is central to knowledge and its manipulation. Learning and the accumulation of “human capital” is a social, not an individual process. Technological change is a major source of socio-economic change, with impacts on, for example, forms of agricultural practice, gender roles and family organisation.

## **4. Socio-economic structures and perceptions are socially constructed**

The dialectical perspective of social constructionism allows, in consequence, for an understanding if institutions are constructed, they may be reconstructed. Means and ends are part of a continuum: both the means for a better society and the ends that define it change as society changes. The Classical Institutional perspective claims that all socio-economic outcomes are negotiated and all current arrangements are subject to further negotiation. Socio-economic change is a process whereby the conflict of interests leads to new “reasonable values”.

These four foundational concepts shared by institutional and feminist thought suggest the conclusion that gender roles are socially constructed, as are the economic advantages and disadvantages, entitlements and penalties associated with those gendered roles in the economy.

## **2. Gender analysis**

As shown above, feminist theory reveals itself as having important similarities to institutional analysis, as both view the acquisition of knowledge as a cultural enterprise, challenge dualistic understandings of knowledge and social life and have high regard for historical context (Jennings 1993). In the following I provide a short introduction on the foundations of feminist perspectives and feminist economics, while also discussing what feminist constructivism could mean for (re)conceptualisation of the institutional nature of gender. Finally, I discuss how examining the nexus of power, politics and gendered institutions can make important contributions towards understanding the persistence of institutions.

Feminist institutionalists view culture as the essential element of continuity necessary for viable and coherent social arrangements (Jennings 1993). Behaviour is multidimensional and complex, so that its various aspects cannot be easily separated. Conflict routinely results from, while cumulatively causing, social evolution. There is no universal law for social processes, processes and meanings are rather mutually and historically determined. The feminist institutional mode of social inquiry places historical and cultural context in the foreground and crosses disciplinary boundaries. Veblen's (1899) "theory of the leisure class" is a major contribution to Old Institutionalism and can be regarded as an early work of institutionalism with feminist concern (Jennings 1993). He places the socially constructed distinctions between men and women at the centre of this, his first major, work, arguing that historically women had first been viewed as objects of seizure, then as producers of consumption goods for their masters and, finally, by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as idle objects for the display of men's wealth. In modern societies, status rests on ownership and the ability to consume without personal effort, as demonstrated by men through women, who were trained to be homemakers and consumers, ornaments for men; only disreputable women worked for money. Veblen explicitly questions the social norms and values honoured by this perspective in his economic analysis. He rejects conventional associations of the market with useful economic activities and understands the real economy as a provisioning process. Veblen's critique of the "barbarian status of women" is linked to a broader analysis of a social hierarchy rooted in gender, among other, distinctions.

### ***2.1. Foundations of feminist perspectives and feminist economics***

The basic feminist insight is that women are systematically discriminated against. Making a distinction between sex and gender is central to contemporary feminism (Barker 1999). Whereas sex refers to the biological differences between men and women, gender refers to the social construction of sexual identity: a construction that assigns different roles, rights and opportunities to persons based on their sex. Race, ethnicity, class and sexuality are other categories that intersect to determine the cultural, social and economic location of individuals. For feminist institutional researchers gender is not something people “have” but rather something they “do”. Gender as a practice, performance and methodical accomplishment directs the analytical lens towards social and political institutions, away from the individual. Walby (1990) states that gender relations are inevitably power relations beyond formal structures, encompassing also “private” ones like the family.

One common theme in feminist inquiry is the unravelling of the cultural origins of knowledge and the challenge of overcoming dualistic thinking in the social construction of ‘economic man’ (Mellor 1997). Descartes’ mind/body distinction, Locke’s construction of the public/private spheres, and the structure of modern science are powerful foundations for the hierarchical gender relations in contemporary political economy. The rise of modern dualism in Descartes’ mind/body distinction is followed by a cultural association of masculinity with ideals of separation or separateness, and femininity with ideals of connection or relation (Bordo 1987). In Western philosophy, the masculine mind is constructed as the seat of pure reason and the feminine body as an unreliable source of sensation and emotion (von Winterfeld 2006).

In her seminal book “The Science Question in Feminism” (1986), Harding investigates the cultural construction of knowledge and gender in the practices of modern science, which has taken on a quasi-religious, authoritarian character, because it claims to have unique methods of knowledge production, insulated from cultural biases, that yields “objective truth”. The claim that such truth represents the “universal” leads to gender asymmetries in science. Many institutions developed under men, including science, display an unjustified affinity with masculine attitudes of detachment and autonomy. Knorr Cetina (1999) emphasises that decisions concerning what constitutes acceptable and convincing evidence are made by scientific communities. The idea of objectivity as individually attainable through rigorous methods, emotional detachment and “separation” from both the object of study and

other researchers appears to be an emotionally loaded, culturally created construct (Longino 1992).

Nicholson (1986) analyses the historical process of the making of self-determination and self-interest into traditional prerogatives of men. The rise of the modern individual goes hand in hand with the distinction between public and private. She shows how these distinctions between social spheres have culturally constructed notions of masculinity and femininity. With John Locke, the social basis of the public state is defined as the association of isolated heads of private landed households, leaving aside all women and unpropertied men. The economic and reproductive aspects of the household were not given social distinction nor seen as a basis for public standing. Only legal ownership of property conferred social status. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the accumulated weight of these ideas resulted in the cult of domesticity for women and the extension of privileges to all white men. The private household, not the public state, exercised control over production and the disposition of men's labour. The household also retained control over women's labour, but that labour was no longer recognised as productive.

Feminist economic analysis in economic development began with the examination of the role of gendered division of labour. Boserup (1970) showed that perception of productive labour as participation in the market discounts the value of women's domestic labour and obscures its contributions to economic welfare. Neoclassical economics suffers from an androcentric bias and is most resistant to integrating gender into its theories, models and policies. It is assumed that self-interested individualism motivates human's decisions in the market but does not motivate either men or women in the household: an assumption that idealises the family and legitimates gender inequality.

In neoclassical economics, the household is an entity of unified interests, with the head of the household assumed to be an altruist. Only the action of the head is analysed, all others disappear. This treatment of the family reflects the theoretical dichotomy between the private and the public. Rationality, objectivity and freedom are associated with the public sphere, emotion, subjectivity and necessary obligation with the private sphere. This distinction has a long history in the Western liberal tradition. The association of women with family is still deeply embedded in our culture and remains a foundation of contemporary gender distinctions. This dualism both separates and privileges the market over other spheres of life (Jennings 1995).

Institutionalism and feminism meet where they draw similar conclusions on the continuity of culture, the problems and hierarchies created by dualistic constructions and the importance of historical accounts (Waller and Jennings 1992). Feminist institutionalists challenge the very definition of “economic pursuits”, the cultural interpretations that prioritize “the economic” and explore the historical origins of modern cultural beliefs and practices. They are especially interested in the gendered aspects of existing distinctions between “economic” and “noneconomic” pursuits. Jennings explains that “feminist institutionalism, which relies on a concept of culture that unifies social habits of thought and behaviour and rejects dualism, is concerned with the cultural manifestations of dualism in social compartmentalisations and social rankings” (1993:119). Feminist economics can broaden the understanding of economic processes and institutions by exploring the ways in which people’s economic opportunities, choices and constraints are influenced by the multiple and often contradictory social locations they occupy.

## ***2.2. Feminist constructivism and the institutional nature of gender***

Building on the general ideas of social constructivism discussed above, Ferber and Nelson (1993) develop the central ideas and vocabulary of a feminist constructivist view on economics and gender. As already mentioned, gender is the social meaning given to biological differences and refers to cultural constructs. The characteristics traditionally attributed to either men or women are more general human characteristics and their identification as “feminine” or “masculine” is a matter of social belief. Patterns of gender attribution are subject to considerable historical and cross-cultural variation. Accordingly, the simple equation of biological men with constructions of masculinity is “essentialism” – the mistaken belief that certain traits are natural essences instead of being socially constructed. Consequently, gender is not simply “pertaining to women”. It is androcentric to consider attributes traditionally associated with men as “human”, “neutral” and “universal”, while those traits associated with women are marked by the “contamination” of gender. The powerful myths of masculinity and their privileging of masculine ideals are seen, from this perspective, as being based on the unjust and damaging disregard of qualities perceived as feminine.

The institutional nature of gender is central to Zein-Elabdin (1996), discussing analytical approaches to gender and the environment. She proposes the consideration of gender specification as referring to the social designation of each individual to a particular gender

and the historically and culturally circumscribed economic and social roles contingent upon that designation. She warns that overlooking the institutional nature of gender obscures its economic significance, its path dependency, and its resistance to change. It also obscures power implications, thereby depriving the issue of gender of one of its most important elements. She rather views the institutional perspective as being capable of integrating gender as a subject of study in economics and of bringing forth its full economic, political and cultural significance.

Zein-Elabdin (1996) defines gender specification as a collection of historically and culturally determined habits of thought, economic systems the actual processes of provisioning and material satisfaction. In terms of its economic and political significance and implications, the institutional approach apportions equal importance to gender specification as to other institutions, including markets. As an institution, gender specification in any particular society defines distinctive roles for men and women in production, as it also determines their relative shares in the resulting output. Given that production and distribution are the primary functions of all economic systems, gender specification becomes fundamental rather than incidental.

Further, Zein-Elabdin questions the understanding of institutions as incentive structures for society and the dominant assumption and focus on efficient decisions made by individuals, responding uniformly to stimuli. Accordingly, the New Institutional Economics approach appears to miss the cultural idiosyncrasies and path dependencies of institutions and the nature of institutions as habits of thought. The problem, then, is rather identifying and understanding actual institutions and economic processes that lead to gender-specific attitudes and actions within different historical and cultural confines. Conceptualising the institutional nature of gender brings to light gender specification as a limiting factor for men as well as women and unmask the political underpinnings of gender issues. A feminist institutional analysis thus reveals the power structures that privilege many men over many women and the political interests standing in the way of a redefinition of power relations and wealth distribution.

### ***2.3. Power and gendered institutions***

With an focus on power, Kenny (2007) explores the possibilities of interchange between feminist gender analysis and new institutional theory for analysing the ways in which political institutions reflect, structure and reinforce gendered patterns of power (Kenney 1996) in order

to unveil how seemingly neutral institutional processes and practices are in fact gendered. Questions of institutional change are closely linked to power, conceptualised from either a functionalist or path-dependent perspective. While functionalists attribute change to the functions institutions perform for powerful actors, the idea of path-dependency stresses the history of an institution determining or restricting further developments.

Skocpol (1992) highlights the role of power in stabilising or changing institutions. At the moment of its creation, an institution is reinforced through asymmetric power relations, privileging certain groups at the expense of others. At moments of institutional change the privileged reinforce and entrench their own position of power. She views such series of events as being historically contingent, so that institutions can also provide unintended opportunities for marginal groups to exercise power. Skocpol stresses the structures maintaining power and reinforcing positions, while agency comes to the forefront in critical moments of institutional change. However, institutional stability and change need to be understood as a dynamic and historical process. Thelen (2004) argues that institutional creation and change takes place in historical situations of multiple, shifting interests and alliances. Analysis should thus concentrate on the identification of the elements in institutional arrangements that are up for renegotiation and the reasons for their amenability.

Kenny (2007) identifies the importance of power and the political for feminist and institutional analysis, as both perceive seemingly neutral processes as being charged with hidden norms and values, privileging certain groups over others. Both stress the historicity of power relations, pointing to the options of resistance and power reversal. Their joint contribution to the debate on power is the understanding of “standard operating procedures” (Kenny 2007:95) in explaining institutional resistance to change, revealing the institutionalised repertoire which suggests what is appropriate behaviour for a certain individual in a particular setting. Connecting gender, institutions and power establishes gender as a crucial dimension in the study of how gender norms operate within institutions. Vice versa, power becomes a central analytical focus in the analysis of institutions in order to describe and understand how institutions embody certain sets of gendered power relations.

### **3. Gender norms as asymmetric institutions: Economic and social norms in West Africa**

Treating gender as an institution increases awareness of its fundamentally social nature and opens up links between diverse kinds of theoretical and empirical work, making gender's invisible dynamics and complex intersections with other institutions more apparent and subject to critical analysis and change (Yancey Martin 2004). In the following, I draw on empirical case studies from West Africa, specifically the work of van Staveren and Odebode (2007) on asymmetric and symmetric institutions among the Yoruba in Nigeria, to illustrate the intersection of gender and institutional analysis. I add to their findings through a comparative case study of the Kusasi and Dagomba in Northern Ghana that contextualises the family and economic norms, as well as non-material sources, grounding male status. Further, I show that the gender specifications of “biographical mobility” and “compulsory residence” frame and limit economic opportunities for women.

Van Starveren & Odebode characterise institutions as “durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions in society either similarly, differently or unequally for different groups in society” (2007: 910). Harriss-White (2000) proposes that exchange processes are constituted by, and constitute in turn, a wide set of social institutions: state, locality, ethnic group, caste, religion, kin, age and gender. Gender norms may be regarded as an institution; the specific expression of such norms is often mediated through other institutions, resulting in a complex, layered set of institutions, such as the labour market, the firm, property rights, tax systems or public services. Such institutions become “bearers of gender” (Elson 1999).

#### ***3.1. The Yoruba of Nigeria: Asymmetric and symmetric institutions***

The strength of sociological thinking about institutions is its ability to recognize asymmetries at the levels of structure, identity and symbolic meaning. Yancey Martin (2004: 1249-73) identifies five features of asymmetric institutions: (1) both constrain and facilitate behaviour by group members; (2) are characterized by particular expectations, rules and procedures; (3) are internalised by group members as identities; (4) have a legitimating ideology; and (5) are organised in accord with and permeated by power. This results in gender being a complex, multi-dimensional institution, shaped unequally for men and women, with men generally

benefiting more than women in terms of access to and control over resources, household division of labour, distribution of rewards and decision making power.

A particularly important institution is the household: a gendered institution that, at the same time, mediates other institutions. Goetz (1997) perceives the household to be the primary institution through which women's entitlements and capabilities are distorted so as to undermine their capacity to manage transactions to their advantage in other institutions. But households are not by definition gendered and, hence, asymmetric. In developing countries, the household is a rather fluid concept, encompassing a wide variety of types (e.g., extended, with in and out migration, and multiple households in polygamous marriages). There are complex differences between what constitutes a household and a family. Income-pooling among family members, for example, is a contested requirement for an institution to qualify as a household, since often individual income-streams are kept separate in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A case study by van Straveren and Odebode (2007) on Yoruba women in Nigeria, which I summarize here, provides an excellent analysis of gender norms as institutions, marking a pronounced distinction between institutions that have symmetric and asymmetric effects. Gender norms are an asymmetric institutional setting for men and women, even when norms about women's labour force participation, individual control over income and partners' contribution to household budget are symmetric.

Yoruba women in Nigeria have strong patrilineal kinship ties within an extended, partilocal family system, where women "belong" almost as property to men, rather than acting as equals. An observed paradox, however, is that Yoruba women are better educated and contribute more often to household expenditures compared to those of other ethnic groups; yet, at the same time, their decision making power is lower. Yoruban economic norms centre on financial independence: Partners are expected to earn income and contribute to household income, maintaining direct control over individual income by non-pooling. The non-pooling of incomes seems to offer a form of protection against male rent-seeking behaviour or appropriation of earnings and assets by men to support other wives and children or to get married; the economic norm does not rest on moral values of independence, equality and responsibility. The norm appears to be symmetric, since they do not differentiate between men and women and clearly find support among women.

In contrast, Yoruban familial norms are clearly asymmetric: marriage norms, in particular concerning property, inheritance, polygamy, and child custody, benefit

men/fathers/sons over women/mothers/daughters, and division of labour norms assign most of the unpaid work to women. Familial norms clearly favour men, who can marry up to four wives, inherit property without needing to share with their sisters, have automatic child custody, and hardly share in domestic work and childcare. The gendered ideology backing these norms keeps male-female power differences firmly in place.

The interaction between symmetric and asymmetric norms explains why, although there are strong economic norms and practices cultivating financial interdependence between men and women, Yoruban women have such low decision-making power in the household. The symmetric and asymmetric norms should not, however, be regarded as competing with each other; they are rather interdependent. Interaction between the symmetric and asymmetric – gendered – norms within the household makes the household as an institution a bearer of asymmetric gender norms, turning the possibly equal effects of the symmetric norms into unequal outcomes. The paradox here may be traced along the following chain: Men have a higher earning capacity than women. This is backed up by male property rights to land, house and household assets, and Yoruban ideals regarding the head of household give strong symbolic meaning to male status. The father's right to child custody likely spurs women to prevent separation by contributing even more rather than less to the household budget in order to remain with their children and finance their needs. The norm of non-pooling allows men to hide how much they earn and, hence, inhibit women's claims on their income. On the surface the Yoruban norms signify relations of equality, but in practice they result in gendered inequities.

Van Staveren and Odebode (2007) suggest that marking the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric norms enables a more detailed and nuanced kind of institutional analysis. Symmetric norms have unequal effects because they are dominated by asymmetric norms protecting and providing socio-economic advantages for men. Institutions of gender equality in one sphere of life will not necessarily be able to compensate for asymmetric institutions in others. In this case, symmetric economic norms do not help to support gender equality in a context in which laws and customs discriminate against women. A gender-institutional approach understands the use of bargaining power as male free-riding on symmetric economic norms, enabled by an asymmetric institutional context. Consequently, a focus on the wider institutional context of family law, property rights and non-material sources of masculine status is needed.

### ***3.2. Economic and social institutions in Northern Ghana***

All over Sub-Saharan Africa, women can be seen carrying heavy loads on their heads, while men use bicycles or donkeys for transport (Streiffeler 1994: 66). The perception of women's duty and their nature being to carry things is a deeply ingrained norm and requires deconstruction to be revealed as an essentialist construct. It is certainly one possible activity for women to carry goods on their heads, but not an essential trait of their being. Building on the above literature review and discussion, based on my own fieldwork in Ghana, West Africa (Padmanabhan 2002), I now look in a more detailed manner into two cases of institutional environments and their familial norms, economic norms like property rights and gendered status creation that enable the (re)production of such essentialism. Delineating the constructions of gender among the ethnic Kusasi and Dagomba groups, by focussing on specific constructions of gender and their consequences for economic acting, I demonstrate how feminist institutional analysis can unravel the deeply embedded gendered structure of economic provisioning and make the seemingly "natural state" of gender relations visible as socially created institutional arrangements.

In West Africa, households undergo changes in the course of a dynamic household cycle, but with different implications for men and women. The Kusasi and the Dagomba live in the Northern part of Ghana and maintain distinct, gendered institutions regarding wealth accumulation and the foundation and dissolving of households. In the following, I provide a comparative analysis of the institutional contexts of both ethnic groups with respect to their central, but distinctive, property rights institutions, specifically focusing on bridewealth in Dagbon and bride-price among the Kusasi.

The gender specification in both ethnic groups assigns men the social responsibility of providing staple foods for their households, usually by growing starchy crops like yams, millet and maize, while women provide for the soup ingredients and the processing to turn staples into palatable dishes. Households are polygamous and patrilocal; compounds are inherited by sons and wives move into their husband's house. In cases of divorce, child custody lies with the father; small children will stay with the mother, but return to the father's compound when grown older.

#### **4. The gender specification of the Kusasi of Ghana: Compulsory residence**

The Kusasi are one ethnic group inhabiting the administrative Upper-East Region in Ghana. They are sedentary agriculturalists, cultivating millet and cash crops, such as onions and other vegetables, besides rearing cattle and small ruminants in the Sudan savannah. Historically, they are an archepalous ethnic group, with flat hierarchies and a decentralised decision-making unit of male elders. In the modern Ghanaian state, they have gained access to the House of Chiefs at the national level. The central feature structuring gender relations is the bride-price necessary to arrange a marriage. The exchange of cattle and other animals between the groom and the father-in-law to settle the marriage alliance is an institution with manifold consequences on family and economic norms:

- 1) The ability to pay the bride-price improves men's status. The necessity of young men to accumulate wealth for their marriage is supported by institutional control over productive assets.
- 2) Familial norms support the conjugal contract in order to increase the stability of the marriage alliance so as to avoid repayment of the bride-price in incident of divorce.
- 3) Economic norms privilege men over women in production and distribution. The bride-price excludes women institutionally from lines of accumulation between men.

The bride-price and both families' interest in sustaining the conjugal contract results in an institutionalised "compulsory residence" for Kusasi women. The normative pressure to carry on with a marriage and avoid the humiliating repayment forces women to stay in their husbands compound. Moreover, as their bridewealth consists only of a ritual calabash, they are faced with asymmetric economic institutions that make separation more risky for them. Although women engage in petty trade, food processing or agriculture to fulfil their economic responsibility for providing soup-ingredients, Kusai economic norms guarantee men's access to communally held land and, historically, a monopoly on staple food cultivation, now being transferred to lucrative cash crops (Padmanabhan 2007). The masculine status of the breadwinner is accentuated by religious rituals accompanying the husband's funeral, when the

widow is allowed to take her first and only look into the compound's millet barn, and act as a non-material source of status.

Gender specification among the Kusasi results in economic norms that naturalises women's exclusion from accumulation lines and induce compulsory residence through familial norms. This institutional arrangement legitimises the by-passing of women concerning issues of access to productive assets and is reinforced by the ideology of the male breadwinner.

#### ***4.1. The gender specification of the Dagomba of Ghana: Biographical mobility***

For a comparative case, we now turn to the Dagomba ethnic group, residing in the administrative Northern Region of Ghana. In the Guinea savannah they cultivate yams and maize along with beans and women collect sheanuts to produce the highly sought-after vegetable fat, sheabutter. Under a hierarchical governance structure of male chiefs and subchiefs the Dagomba live in ethnically homogenous villages. The lifelong "biographical mobility" of women is constitutive of gender specification, as they may move in and out of households according to marital status, along with movable private possessions, endowed as bridewealth. Economic and familial norms interact to produce gendered outcomes through symmetric and asymmetric institutions:

1. Men's status is linked to the patrilocal site of the house and subsequent access to land. Their authority in spiritual matters is a non-material source of status.
2. The institution of "maternity leave" (*dwanka*) stresses women's independent income streams, their possible biographical mobility and familial norms reinforce accumulation of bridewealth.
3. The symmetric economic norms of the independently productive women are contingent and can be threatened by accusations of witchcraft.

The lifelong "biographical mobility" of women is constitutive of gender specifications in these patrilocal and mostly polygamous households. In contrast to the Kusais, Dagomba women marry with a bridewealth as their private property when entering or leaving a husband's compound. The amount of cola-nuts donated to the bride's father by the groom is a

primarily symbolic gesture of respect. The institution of maternity leave (*dwanka*) requests the young wife after the birth of each of her first two children to return to her father's house until the child is able to walk. This is a period for women to accumulate bridewealth by engaging in trade and sheabutter production. Engagement in the cultivation of their own fields during this time is a rather new phenomenon and depends on indirect access to land (Padmanabhan 2007). After the leave is over, the woman will return to her husband's compound to claim the status of a "cooking wife", with a room of her own and the responsibilities of providing soup-ingredients and preparing meals for the whole compound (Oppong 1973).

This biographical mobility may continue throughout her life, as she may return to her natal home in case of divorce or at menopause. Thus the bridewealth, including utensils for income-generating activities, is an institutionalised back-bone supporting her economic activities in all households. Nevertheless, economically successful and socially independent women are threatened by the lingering possibility of accusations of witchcraft often by young men. This strong cultural pattern is easily evoked to keep women at bay if they are deemed to be transgressing gendered economic norms. A witch hunt can lead to being banned from the village or even lynching. At the same time, male soothsayers have a high status and occupy powerful positions from which they contribute to sanctioning and regulating the institutional options for women's economic and social behaviour.

## **5. Conclusion: Mutual strengthening of analytical rigour**

The comparative case study of economic and familial norms in Nigeria and Ghana as symmetric and asymmetric institutions demonstrates the analytical potential of understanding the social construction of gender and its intersection with other institutions. The empirical cases of gender specification with respect to male and female status, economic and familial norms in northern Ghana show how the interaction of asymmetric and symmetric institutions enable and constrain the economic behaviour of women. The gender specification of compulsory residence for Kusasi women is a reflection of familial norms for achieving stable marriage contracts – at the expense of female control of central agricultural production factors, like land – is supported by the ideology of the off-limits barn of the male breadwinner. Biographical mobility, as the Dagomba form of gender specification, reflects familial norms of frequent divorce, expressed in terms of the movable bridewealth of

women's property. Economic norms allow for female participation in the sheabutter economy, while social and economic independence is controlled by the coercive power of witchcraft accusations. A feminist institutional analysis can help to unpack such environments that enable and constrain both men and women in similar or unequal fashion. This paper has looked at the ability of institutional analysis to conceptualise gender. Based on the common understanding of institutions as social constructions, it seems that Classical Institutional Economics *can* contribute to more rigorous investigation of the power dimension in gendered processes of economic provisioning.

## **References**

- Abbott, Andrew (1988) *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Barker, Drucilla K. (1999) Gender. In Peterson, Janice & Margret Lewis (eds.) *The Elgar Companion to Feminist Economics*. 390-396.
- Beckmann, Volker & Martina, Padmanabhan (2009) (eds.) *Institutions and Sustainability. Political Economy of Agriculture and teh Environment*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Berger, Peter & Thomas, Luckmann (1967) *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Penguin.
- Blumer, Herbert (1969) *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Bordo, Susan (1987) *The Flight of Objectivity*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Boserup, Ester (1970) *Women's Role in Economic Development*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bromley, Daniel (1989) *Economic Interest and Institutions. The Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Bromley, Daniel (1991) *Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Coase, Ronald (1960) The Problem of Social Cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*. 3.1-44.
- Commons, John (1931) Institutional Economics. *The American Economic Review*, 26 (1), 237-249.
- DiMaggio, Paul & Walter Powell (1991) *The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Elson, Diane (1999) Labour Markets as Gendered Institutions. *World Development* 27 (3) 611-627.
- Ferber, Marianne A. & Julie A. Nelson (1993) Introduction: The Social Construction of Economics and the Social Construction of Gender, in Ferber, Marianne A. & Julie A. Nelson (eds) *Beyond Economic Man. Feminist Theory and Economics*. 1-22.

- Goetz, Anne Marie (1997) *Getting Institutions Right for Women in Development*. London: Zed Books.
- Hagedorn, Konrad (2008) Particular requirements for institutional analysis in nature-related sectors. *European Review of Agricultural Economics* 35, 357-384.
- Hall, Peter & Rosemary Taylor (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. *Political Studies* 44, 936-957.
- Harding, Sandra (1986) *The Science Question in Feminism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Harriss-White, Barbara (2000) Taking Gender: Social Institutions as Regulators of Markets. In: van Tilburg, Aad, Henk Moll & Arie Kuyvenhoven (eds.) *Agricultural Markets beyond liberalisation*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey (1984) *The Democratic Economy*. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey (1988) *Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey (1999) *Evolution and Institutions: On Evolutionary Economics*. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey (2004) *The Evolution of Institutional Economics. Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism*. London: Routledge.
- Jennings, Ann L. (1993) Public or Private? Institutional Economics and Feminism. In Ferber, Marianne A. & Julie A. Nelson (eds) *Beyond Economic Man. Feminist Theory and Economics*. 111-129.
- Katz, Elizabeth (1997) The Intra-Household Economics of Voice and Exit. *Feminist Economics* 3 (3) 25-46.
- Kenney, Sally (1996) New Research on Gendered Political Institutions. *Political Research Quarterly* 49, 445-466.
- Kenny, Meryl (2007) Gender, Institutions and Power: A Critical Review. *Politics* 27 (2), 91-100.
- Knorr Cetina, Karin D. (1981) *The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

- Knorr Cetina, Karin D. (1999) *Epistemic Cultures. How the Sciences Make Knowledge*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Longino, Helen (1990) *Essential Tensions – Phase Two: Feminist, Philosophical, and Social Studies of Science*. In: McMullin, Ernan: *Social Dimension of Science*. South Bend: Notre Dame University Press.
- March, James & Johan Olsen (1989) *Rediscovering Institutions*. New York: Free Press.
- Mayhew, Ann (1999) *Institutional Economics*. in Peterson, Janice & Margret Lewis (eds.) *The Elgar Companion to Feminist Economics*. 479-486.
- Mellor, Mary (1997) *Women, Nature and the Social Construction of ‘Economic Man’*. *Ecological Economics* 20, 129-140.
- Nicholson, Linda (1986) *Gender and History*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- North, Douglas (1981) *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Oppong, Christine (1973) *Growing up in Dagbon*. Accra: Ghana Publishing Cooperation.
- Padmanabhan, Martina (2002) *Trying to grow. Gender Relations and Agricultural Innovations in Northern Ghana*. Münster: Lit.
- Padmanabhan, Martina (2007) *The Making and Unmaking of Gendered crops in Northern Ghana*. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*. 28 (1), 57-70.
- Polanyi, Karl (1957) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economical Origins of our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Rutherford, Malcolm (1994) *Institutions in Economics. The Old and the New Institutionalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Schmid, Alan (1987) *Property, Power and Public Choice. An Inquiry into Law and Economics*. New York: Praeger.
- Skocpol, Theda (1992) *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Steinmo, Sven (1993) *Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Streffeler, Friedhelm (1994) State Substitution and Market Liberalization in Northern Kivu, Zaire. *Sociologia Ruralis* 34 (1), 63–70.
- Thelen, Kathleen. (2004) *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Straveren, Irene & Olasunbo Odebode (2007) Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions: a Case Study of Yoruba Women in Nigeria. *Journal of Economic Issues* 41 (4). 903-926.
- Vatn, Arild (2005) *Institutions and the Environment*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Veblen, Thorstein (1899) *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions*. New York: Macmillan.
- von Winterfeld, Uta (2006) *Naturpatriarchen: Geburt und Dilemma der Naturbeherrschung bei geistigen Vätern der Neuzeit*. München: Oekom.
- Walby, Sylvia (1990) *Theorising Patriarchy*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Waller, William & Ann Jennings (1990) On the possibility of a Feminist Economics: The Convergence of Institutional and Feminist Methodology. *Journal of Economic Issues* 24: 613-22.
- Weingast, Barry R. and William Marshall (1988) The Industrial Organization of Congress. *Journal of Political Economy* 96: 132-63.
- Williamson, Oliver (1975) *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications*. New York: Free Press.
- Yancey Martin, Patricia (2004) Gender as Social Institution. *Social Forces* 82 (4). 1249-73.
- Zein-Elabdin, Eiman (1996) Development, Gender, and the Environment: Theoretical or Contextual Links? Toward an Institutional Analysis of Gender. In *Journal of Economic Issues* 30 (4) 12, 929-47.

# Universität Leipzig

## Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Nr. 1	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Stock Options wegen oder gegen Shareholder Value? Vergütungsmodelle für Vorstände und Führungskräfte 04/1998
Nr. 2	Thomas Lenk / Volkmar Teichmann	Bei der Reform der Finanzverfassung die neuen Bundesländer nicht vergessen! 10/1998
Nr. 3	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Gedanken über Führen – Dienen – Verantworten 11/1998
Nr. 4	Kristin Wellner	Möglichkeiten und Grenzen kooperativer Standortgestaltung zur Revitalisierung von Innenstädten 12/1998
Nr. 5	Gerhardt Wolff	Brauchen wir eine weitere Internationalisierung der Betriebswirtschaftslehre? 01/1999
Nr. 6	Thomas Lenk / Friedrich Schneider	Zurück zu mehr Föderalismus: Ein Vorschlag zur Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der neuen Bundesländer 12/1998
Nr. 7	Thomas Lenk	Kooperativer Förderalismus – Wettbewerbsorientierter Förderalismus 03/1999
Nr. 8	Thomas Lenk / Andreas Mathes	EU – Osterweiterung – Finanzierbar? 03/1999
Nr. 9	Thomas Lenk / Volkmar Teichmann	Die fiskalischen Wirkungen verschiedener Forderungen zur Neugestaltung des Länderfinanzausgleichs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine empirische Analyse unter Einbeziehung der Normenkontrollanträge der Länder Baden-Württemberg, Bayern und Hessen sowie der Stellungnahmen verschiedener Bundesländer 09/1999
Nr. 10	Kai-Uwe Graw	Gedanken zur Entwicklung der Strukturen im Bereich der Wasserversorgung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen 10/1999
Nr. 11	Adolf Wagner	Materialien zur Konjunkturforschung 12/1999
Nr. 12	Anja Birke	Die Übertragung westdeutscher Institutionen auf die ostdeutsche Wirklichkeit – ein erfolg-versprechendes Zusammenspiel oder Aufdeckung systematischer Mängel? Ein empirischer Bericht für den kommunalen Finanzausgleich am Beispiel Sachsen 02/2000
Nr. 13	Rolf H. Hasse	Internationaler Kapitalverkehr in den letzten 40 Jahren – Wohlstandsmotor oder Krisenursache? 03/2000
Nr. 14	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Unternehmensführung (Corporate Governance) und Hauptversammlung 04/2000
Nr. 15	Adolf Wagner	Materialien zur Wachstumsforschung 03/2000
Nr. 16	Thomas Lenk / Anja Birke	Determinanten des kommunalen Gebührenaufkommens unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der neuen Bundesländer 04/2000
Nr. 17	Thomas Lenk	Finanzwirtschaftliche Auswirkungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichtsurteils zum Länderfinanzausgleich vom 11.11.1999 04/2000
Nr. 18	Dirk Büttel	Continuous linear utility for preferences on convex sets in normal real vector spaces 05/2000
Nr. 19	Stefan Dierkes / Stephanie Hanrath	Steuerung dezentraler Investitionsentscheidungen bei nutzungsabhängigem und nutzungsunabhängigem Verschleiß des Anlagenvermögens 06/2000
Nr. 20	Thomas Lenk / Andreas Mathes / Olaf Hirschfeld	Zur Trennung von Bundes- und Landeskompetenzen in der Finanzverfassung Deutschlands 07/2000
Nr. 21	Stefan Dierkes	Marktwerte, Kapitalkosten und Betafaktoren bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung 10/2000
Nr. 22	Thomas Lenk	Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships in Germany: Requirement for New Regulations? 03/2001
Nr. 23	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Stock Options – Aktuelle Fragen Besteuerung, Bewertung, Offenlegung 03/2001

Nr. 24	Thomas Lenk	Die „kleine Reform“ des Länderfinanzausgleichs als Nukleus für die „große Finanzverfassungs-reform“? 10/2001
Nr. 25	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Biotechnologie im Spannungsfeld von Menschenwürde, Forschung, Markt und Moral Wirtschaftsethik zwischen Beredsamkeit und Schweigen 11/2001
Nr. 26	Thomas Lenk	Finanzwirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Neuregelung des bundestaatlichen Finanzausgleichs – Eine allkoative und distributive Wirkungsanalyse für das Jahr 2005 11/2001
Nr. 27	Sören Bär	Grundzüge eines Tourismusmarketing, untersucht für den Südraum Leipzig 05/2002
Nr. 28	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex: Zuwahl (comply) oder Abwahl (explain)? 06/2002
Nr. 29	Adolf Wagner	Konjunkturtheorie, Globalisierung und Evolutionsökonomik 08/2002
Nr. 30	Adolf Wagner	Zur Profilbildung der Universitäten 08/2002
Nr. 31	Sabine Klinger / Jens Ulrich / Hans-Joachim Rudolph	Konjunktur als Determinante des Erdgasverbrauchs in der ostdeutschen Industrie? 10/2002
Nr. 32	Thomas Lenk / Anja Birke	The Measurement of Expenditure Needs in the Fiscal Equalization at the Local Level Empirical Evidence from German Municipalities 10/2002
Nr. 33	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Die Lust am Fliegen Eine Parabel auf viel Corporate Governance und wenig Unternehmensführung 11/2002
Nr. 34	Udo Hielscher	Wie reich waren die reichsten Amerikaner wirklich? (US-Vermögensbewertungsindex 1800 – 2000) 12/2002
Nr. 35	Uwe Haubold / Michael Nowak	Risikoanalyse für Langfrist-Investments Eine simulationsbasierte Studie 12/2002
Nr. 36	Thomas Lenk	Die Neuregelung des bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs auf Basis der Steuerschätzung Mai 2002 und einer aktualisierten Bevölkerungsstatistik 12/2002
Nr. 37	Uwe Haubold / Michael Nowak	Auswirkungen der Renditeverteilungsannahme auf Anlageentscheidungen Eine simulationsbasierte Studie 02/2003
Nr. 38	Wolfgang Bernhard	Corporate Governance Kodex für den Mittel-Stand? 06/2003
Nr. 39	Hermut Kormann	Familienunternehmen: Grundfragen mit finanzwirtschaftlichen Bezug 10/2003
Nr. 40	Matthias Folk	Launhardtsche Trichter 11/2003
Nr. 41	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Corporate Governance statt Unternehmensführung 11/2003
Nr. 42	Thomas Lenk / Karolina Kaiser	Das Prämienmodell im Länderfinanzausgleich – Anreiz- und Verteilungsmittelnwirkungen 11/2003
Nr. 43	Sabine Klinger	Die Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung des Haushaltsektors in einer Matrix 03/2004
Nr. 44	Thomas Lenk / Heide Köpping	Strategien zur Armutsbekämpfung und –vermeidung in Ostdeutschland: 05/2004
Nr. 45	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Sommernachtsfantasien Corporate Governance im Land der Träume. 07/2004
Nr. 46	Thomas Lenk / Karolina Kaiser	The Premium Model in the German Fiscal Equalization System 12/2004
Nr. 47	Thomas Lenk / Christine Falken	Komparative Analyse ausgewählter Indikatoren des Kommunalwirtschaftlichen Gesamt-ergebnisses 05/2005
Nr. 48	Michael Nowak / Stephan Barth	Immobilienanlagen im Portfolio institutioneller Investoren am Beispiel von Versicherungsunternehmen Auswirkungen auf die Risikosituation 08/2005

Nr. 49	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Familiengesellschaften – Quo Vadis? Vorsicht vor zu viel „Professionalisierung“ und Ver-Fremdung 11/2005
Nr. 50	Christian Milow	Der Griff des Staates nach dem Währungsgold 12/2005
Nr. 51	Anja Eichhorst / Karolina Kaiser	The Institutional Design of Bailouts and Its Role in Hardening Budget Constraints in Federations 03/2006
Nr. 52	Ullrich Heilemann / Nancy Beck	Die Mühen der Ebene – Regionale Wirtschaftsförderung in Leipzig 1991 bis 2004 08/2006
Nr. 53	Gunther Schnabl	Die Grenzen der monetären Integration in Europa 08/2006
Nr. 54	Hermut Kormann	Gibt es so etwas wie typisch mittelständige Strategien? 11/2006
Nr. 55	Wolfgang Bernhardt	(Miss-)Stimmung, Bestimmung und Mitbestimmung Zwischen Juristentag und Biedenkopf-Kommission 11/2006
Nr. 56	Ullrich Heilemann / Annika Blaschzik	Indicators and the German Business Cycle A Multivariate Perspective on Indicators of Ifo, OECD, and ZEW 01/2007
Nr. 57	Ullrich Heilemann	“The Soul of a new Machine” zu den Anfängen des RWI-Konjunkturmodells 12/2006
Nr. 58	Ullrich Heilemann / Roland Schuhr / Annika Blaschzik	Zur Evolution des deutschen Konjunkturzyklus 1958 bis 2004 Ergebnisse einer dynamischen Diskriminanzanalyse 01/2007
Nr. 59	Christine Falken / Mario Schmidt	Kameralistik versus Doppik Zur Informationsfunktion des alten und neuen Rechnungswesens der Kommunen Teil I: Einführende und Erläuternde Betrachtungen zum Systemwechsel im kommunalen Rechnungswesen 01/2007
Nr. 60	Christine Falken / Mario Schmidt	Kameralistik versus Doppik Zur Informationsfunktion des alten und neuen Rechnungswesens der Kommunen Teil II Bewertung der Informationsfunktion im Vergleich 01/2007
Nr. 61	Udo Hielscher	Monti della citta di firenze Innovative Finanzierungen im Zeitalter Der Medici. Wurzeln der modernen Finanzmärkte 03/2007
Nr. 62	Ullrich Heilemann / Stefan Wappler	Sachsen wächst anders Konjunkturelle, sektorale und regionale Bestimmungsgründe der Entwicklung der Bruttowertschöpfung 1992 bis 2006 07/2007
Nr. 63	Adolf Wagner	Regionalökonomik: Konvergierende oder divergierende Regionalentwicklungen 08/2007
Nr. 64	Ullrich Heilemann / Jens Ulrich	Good bye, Professir Phillips? Zum Wandel der Tariflohndeterminanten in der Bundesrepublik 1952 – 2004 08/2007
Nr. 65	Gunther Schnabl / Franziska Schobert	Monetary Policy Operations of Debtor Central Banks in MENA Countries 10/2007
Nr. 66	Andreas Schäfer / Simone Valente	Habit Formation, Dynastic Altruism, and Population Dynamics 11/2007
Nr. 67	Wolfgang Bernhardt	5 Jahre Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex Eine Erfolgsgeschichte? 01/2008
Nr. 68	Ullrich Heilemann / Jens Ulrich	Viel Lärm um wenig? Zur Empirie von Lohnformeln in der Bundesrepublik 01/2008
Nr. 69	Christian Groth / Karl-Josef Koch / Thomas M. Steger	When economic growth is less than exponential 02/2008
Nr. 70	Andreas Bohne / Linda Kochmann	Ökonomische Umweltbewertung und endogene Entwicklung peripherer Regionen Synthese einer Methodik und einer Theorie 02/2008
Nr. 71	Andreas Bohne / Linda Kochmann / Jan Slavik / Lenka Slaviková	Deutsch-tschechische Bibliographie Studien der kontingenten Bewertung in Mittel- und Osteuropa 06/2008

Nr. 72	Paul Lehmann / Christoph Schröter-Schlaack	Regulating Land Development with Tradable Permits: What Can We Learn from Air Pollution Control? 08/2008
Nr. 73	Ronald McKinnon / Gunther Schnabl	China's Exchange Rate Impasse and the Weak U.S. Dollar 10/2008
Nr. 74	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Managervergütungen in der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise Rückkehr zu (guter) Ordnung, (klugem) Maß und (vernünftigem) Ziel? 12/2008
Nr. 75	Maritz Schularick / Thomas M. Steger	Financial Integration, Investment, and Economic Growth: Evidence From Two Eras of Financial Globalization 12/2008
Nr. 76	Gunther Schnabl / Stephan Freitag	An Asymmetry Matrix in Global Current Accounts 01/2009
Nr. 77	Christina Ziegler	Testing Predictive Ability of Business Cycle Indicators for the Euro Area 01/2009
Nr. 78	Thomas Lenk / Oliver Rottmann / Florian F. Woitek	Public Corporate Governance in Public Enterprises Transparency in the Face of Divergent Positions of Interest 02/2009
Nr. 79	Thomas Steger / Lucas Bretschger	Globalization, the Volatility of Intermediate Goods Prices, and Economic Growth 02/2009
Nr. 80	Marcela Munoz Escobar / Robert Holländer	Institutional Sustainability of Payment for Watershed Ecosystem Services. Enabling conditions of institutional arrangement in watersheds 04/2009
Nr. 81	Robert Holländer / WU Chunyou / DUAN Ning	Sustainable Development of Industrial Parks 07/2009
Nr. 82	Georg Quaas	Realgrößen und Preisindizes im alten und im neuen VGR-System 10/2009
Nr. 83	Ulrich Heilemann / Hagen Findeis	Empirical Determination of Aggregate Demand and Supply Curves: The Example of the RWI Business Cycle Model 12/2009
Nr. 84	Gunther Schnabl / Andreas Hoffmann	The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas and Growth in Emerging Markets 03/2010
Nr. 85	Georg Quaas	Does the macroeconomic policy of the global economy's leader cause the worldwide asymmetry in current accounts? 03/2010
Nr. 86	Volker Grossmann / Thomas M. Steger / Timo Trimborn	Quantifying Optimal Growth Policy 06/2010
Nr. 87	Wolfgang Bernhardt	Corporate Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen? Eine Widerrede 06/2010
Nr. 88	Philipp Mandel / Bernd Süsmuth	A Re-Examination of the Role of Gender in Determining Digital Piracy Behavior 07/2010
Nr. 89	Philipp Mandel / Bernd Süsmuth	Size Matters. The Relevance and Hicksian Surplus of Agreeable College Class Size 07/2010
Nr. 90	Thomas Kohstall / Bernd Süsmuth	Cyclic Dynamics of Prevention Spending and Occupational Injuries in Germany: 1886-2009 07/2010
Nr. 91	Martina Padmanabhan	Gender and Institutional Analysis. A Feminist Approach to Economic and Social Norms 08/2010